A NOTE ON ARBITRAGE AND CLOSED CONVEX CONES

We give an example of a subspace K of     such that     , where     denotes the closure with respect to convergence in probablity. On the other hand, the cone   C ≔ K − L ^∞₊  is dense in   L ^∞  with respect to the weak-star topology  σ( L ^∞, L ¹)  . This example answers a question raised by I. Evstigneev. The topic is motivated by the relation of the notion of no arbitrage and the existence of martingale measures in Mathematical Finance.     

The Asset Management Industry in Asia: Dynamics of Growth,Structure, and Performance

We examine the industrial organization and institutional development of the asset management industry in Asian developing economies—specifically in China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand. We focus on the size and growth of the buy‐side of the respective financial markets, asset allocation, the regulatory environment, and the state of internationalization of the fund management industry in its key components—mutual funds, pension funds, and asset management for high net worth individuals. We link the evolution of professional asset management in these environments to the development of the respective capital markets and to the evolution of corporate governance. We find that the fund management industry occupies a very small niche in domestic financial systems that are dominated by banks. At the same time, we find that its growth has been very rapid in the early 2000s and we suggest that this is likely to persist as the demand for professional management of financial wealth in the region develops and as the pension fund sectors of the respective economies are liberalized to allow larger portions of assets to be invested in collective investment schemes.     

Choice of Distribution System in the New Zealand Life Insurance Industry

Using 1988–93 panel data drawn from the New Zealand life insurance industry, this paper examines empirically the notion that the choice of distribution system is an efficient contracting solution to incentive conflicts between owners, managers and sales agents in life insurance firms. Consistent with what was hypothesised, the empirical results suggest that choice of distribution system is distinguished by organisational form, firm size, and sales commission. However, contrary to expectations, the variables representing product diversity and asset specificity were found not to be statistically significant. The empirical results thus lend mixed support for prior predictions.     

Procedures for revising management judgments forecasts

Forecast improvement is often approached by attempting to find the “best” model for a given situation. Less attention has been paid to the possibility of examining past prediction errors for patterns that may suggest forecast adjustments for the future. This empirical study involves one firm’s management judgment forecasts for product sales and the attempts made to improve their accuracy by removing certain types of bias. In three of the five series examined, error reduction averaging close to thirty percent occurs as a result of the adjustment procedure. The other two series proved to be relatively free from bias and were therefore not in need of the correction method described.     

Building Small City and Town Sams and CGE Models

In this paper we attempt to describe both the data sources and organizational methods that allow for effective and easily created SAMs and regional computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Small cities of around 100,000 people will face very different constraints than a town of 2000 people. Unfortunately, most CGE models typically describe relatively large geographical areas and are therefore not able to capture the uniqueness of individual cities within the region. An illustrative example using these methods demonstrates that the economic impacts vary substantially over different municipalities to the same economic shock.     

Habilitation von Ralf Hohlfeld

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

A Critique of the Legal and Philosophical Case for Rent Control

Rent control is an economic abomination. It diverts investments away from residential rent units, it leads to their deterioration, it is responsible for urban decay such as in the South Bronx, it does not help poor tenants, it is a horrendous means of income redistribution. Yet this economic regulation is beloved of intellectuals (hot beds of pro rent control sentiment are Berkeley, Ann Arbor and Cambridge) particularly in the legal and philosophical communities. The present article is dedicated to an exploration and rejection of the arguments in behalf of rent control which emanate from this source.