Fiscal Policy in Europe: How Effective Are Automatic Stabilisers?

It is largely recognised that fiscal policy will have largerresponsibilities for cyclicalstabilisation in EMU given the loss of the monetary instrument.At the same time, theEMU's budgetary framework emphasises the need to rely onautomatic fiscal stabilisers,rather than active policies in cushioning the business cycle.We show that automaticstabilisers are relatively powerful in the event of shocksto private consumption, but lessso in the case of shocks to private investment and exports.In the case of supply sideshocks, the automatic stabilisers are largely ineffective,but this may actually be a goodthing to the extent that supply-side disturbances call forstructural adjustment rather thancyclical stabilisation.     

The Euro — A Tale of 20 Years: What Are the Priorities Going Forward?

Intereconomics - First, we need to recall the initial objectives set for the euro and how these have changed over time, notably due to the weaknesses that came to the fore throughout the recent...     

From Deficits to Debt and Back: Political Incentives under Numerical Fiscal Rules

Under numerical fiscal rules, such as those underpinning EMU,governments have strong temptations to use accounting tricksto meet the fiscal constraints. Given these political incentives,fiscal variables that in the past were regarded as a mere residualacquire a strategic role. This is the case of the so-calledstock-flow adjustment (SFA) which reconciles deficit and debtdevelopments. We develop a simple theoretical model where deficitsand two distinct SFA components (one that could be used to reducethe deficit figures and the other to impact debt figures instead)are determined as a result of a constrained optimisation byfiscal authorities. Econometric evidence provides results consistentwith the model findings. The SFA component related to the purposeto hide deficits rises with the recorded deficit, while thesales of financial assets designed to keep the debt under controlrise with both debt and deficit. When deficits are in excessof the 3 percent limit, accounting gimmicks become more sensitiveto the size of deficits. The SGP per se does not appear to increasethe extent to which higher deficits trigger more accountinggimmicks. However, the SGP seems associated with a more intenseuse of accounting gimmicks irrespective of the level of deficit.Such accounting practices have greatly contributed to the lossof credibility of Economic and Monetary Union's fiscal rules.If properly implemented, the reformed Pact, which stresses durableadjustment and long-run sustainability, should help curb suchperverse incentives. (JEL codes: E61, H62, H87)     

Undisclosed orders and optimal submission strategies in a limit order market

Reserve orders enable traders to hide a portion of their orders and now appear in most electronic limit order markets. This paper outlines a theory to determine an optimal submission strategy in a limit order book, in which traders choose among limit, market, and reserve orders and simultaneously set price, quantity, and exposure. We show that reserve orders help traders compete for the provision of liquidity and reduce the friction generated by exposure costs. Therefore, total gains from trade increase. Large traders always benefit from reserve orders, whereas small traders benefit only when the tick size is large.     

Revisiting EMU's Stability Pact: A Pragmatic Way Forward

The Stability and Growth Pact is under fire. Some countriesare meeting major problems in sticking to the rules. Proposalsto reform the Pact or ditch it altogether abound. The allegedweaknesses of the Pact tend to reflect trade-offs typical ofsupra-national arrangements. This aspect has to be factoredin when considering reforms of the current fiscal rules: thereis no miracle solution. EMU without rules would be an interestingexperiment, but a risky policy option. Given the existing degreeof political integration in EMU, internal adjustment ratherthan attempting to redesign the rules from scratch appears amore suitable way forward. Redefining the medium-term budgetarytarget, improving transparency, tackling the pro-cyclical fiscalbias in good times, moving towards non-partisan applicationof the rules, and improving transparency in the data can achieveboth stronger discipline and higher flexibility.     

Automatic Fiscal Stabilisers in EMU: A Conflict between Efficiency and Stabilisation?

It is often claimed that tax and welfare reforms that aim atenhancing efficiency may come at the cost of cyclical stabilisation.Reducing the generosity of welfare systems and lowering taxesmay boost efficiency and output, and improve market adjustmentto shocks. But, by reducing the size of automatic stabilisers,it may also imply less cyclical smoothing. This would be unwelcomein EMU given the loss of national monetary autonomy and thewell-known pitfalls of active fiscal management. This paperargues that the alleged trade-off between efficiency/flexibilityand stabilisation may not exist. We show that, if the initiallevel of the tax burden is high, reducing it may lead to higheroutput stabilisation in the event of a supply shock and higherinflation stabilisation in the event of a demand shock. Simulationsshow that European countries - especially small ones - mighthave a tax burden close to or even higher than the thresholdlevel. (JEL E52, E61, F42)     

Fiscal discipline and flexibility in EMU: the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact

Fiscal discipline to safeguard the credibility of the singlemonetary authority and fiscal flexibility to respond to country-specificshocks are two core principles governing budgetary policy inEMU. The Stability and Growth Pact aims at ensuring the firstobjective. To comply with the requirements of the pact, EU membersneed to achieve a 'close to balance or surplus' position andchange their budgetary behaviour in periods of cyclical upturnsby refraining from spending the 'growth dividend'. Past experienceshows that fiscal laxity does not buy more effective stabilization.Once EMU countries have achieved their medium-term target, theirautomatic stabilizers will be able to operate fully, thus helpingin smoothing out cyclical fluctuations. The main potential problemsin the implementation of the pact may arise in the early yearsof EMU, during the transition to a balanced budget, in the eventof a slow-down in economic activity.     

Defying the ‘Juncker curse’: can reformist governments be re-elected?

European policy makers, notably in the euro area, seem to take for granted that the electorate will punish them for bold reform in product and labour markets. This may explain why progress in the euro area has been comparatively limited. This paper posits and, using a dataset for 21 OECD countries, shows that this fear of electoral backlashes is unfounded, provided that financial markets work well. The mechanisms involved are relatively straightforward: well functioning financial markets “bring forward” future yields of structural reform to the present, thus permitting to overcome possible short-run costs. As a result, the electorate tend to reward, not punish, reformist governments. This has important implications for the design of structural reform packages, with financial market reforms being an essential ingredient beside product and labour market reforms.

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the EMU when cyclical conditions are uncertain

This paper examines economic policy interactions in the Economic and Monetary Union when the assessment of cyclical conditions in real time is surrounded by uncertainty. On the basis of a simple stylised model it shows that with a Nash-type of interaction different views about the output gap on the side of the policy players—the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Central Bank—can give rise to excessive activism with policy players pushing economic variables into opposite directions. It argues that the costs of such policy conflicts can be reduced by agreeing on a common assessment of the cycle, by constraining policy variables, and/or by increasing the weight of fiscally conservative institutions. An alternative option to sidestep policy conflicts ensuing from diverging views of the cycle is to take policy decisions sequentially, as is the case in a Stackelberg-type of interaction. The paper shows that for a given misperception of the cycle, the impact on the policy instruments and on output and inflation are generally smaller in the Stackelberg equilibrium as compared to a Nash outcome. Alternative allocations of roles—that is leader versus follower—are discussed and assessed.