Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents

We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim was to describe the equilibrium price formation and analyze how the lack of information may affect the allocation of resources. To do so, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the Shapley–Shubik game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (J Math Econ 39:391–400, 2003 ).     

跨国公司在华子公司循环型发展战略

本文通过分析研究跨国公司在华子公司实施循环型发展战略的五大动因,结合2005年关于跨国公司在华子公司战略研究方面的调研结果．认为跨国公司在华子公司制定的发展战略正在我国发展循环经济的影响下呈现出一些新的特点,即出现了循环型发展战略。本文在提出跨国公司在华子公司循环型发展战略方格图的基础上．对目前跨国公司在华实践的循环型发展战略五个主要模式进行了归纳、总结。     

Policy Environment for the Tourism Sector's Adaptation to Climate Change in the South Pacific – The Case of Samoa

Samoa and its neighbouring Pacific Island Countries are highly vulnerable to climate change risks because their population and infrastructure are mostly located on low-lying coastal areas. Impacts of climate change are potentially disastrous to tourism, the major economic sector in the region. This research examines the conduciveness of the policy environment in Samoa for the tourism sector to adapt to climate change along three dimensions: stakeholders’ will and commitment, resources available, and policy-making mechanisms [Wong, E.P.Y., Mistilis, N., & Dwyer, L. (2011). A framework for analyzing intergovernmental collaboration – the case of ASEAN tourism. Tourism Management, 32, 367–376]. Samoa is used as an exemplar case study to understand how the Pacific island tourism sector can best adapt to climate change. It was found that the policy environment in Samoa is generally conducive. However, there is a strong need for closer public–private cooperation.     

Shareholders as Norm Entrepreneurs for Corporate Social Responsibility

This article advances the idea that shareholders who seek to influence corporate behaviour can be understood analytically as norm entrepreneurs. These are actors who seek to persuade others to adopt a new standard of appropriateness. The article thus goes beyond studies which focus on the influence of shareholder activism on single instances of corporate conduct, as it recognises shareholders’ potential as change agents for more widely shared norms about corporate responsibilities. The article includes the empirical example of US internet technology companies who, in their Chinese operations, face conflicts of norm systems in regard to freedom of expression on the internet. Shareholders have been active in seeking to persuade these companies to adopt a norm of adhering to global standards for human rights over restrictions implied by authoritarian regimes to which they deliver services.     

Everybody wins? A discourse analysis of competing stakeholder expectations in Social Impact Bonds

ABSTRACT

This paper explores how diverse stakeholders frame their expectations of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs). Using discourse analysis, the authors examine competing expectations in SIB press releases, showing how they differ between stakeholders, between institutional contexts, and how they evolve over time. The paper highlights how the prioritization of social finance and collaboration discourses privileges the role of private investors, which in turn diminishes the role of service providers as innovators.     

Towards equilibrium offers in unit commitment auctions with nonconvex costs

We compare two types of uniform-price auction formats commonly used in wholesale electricity markets—centrally committed and self-committed markets. Auctions in both markets are conducted by an independent system operator that collects generator bids and determines which generators will operate and how much electricity each will produce. In centrally committed markets, generators submit two-part bids consisting of a startup cost and a variable energy cost. Self-committed markets force generators to incorporate their startup costs into a one-part energy bid. The system operator in a centrally committed system ensures that each generator recovers the startup and energy costs stated in its two-part bid, while no such guarantees are made in self-committed markets. The energy cost ranking and incentive properties of these market designs remains an open question. While the system operator can determine the most efficient dispatch with a centralized market, the auction mechanism used to solicit generator data compels generators to overstate costs. Self commitment might involve less efficient dispatch but have better incentive properties. We derive Nash equilibria for both market designs in a symmetric duopoly setting. We also derive simple conditions under which the two market designs will be expected cost-equivalent.