Strategic behavior in financial markets

We describe a financial market as a noncooperative game in strategic form. Agents may borrow or deposit money at a central bank and use the cash available to them in order to purchase a commodity for immediate consumption. They derive positive utility from consumption and from having cash reserves at the end of the day, whereas being bankrupt entails negative utility. The bank fixes interest rates. The existence of Nash equilibria (both mixed and pure) of the ensuing game is proved under various assumptions. In particular, no agent is bankrupt at equilibrium. Asymptotic behavior of replica markets is discussed, and it is shown that given appropriate assumptions, the difference between a strategic player and a price taker is negligible in a large economy.     

The ALEP definition of complementarity and least concave utility functions

The use of least concave utility functions describing a given concavifiable preference relation is suggested for determining the complementary vis-à-vis substitute nature of a pair of commodities.     

Violation of the Law of Demand

Following the classic work of Mitjuschin, Polterovich and Milleron, necessary and sufficient as well as sufficient conditions have been developed for when the multicommodity Law of Demand holds. We show when the widely cited Mitjuschin and Polterovich sufficient condition also becomes necessary. Using this result, violation regions for the very popular Modified Bergson (or hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) class of utility functions are fully characterized in terms of preference parameters. For a natural extension of the constant elasticity of substitution member of the Modified Bergson family that is neither homothetic nor quasihomothetic, we create the first simple, explicit example of which we are aware that (i) fully characterizes violation regions in both the preference parameter and commodity spaces and (ii) analyzes the range of relative income and price changes within which violations occur.     

Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions

Concavifiable convex preference orderings are characterized and minimally concave utilities are constructed, using three different approaches. One involves the intersection of arbitrary lines with the three indifference surfaces, another involves conditions on the normals of two indifference surfaces and is related to the super-gradient map of a possible concave utility. In the third approach it is assumed that the ordering is induced by a twice-differentiable utility and Perror's integral of a certain expression formed from the derivatives is used. A possible economic interpretation of minimally concave utilities is suggested, and it is shown that one cannot select concave utilities so that they depend continuously on the ordering.     

Approximation of convex preferences

It is shown geometrically that a monotone concave preference order can be approximated by orders representable by a concave utility function. This is applied to proving that preferences with ‘desirable’ properties (such as inducing smooth excess demand functions, analyticity, strict convexity) are dense.     

Demand properties of concavifiable preferences

The purpose of the present paper is to clarify the relation between choice theory for individual consumers, i.e., the observed demand behavior, and the preference ordering ?$?$ of that individual. Specifically, we study how concavifiability (i.e., representability of ?$?$ by a concave utility function) is expressed by quantities (cross-coefficients) appearing in revealed preferences theory. We present a sequence of rather explicit necessary conditions for concavifiability. All these conditions are quantitative asymptotic strengthenings of the strong axiom of revealed preference. The results and concepts are illustrated by means of examples in which an expenditure data is defined by providing its generating utility function.     

Remarks concerning concave utility functions on finite sets

Summary. A direct construction of concave utility functions representing convex preferences on finite sets is presented. An alternative construction in which at first directions of supergradients (prices) are found, and then utility levels and lengths of those supergradients are computed, is exhibited as well. The concept of a least concave utility function is problematic in this context.Received: 28 November 2002, Revised: 28 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D11, C60.I am indebted to an anonymous referee, Marcel K. Richter and Kam-Chau Wong, for many valuable remarks and suggestions.