An experimental investigation of soft price caps in uniform price auction markets for wholesale electricity

This paper presents the results from an auction experiment using industry professionals and student participants who compete in a simulated wholesale market for electricity. Motivated by the intervention by FERC in response to the “meltdown” of the California spot market, we investigate the effect of including a “soft” price cap in a uniform price auction as a means of mitigating high prices. When prices are driven above the soft cap, offer curves become flat, in contrast to the hockey stick shape observed in a typical uniform price auction for electricity. This flat offer curve leads to market prices that are relatively insensitive to both generation costs and demand reductions.      

An Empirical Study of the Impact of CEO Characteristics on New Firms' Time to IPO*

An initial public offering (IPO) is one of the most critical events in the life of a firm. As the IPO market continues to attract attention from both entrepreneurs and investors, research examining the relationship between the firm's characteristics and its IPO performance is growing. In this paper, we use the upper echelon perspective to empirically examine the relationship between the firm's chief executive officer (CEO) and the firm's time to IPO, a relationship that has so far received little attention. Using data obtained from 237 IPOs in the U.S. software industry, we found that the CEO's prior executive experience, network, and age are significantly related to the new firm's time to IPO. This study extends the understanding of the important role of the CEO in the IPO and provides investors greater insight into those variables that influence the speed with which firms go public.     

Does Allowing the Bells to Offer InterLATA Long-Distance Service Affect Entry into Local Telephony?

Following the 1984 divestiture of AT&T, local telephone service was provided by several Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs). The RBOCs served as monopoly providers of local telephone service in their respective territories but were prohibited from offering long-distance service to their in-region subscribers. Section 271 of the landmark Telecommunications Act of 1996 allows an RBOC to offer in-region long-distance service if it demonstrates that the local telephone exchange market is open to competitive entry. This study empirically evaluates the efficacy of this policy by considering the impact of RBOC entry into long-distance on the development of competitive entry into local telephony. The results suggest that section 271 has been successful in promoting entry into local telephony. However, aggregate price data suggest that this entry has not been realized with lower rates for residential telephone subscribers.