Assessing the Effects of Service Quality,Past Experience,and Destination Image on Behavioral Intentions in the Spring Training Camp of a Japanese Professional Baseball Team

This study aimed to examine the theoretical relationships between service quality, past experience, destination image, and behavioral intentions in the spring training camp of a professional baseball team in Japan. The results indicate that the service quality of spring training camps was divided into five factors: (1) place, (2) enjoyment, (3) information, (4) fan interaction, and (5) operating time. The findings suggest that service quality and past experience had positive effects on both destination image and behavioral intentions. Behavioral intentions were also highly influenced by destination image. Future research and managerial implications are also discussed.     

Resource Investments and Loyalty to Recreational Sport Tourism Event

ABSTRACT

Sport tourism events have a marketing possibility in the Japanese tourism industry. The ultramarathon is a very popular recreational sport event in the world. This type of sport tourism event has shared with completive and enjoyment factors in relation to participant's motivation. Loyalty is a very important factor with attendance to recreational sport events. Generally, as many researchers indicated, that participants' loyalty will lead to repeat attendance or purchase. However, there is no consensus as to how loyalty develops. In the files of recreational sport tourism event research, the process leading to participants' loyalty with a specific event is not evident.

The purpose of this article is to test a conceptual framework of the development of loyalty (Morais et al., 2004 Morais, D. B., Dorsch, M. J. and Backman, S. J. 2004. Can tourism providers buy their customers' loyalty? Examining the influence of customer-provider investments on loyalty. Journal of Travel Research, 42(3): 235–243. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) that is grounded in resource theory. According to the proposed model, when participants and organizers invest specific profiles of resources in each other, the participants tend to develop a bond with the customer and become dedicated to maintaining a stable relationship. The model is used to discuss the mixed results of current loyalty from recreational sport event tourists to organizers and to outline future research efforts.     

Voting, bargaining, and factor income distribution

The effect of possible price control on factor income distribution under a democratic system is examined in the context of a collective bargaining model. A solution concept of the cooperative game theory called the Harsanyi-Shapley value is chosen to predict a likely outcome. The explicit solution for a non-atomic production economy, with two production factors and a fixed coefficient technology, is obtained. We find that this solution can be realized through prices. It is observed that in this solution, factor income shares respond to the ratio of the total endowments of two factors.     

CBD hypothesis and economies of agglomeration

Economies of agglomeration as a rationale for the formation of central business district of a city is examined. In a simultaneous location problem of firms and workers on a line segment, a locational interaction effect among firms is introduced. As an optimal solution to the cost minimization problem, a locational pattern is obtained in which the outermost zone is occupied by workers, the middle zone by firms, and the innermost zone by both workers and firms.     

Incomplete insurance and absolute risk aversion

Suppose that a subset of states of nature are not verifiable individually. Given an optimal feasible insurance scheme, the expected utility across a group of unverifiable states is greater (less) than that of a verifiable state, if the degree of absolute risk aversion is decreasing (increasing).     

The Neoclassical Investment Model and a New Conservation Law

q ratio is derived. We also show that, along the quasi-turnpike path, Tobin's marginal q is equal to the maximum value of average q. But along the turnpike path, marginal q becomes equal to the limiting value of average q. Received September 15, 1999; revised version received January 25, 2001