THE EFFECTS OF THE 1.03 MILLION YEN CEILING IN A DYNAMIC LABOR SUPPLY MODEL

In this paper I examine the effects of a means-tested transfer system in Japan ("1.03 million yen ceiling") in a dynamic labor supply model with endogenous retirement. In Japan, married women have reason to limit their annual earnings to no more than 1.03 million yen in order to receive a number of benefits available to low-income wives, and in fact often choose to do so. In a dynamic model, the optimal labor supply schedule follows a pattern that is not seen in a static framework, which I call the "spillover effect." The paper also examines the properties of dynamic welfare cost of this ceiling. ( JEL J22, H24, H55)     

Welfare‐ and Revenue‐Enhancing Tariff and Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition

We examine welfare and revenue effects of tariff and tax reform in a country importing final and intermediate goods, both of which are produced under imperfect competition. We consider two reform strategies. First, lower the sum of a consumption tax and a tariff on the intermediate good, and leave the sum of the consumption tax and a tariff on the final good unchanged. Second, lower the former and change the latter to leave government revenue unchanged. We specify conditions under which each reform strategy raises welfare without decreasing government revenue.     

Peter von Staden. Business-Government Relations in Prewar Japan

Business–Government Relations in Prewar Japan by Petervon Staden deals with the Japanese iron and steel industry fromthe late 1910s through the early 1930s. The period was the turbulentyears for the industry, finally leading to the formation ofJapan Steel Corporation in 1934. Japan Steel Corporation wasa huge production firm, by Japanese standard, whose market sharewas over 90 percent in pig iron and over 50 percent in finishedsteel of the Japanese market, so that it became virtually amonopoly firm. How and why was such a semimonopoly iron