THE VALUE OF CLEANER AIR: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

Policymakers in the legislative and regulatory arenas face increasing public expectations that authorities will both promulgate and implement strict environmental programs. At the same time, the aggregate cost of such programs is rising and is impacting economic sectors previously untouched. In this context, a major study used an integrated interdisciplinary perspective to determine what economic benefits would result from air pollution controls. Specifically, the study developed estimates for the health benefits of reducing ozone and fine particulate matter concentrations in the nation's most polluted region—the South Coast Air Basin centering on Los Angeles. This paper presents the economic methodologies and results of that study. It also discusses how health and atmospheric sciences informed the economic assessment.     

Generalized Tâtonnement and the Solution of Economic Models*

The theoretical literature on tâtonnement processes leads to the conclusion that convergence is guaranteed only urrder fairly restrictive assumptions. Recently, however, large competitive equilibrium models have been successfully solved using algorithms inspired by tâtonnement processes .
This paper stresses the idea that a model builder has more freedom to set up the process than a theoretician, for whom only one assignment of prices to excess demand is reasonable; for computational purposes, any assignment is acceptable. The diagonal dominance criterion provides guidelines to set up such an assignment. It is used to show that even intractable examples of global instability can easily be solved .     

Monetary Targeting: The International Experience*

This paper examines the experience of nine industrial countries with monetary targeting. The paper suggests that monetary targets were adopted as a tactical response to a particular economic situation, not as monetary rules. Other objectives were given precedence over targets when thought desirable. Most countries changed the targeted aggregate, and two dropped targets altogether. While inflation fell in most countries, the extent to which this was due to the pursuit of monetary targets is unclear. The place of monetary aggregates in many countries now appears to be as one among a number of indicators considered by the authorities in the setting of monetary policy.     

ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS AND CIGARETTE SMOKING: EVIDENCE FROM MYOPIC AND RATIONAL ADDICTION MODELS

Because of the high social cost of cigarette smoking, many countries impose advertising restrictions to reduce cigarette consumption. Yet previous studies conclude that advertising constraints have been ineffective at reducing cigarette smoking. This conclusion is incorrect because it ignores the fact that advertising restrictions have supply as well as demand effects. The authors extend existing research by showing that advertising regulations, especially those found in the recent National Tobacco Settlement, have decreased the equilibrium level of cigarette consumption in the United States, a result that holds for both myopic and rational addiction models. (JEL L50, L66, M37 )     

Option Valuation with Systematic Stochastic Volatility

We use an extension of the equilibrium framework of Rubinstein ( 1976 ) and Brennan ( 1979 ) to derive an option valuation formula when the stock return volatility is both stochastic and systematic. Our formula incorporates a stochastic volatility process as well as a stochastic interest rate process in the valuation of options. If the “mean,” volatility, and “covariance” processes for the stock return and the consumption growth are predictable, our option valuation formula can be written in “preference-free” form. Further, many popular option valuation formulae in the literature can be written as special cases of our general formula.     

How Control System Design Influences Performance Misreporting

This paper investigates reporting honesty when managers have monetary incentives to overstate their performance. We argue that managers who report about their performance will take into account how their report affects their peers (i.e., other managers at the same hierarchical level). This effect depends on the design of the organization's control system, in particular, on the reward structure and the information policy regarding individual performance reports. The reward structure determines if peers’ monetary payoff is increased or decreased when managers claim a higher level of performance. The information policy determines if managers will be able to link individual peers to their reports and affects the nonmonetary costs of breaking social norms. We present the results of a laboratory experiment. As predicted, we find that participants are more likely to overstate their performance if this increases the monetary payoff of others than if their reported performance decreases others’ monetary gains. In addition, overstatements are lower under an open information policy, where each individual's reported performance is made public, compared to a closed information policy, where participants only learn the average performance of the other participants. Our findings have several important implications for management accounting research and practice.