Groves mechanisms and communication externalities

We put forward a model of private goods with externalities. Agents derive benefit from communicating with each other. In order to communicate they need to operate on a common platform. Adopting new platforms is costly. We first provide an algorithm that determines the efficient outcome. Then we prove that no individually rational and feasible Groves mechanism exists. We provide sufficient conditions that determine when an individually rational Groves mechanism runs a deficit and we characterize the individually rational Groves mechanism that minimizes such deficit whenever it occurs. Moreover, for 2-agent economies, we single out the only feasible and symmetrical Groves mechanism that is not Pareto dominated by another strategy-proof, feasible and symmetrical mechanism.     

A welfare evaluation of the 1986 tax reform for married couples in the United States

This paper evaluates the welfare effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA86). We rely on different welfare metrics, which fully retain preference heterogeneity and are based on different ethical priors. We estimate utility functions with preference heterogeneity on the basis of structural models of family labor supply. Then, using these estimated preferences, we compute and compare different well-being rankings corresponding to different ways of measuring well-being. Finally, we identify the losers and the winners of TRA86, in absolute and relative terms, for each of the welfare metrics.