A Real Options Model of Real Estate Development with Entitlement Risk

Most development projects encounter a highly uncertain entitlement process that is largely uncontrollable by developers. In this study, entitlement is modeled as a separate stage within a compound real option, where developers begin with minimal control (maximum risk) and each successful stage increases control (decreases risk). We solve the model analytically, provide three‐dimensional numerical comparisons, and empirically test the model's predictions using hand collected rezoning petitions. Our main result refines the classic development option model: developers first invest early (secure entitlements) in order to obtain the option to subsequently delay investment (construct the optimal building at the optimal time).     

Female Representation on Corporate Boards in Europe: The Interplay of Organizational Social Consciousness and Institutions

Journal of Business Ethics - We examine the role of alignment between organizational social consciousness and the informal and formal institutions of a country in increasing female representation...     

Foreign banks in Japan: A study of a Japanese deregulation process

The deregulation of foreign banks in Japan, although corresponding in broad outline to world-wide trends, has diverged substantially in many particulars from patterns seen elsewhere. It has tended to be excruciatingly slow and piecemeal and to have been of minimal benefit to foreign banks. A review of this process leads to the conclusion that these characteristics result from organisational and political-bureaucratic factors inherent to the Japanese style of government which is, in turn, partially a reflection of Japanese culture. Although these non-economic factors have influenced the specific pattern of change, its overall direction appears to have been consistent with the broader national interest.The authors wish to acknowledge financial support from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Florsheimer Center for Policy Studies, and the Krueger Center for Financial Research.     

Multinationals and changing national business systems in Europe: towards the ‘shareholder value’ model?

This article reviews recent development in employment relations in MNCs, within the context of the varied and changing business systems within Western Europe. Focusing on Germany, France, Sweden and the UK, we analyse both the effects of national corporate governance systems on MNCs, and the extent to which MNCs specifically, and globalisation more widely, have affected the nature of national business and employment systems. While elements of a move towards a more ‘Anglo‐Saxon’, economically liberal model of corporate governance and employment relations can be detected in all four countries, this is far from complete. Cross‐national differences in business systems within Europe therefore continue to exert effects upon MNCs.     

How Indonesian Lecturers have Adjusted to Civil Service Compensation

To compensate for low civil service incomes, most lecturers at Indonesia's public universities hold one or more other jobs. The career path of the typical lecturer is away from teaching: the higher the classification the greater is the number of outside jobs and the smaller is the time devoted to undergraduate teaching. In effect, public universities cannot now compete for the time of their lecturers. Indonesia has been attempting to increase the quality of undergraduate education by investing in further education of lecturers. Our findings show that such efforts will be futile unless concomitant changes are also made on the demand side.     

Pricing the Cost of Expropriation Risk

The paper examines a firm's cost of expropriation risk in a framework that links it to the government's incentive to expropriate. The author develops a pricing model for the firm's cost of expropriation risk that includes the positions of both government and firm. The government's decision to expropriate is modeled as an American-style call option. The cost of expropriation risk is modeled as the value of an insurance policy that pays off all losses resulting from expropriation. The firm's cost of expropriation risk is determined by the government acting to optimize the value of its option to expropriate. The author identifies the parameters that link the government's option to expropriate to the firm's cost of expropriation risk, and shows how the model can be used in capital budgeting decisions and the ongoing management of expropriation risk.