Public policies as specification errors

Treating public policies as computable dynamic general equilibrium model specification errors offers computational and conceptional advantages for comparing models with data. The set of policies calculated to rationalize observed behaviors raises the substantive economic question whether, in any particular market, actual public policies sufficiently coincide with the model's behavior-rationalizing policies, or whether the model offers correct hypotheses about the determinants of demand and supply. As illustrations, public policies are calculated to rationalize, with respect to the stochastic neoclassical growth model, capital market behavior since WWII and labor market behavior in 1929–1950. One conclusion is that capital taxation drives a wedge between consumption growth and the expected pre-tax capital return, in the direction and amount predicted by the theory, and that capital taxation is the major intertemporal distortion in the postwar capital market. Second, a good theory of the Great Depression labor market must explain why measured MRS and MPL diverged so dramatically in 1929–1933 and why the wedge persisted.     

Foreign Manufacturing Multinationals and the Transformation of the Chinese Econom,

1 The argument in brief China became the world＇s largest destination for foreign direct investment （FDI）, almost all of which is FDI in manufacturing and assembly, in 2003, before falling back into a...     

Any complaints? A review of the framework of self-regulation in the Australian advertising industry

Prior to 1996, the Australian system of advertising self-regulation was regarded as a world model and many Asia-Pacific systems included components adapted from the Australian system. The recent changes to this system, encouraged by the abolition of the media accreditation system, consumer association pressure, criticism from the national advertisers association and the lack of a strong advertising agency presence, present an interesting framework in which to review the foundation concepts of self-regulation in advertising. This paper compares the new code of ethics with its predecessor and an international standard. It examines the performance of the code in terms of the number of complaints upheld and complaint by medium and product type and the voluntary response of advertisers. The findings suggest a weakening in the standard of advertising self-regulation in Australia, with fewer provisions in the Code of Ethics, a significantly fewer number of complaints upheld and no real power of enforcement. Although the case is Australian, it raises universal questions such as the vested interest of advertisers in controlling the process and roles of the consumer association, the media and the advertising agencies in guaranteeing the privilege of self-regulation.     

Everybody wins? A discourse analysis of competing stakeholder expectations in Social Impact Bonds

ABSTRACT

This paper explores how diverse stakeholders frame their expectations of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs). Using discourse analysis, the authors examine competing expectations in SIB press releases, showing how they differ between stakeholders, between institutional contexts, and how they evolve over time. The paper highlights how the prioritization of social finance and collaboration discourses privileges the role of private investors, which in turn diminishes the role of service providers as innovators.     

Hardening soft accounting information: Games for planning organizational change

This study provides theory and field evidence on the social process of hardening soft accounting information to make it persuasive for planning organizational change. Accounting information intended to support organizational change is often soft, that is, there is lack of interpersonal agreement about its quality. For example, employees can lack agreement about the quality of accounting information (e.g., activity-based costing) because the information is constructed from subjective information obtained from interviews and surveys. This information can contain unintentional errors as well as intentional distortions that are intended to avoid revealing embarrassing inefficiencies and/or to resist painful organizational change. We use concepts from applied game theory and social psychology to identify from the accounting literature four multi-person games that may be played to harden soft accounting information. These hardening games are characterized in terms of payoffs, players, the comparability of soft accounting information, and the rules of the games that are expected to emerge. We interpret the field evidence as indicating that the hardening games that emerge depend on who the players are and the comparability of their soft accounting information. In addition, we provide evidence on how the rules of the games that harden the information emerge from the players’ social interactions. Finally, we provide evidence on how an organization learns by trial-and-error how to harden soft accounting information by changing the players and the comparability of the soft accounting information.