Costless discrimination and unequal achievements in an experimental tournament

We investigate the emergence of discrimination in an experiment where individuals affiliated to different groups compete for a monetary prize, submitting independent bids to an auctioneer. The auctioneer receives perfect information about the bids (there is no statistical discrimination), and she has no monetary incentive to favor the members of her own group (the bidders are symmetric). We observe nonetheless some discrimination by auctioneers, who tend to assign the prize more frequently to a member of their own group when two or more players put forward the highest bid. Out-group bidders react to this bias and reduce significantly their bids, causing an average decay of their earnings throughout the game, with cumulative effects that generate unequal outcomes. Because the initial bias is costless, such mechanism can survive even in a competitive market, providing a rationale for the long-run persistence of discrimination.     

Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments

We explore by purely experimental means a heterogeneous agents scenario in experimental public goods games, assuming the existence of at least three types of player: free riders, cooperators, and reciprocators. We identify the various types by means of four classification methods, and then play the public goods game with homogeneous groups. We observe that (eq1) the average contribution level is enhanced in this setting; (2) the decay phenomenon is replicated in groups of pure free riders, whereas in groups of cooperative and reciprocating players the contribution is high and fairly stable throughout the game.The experiments reported in this paper were financed by the Cognitive Science Laboratory and the Computational and Experimental Economics Laboratory of the University of Trento. We would like to thank Marco Tecilla, Macrina Marchesin and Dino Parisi for their help in running the experiments, and Luigi Mittone, director of CEEL, for letting us use the laboratorys resources. Paul Webley, Robert Moir, seminar participants at the Universities of Pisa and Trento, Charles Holt and two anonymous referees provided very useful comments on a previous draft.     

On the scope of experiments in economics: comments on Siakantaris

The problem of ‘parallelism’ or external validitycan in principle be solved; I try to show how by means of twosimple examples. I also criticise attempts to dismiss experimentaleconomics that appeal to alleged ontological differences betweenthe natural and the social realm.     

Mega-events and their legacy: Image and tourism in Genoa,Turin and Milan

Hosting, or organising, a mega-event is a form of destination branding; it is a way to generate the leveraging process of the event itself and promote the image of a location. Besides, these events allow a destination to attract the attention of the public and the media, enhancing its awareness nationally and internationally. Mega-events promote greater flows of tourists and visitors, especially in the short term. Nevertheless they produce long-lasting effects, such as the attraction and stimulation of investments, urban regeneration, advanced facilities and equipment, in addition to the improvement of accommodation, services and infrastructures. Thanks to those investments and to the growth in tourist arrivals, the mega-events could have a positive impact on the local economy, also over years, but some of their most important outcomes deal with the so-called intangible legacy, or rather social, cultural and political effects, more difficult to identify and measure. They can modify local identity and image, supporting the repositioning of the hosting place at an international level. The above considerations are discussed in this study; most attention is paid to three Italian cities, involved in top events: Genoa, appointed as European Capital of Culture in 2004; Turin, that hosted the XX Olympic Winter Games in 2006; Milan, that is now organising the Universal Expo 2015.