“Economics and Psychology”? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting*

The article questions the methodology of “economics and psychology” in its focus on the case of hyperbolic discounting. Using some experimental results, I argue that the same type of evidence, which rejects the standard constant discount utility functions, can just as easily reject hyperbolic discounting as well. Furthermore, a decision‐making procedure based on similarity relations better explains the observations and is more intuitive. The article concludes that combining “economics and psychology” requires opening the black box of decision makers instead of modifying functional forms.     

Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting

We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.     

Coping with Technological Change: The Role of Ability in Making Inequality so Persistent

This study provides an explanation to the evolution of wage inequality over the last 30 years and supports this explanation with evidence. A faster rate of technological progress introduces new unknown elements at the workplace. The need to cope with the unknown accentuates the role of ability and thus increases wage inequality within and between education groups. Inasmuch as education is an irreversible investment project the rise in within group inequality BOOSTS UP the rise of between group inequality. Guided by this theory we turn to the PSID for evidence. Using parents' education to approximate child's ability we show the following set of results: (a) Controlling for education of the child, parents' education contributed much more in the 1980s to his wage growth than in the 1970s. (b) The correlation between the parents' and the child's education increases from the 1970s to the 1980s. (c) The return to college education for an individual with no ability rents did not change—it remains steady at the 23 percent. (d) Facts (a)–(c) CANNOT be attributed to the impact of parent's income. It is parents' education and not parents' income that is more relevant for son's economic outcomes in the 1980s.     

Edgar Allan Poe's riddle: Framing effects in repeated matching pennies games

Framing effects have a significant influence on the finitely repeated matching pennies game. The combination of being labelled “a guesser,” and having the objective of matching the opponent's action, appears to be advantageous. We find that being a player who aims to match the opponent's action is advantageous irrespective of whether the player moves first or second. We examine alternative explanations for our results and relate them to Edgar Allan Poe's “The Purloined Letter.” We propose a behavioral model which generates the observed asymmetry in the players' performance.     

A note on the duty of disclosure

This letter studies the possibility of voluntary breach of contract in the presence of new information. If the information had to be disclosed prior to the agreement, it is shown by example that all individuals may be worse off than if the act of disclosure is itself voluntary.     

An aggregation theorem for securities markets

Alternative sets of sufficient conditions are developed under which equilibrium security rates of return are determined as if there exist only identical individuals whose resources, beliefs, and tastes are a composite of the actual individuals in the economy. These conditions include as special cases all those previously examined in the literature (including conditions sufficient to produce the two-parameter mean-variance model), as well as others. Whenever such a composite individual exists it is shown that (1) valuation equations take a specific form and contain only exogenous parameters of the economy; (2) market exchange arrangements are Pareto-optimal; and (3) competitive value-maximizing firms make completely specified Pareto-optimal production decisions both over dates and states. These results rely on the observation that under popular homogeneity assumptions regarding beliefs and tastes, even though the securities market may be incomplete, equilibrium rates of return are determined as if there were an otherwise similar Arrow-Debreu economy.