Does the Commercialization of Voluntary Organizations ‘Crowd out’ Voluntary Work?

This article examines the relationship among voluntary labour supply and commercial income for Norwegian sport voluntary organizations. Empirical results using cross–sectional data on voluntary sport organizations in Norway and on their members show a decrease in voluntary work from an increase in commercial income. Voluntary work and commercial income appear as substitutable resources. Nevertheless, the results have to be differentiated according to the professional situation of the volunteers.
A crowding out effect between voluntary work and commercial resources is at play for non–professionally active individuals whereas professionally active individuals seem to be indifferent to the level of commercial resources in deciding whether to volunteer or not.     

Crop insurance policies and purchases in France

While many crop insurance systems have been reformed around the world, few academic researches have addressed the determinants of the decision on crop insurance at the farm's micro level. In this article, both the financial and the agricultural literature lead to the identification of many rationales for the crop insurance decision. Using data from the period 2003–2006 on a representative survey of French farms (FADN‐RICA), we investigate the different factors that incite farmers to insure against crop risk. We emphasize that the highest risk farms are more likely to have insurance and this decision is positively related to the past amount of claims. Insurance is subscribed by larger farms because insurance appears too expensive for smaller farms, which are indeed naturally less diversified. Interestingly, financial variables (such as capital structure or return on investment) do not significantly determine the insurance decision.     

Formes institutionnelles, rationalité axiologique et conventions

Resume Pour la théorie des coûts de transaction la firme est préférée au marché lorsque les coûts de transaction sont élevés. Si de ce point de vue le marché et la hiérarchie constituent deux formes institutionnelles alternatives de coordination des activités, il reste à expliquer pourquoi certaines organisations prennent la forme lucrative tandis que d'autres prennent la forme non lucrative ou publique. Les explications en termes de coûts de transaction et d'échecs du marché ont en commun de reposer sur une hypothèse de comportement, celle de l'acteur rationnel et égoïste. Or le comportement des acteurs ne peut se réduire à la rationalité instrumentale. L'objectif de cet article n'est pas de dénier la pertinence des approches traditionnelles en termes d'échecs du marché mais d'en limiter le champ d'application. La thèse qui est développée ici est qu'il existe un certain nombre d'activités qui n'ont pas une finalité instrumentale ou économique mais axiologique, bien que comportant une dimension économique, dont la mise en oeuvre requiert des formes institutionnelles et des structures de gouvernance qui sont adaptées à leurs finalités. Pour ces activités, le marché est en échec parce que la rationalité de ces activités lui est étrangère. Les formes non lucratives et publiques offrent une structure de gouvernance adaptée à l'exercice de la rationalité axiologique .     

How Norway’s sovereign wealth fund negative screening affects firms’ value and behaviour

This paper examines the impact of negative screening by responsible sovereign wealth funds on the value of excluded firms. We focus on the main sovereign wealth fund, the Government Pension Fund Global of Norway, which excluded 149 firms from its portfolio during the period 2006–2018. Using an event study methodology, we document a significant decrease in excluded firms’ stock prices. Moreover, we find that the nature of screening matters: norm‐based exclusions suffer from a significant and permanent decrease in their stock value, suggesting that market participants reacted to the Government Pension Fund Global of Norway exclusions. Overall, it can be asserted that the Norwegian fund has a strong signalling effect on financial markets, in terms of social and environmental information. We conclude that sovereign wealth funds could be used by governments as investment vehicles in order to promote responsible investments on a large scale.     

Coordination failure, property rights and non-profit organizations

This paper advances a socio-economic theory of nonprofit organizations aiming at conceiving this organizational form in its complexity and at analysing it from both the viewpoints of its economical and political (democratic) dimensions. This theoretical approach accounts for the existence of nonprofit organizations and the reasons why nonprofit organizations are relatively more efficient when compared with for-profit and government organizations in particular circumstances. The various current explanations of the existence of nonprofit organizations (contract failure, government failure, philanthropic failure) are regrouped around the concept of coordination failure. The paper then examines how nonprofit organizations are able to mitigate these coordination failures. The central thesis is that the specific distribution of property rights characterizing nonprofit organizations results in a particular type of governance structure which allows them to mitigate coordination failures. In turn, the ability of the organization to mitigate coordination failures and therefore its efficiency is conditioned on its democratic functioning.