Robust rational turnout

We show that equilibria of a class of participation games (Palfrey and Rosenthal in Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983; Journal of Public Economics 24(2):171–193, 1984) exhibit minimal heterogeneity of behavior so that players’ mixed strategies are summarized by at most two probabilities. We then establish that, except for a finite set of common costs of participation, these games are regular. Thus, equilibria of these voting games are robust to general payoff perturbations and survive in nearby games of incomplete information. Thanks to participants of the 2006 MPSA conference for comments on an early version.     

Mixture of Truthful–Untruthful Responses in Public Surveys

When sensitive issues are surveyed, collecting truthful data and obtaining reliable estimates of population parameters is a persistent problem in many fields of applied research mostly in sociological, economic, demographic, ecological and medical studies. In this context, and moving from the so‐called negative survey, we consider the problem of estimating the proportion of population units belonging to the categories of a sensitive variable when collected data are affected by measurement errors produced by untruthful responses. An extension of the negative survey approach is proposed herein in order to allow respondents to release a true response. The proposal rests on modelling the released data with a mixture of truthful and untruthful responses that allows researchers to obtain an estimate of the proportions as well as the probability of receiving the true response by implementing the EM‐algorithm. We describe the estimation procedure and carry out a simulation study to assess the performance of the EM estimates vis‐à‐vis certain benchmark values and the estimates obtained under the traditional data‐collection approach based on direct questioning that ignores the presence of misreporting due to untruthful responding. Simulation findings provide evidence on the accuracy of the estimates and permit us to appreciate the improvements that our approach can produce in public surveys, particularly in election opinion polls, when the hidden vote problem is present.     

Randomized response technique for two sensitive characteristics at the same time

In this paper we present a randomized response technique which can be used to estimate the proportion of individuals having two sensitive characteristics at the same time. The information obtained from this procedure can be used for weighting (post-stratification) purposes.     

Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games

Summary. We develop an index theory for the Stationary Subgame Perfect (SSP) equilibrium set in a class of n-player sequential bargaining games with probabilistic recognition rules. For games with oligarchic voting rules (a class that includes unanimity rule), we establish conditions on individual utilities that ensure that for almost all discount factors, the number of SSP equilibria is odd and the equilibrium correspondence lower-hemicontinuous. For games with general, monotonic voting rules, we show generic (in discount factors) determinacy of SSP equilibria under the restriction that the agreement space is of dimension one. For non-oligarchic voting rules and agreement spaces of higher finite dimension, we establish generic determinacy for the subset of SSP equilibria in pure strategies. The analysis also extends to the case of fixed delay costs. Lastly, we provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness of SSP equilibrium in oligarchic games.Received: 13 May 2004, Revised: 1 March 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C62, C72, C78.I thank John Duggan and participants of the 2003 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, the Political Economy Seminar at Northwestern University, and the Economic Theory seminar at the University of Rochester for helpful comments.     

Dynamic legislative policy making

We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities, and we assume preferences and the status quo are subject to arbitrarily small shocks. We prove that equilibrium continuation values are differentiable and that proposal strategies are continuous almost everywhere. We establish upper hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence, and we provide weak conditions under which each equilibrium of our model determines an aperiodic transition probability over policies. We establish a convergence theorem giving conditions under which the invariant distributions generated by stationary equilibria must be close to the core in a canonical spatial model. Finally, we extend the analysis to sequential move stochastic games and to a version of the model in which the proposer and voting rule are determined by play of a finite, perfect information game.     

A generalized randomized response technique

To eliminate a major source of bias in surveys of human populations resulting from respondents refusal to cooparate in cases where a question of sensitive nature is involved, the idea of “randomized response” was introduced by Warner (1965). In this paper, an alternative randomized response technique is presented which improves upon the pioneering work of Warner (1965). The procedure includes Warner's method as a special case for a specific choice of the parameters. In addition, a generalization of the proposed method is presented.