Technological choices and regulation: the case of the Canadian manufacturing sectors

Abstract The economic environment in which Canadian manufacturing firms operate has changed substantially over the last 40 years. Technological changes, new regulations, deregulation, and exogenous economic shocks all have been important aspects of this economic environment. In this article, we show how to include such changes in the economic environment faced by the firms in a behavioural model that includes the investment decision of the firm under uncertainty. Assumptions regarding the expectation formation process and technology are kept minimal. We estimate the effects of innovations such as the free trade agreement, the foreign investment review agency, and the federal environmental policy on the economic decisions of fifteen Canadian manufacturing sectors. JEL Classification: D24
Choix de technologies et réglementation: le cas des secteurs manufacturiers canadiens Au cours des 40 dernières années, l'environnement économique des firmes manufacturières canadiennes s'est grandement transformé. Que ce soit à cause du changement technologique, de la réglementation, de vagues de déréglementation ou de chocs économiques exogènes, les firmes ont dû s'adapter en modifiant leur technologie. Dans cet article, nous montrons comment prendre en compte les changements de l'environnement économique des firmes dans le cadre d'un modèle décisionnel de la firme en incertitude avec investissement. Les hypothèses concernant la technologie et les anticipations sont aussi générales que possible. Nous estimons l'effet qu'ont eu l'accord de libre échange, l'agence de tamisage des investissements étrangers et la politique environnementale fédérale sur les choix de technologies des firmes de quinze secteurs manufacturiers canadiens.     

Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives

This paper provides a first study of the optimal design of active monitors'exit options in a problem involving a demand for liquidity and costly monitoring of the issuer. Optimal incentives to monitor the issuer may involve restricting the monitor's right to sell her claims on the firm's cash-flow early. But the monitor will then require a liquidity premium for holding such an illiquid claim. In general, therefore, there will be a trade off between incentives and liquidity. The paper highlights a fundamental complementarity between speculative monitoring in financial markets (which increases the informativeness of prices) and active monitoring inside the firm: in financial markets where price discovery is better and securities prices reflect the fundamentals of the issuer better, the incentive cost of greater liquidity may be smaller and active monitoring incentives may be preserved. The paper spells out the conditions under which more or less liquidity is warranted and applies the analysis to shed light on common exit provisions in venture capital financing.     

Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly

Summary.  This paper studies the impact of uncertain demand on firms’ capacity decisions when they operate in an oligopolistic environment. We define a two-stage game where firms choose capacity in the first stage without knowing which state of Nature is going to realize, and output levels in the second, knowing which state is realized. We prove the existence of a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium at which firms are in excess capacity compared with the capacity they would choose in the Cournot certainty equivalent game. Received: May 17, 1996; revised version July 31, 1996     

Price Competition When Consumersare Uncertain About Which Firm Sells Which Quality

In this paper we analyze the properties of price equilibria in a duopoly market where firms sell vertically differentiated products, consumers being uncertain about which firm sells which quality. Both existence and properties of price equilibria are characterized by the beliefs of the consumers' population about the distribution of quality between firms.     

Asymmetric performance: the market share impact of scale and link alliances in the global auto industry

This study investigates how participating in strategic alliances with rivals affects the relative competitive positions of the partner firms. The paper builds on studies that show significant differences in the outcomes of scale and link alliances. The study argues that the more asymmetric outcomes of link alliances translate into greater changes in the relative market shares of the partner firms, due to unbalanced opportunities for inter‐partner learning and learning by doing. We find support for this argument by examining 135 alliances among competing firms in the global automobile industry, from 1966 to 1995. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Assessing Applied Protection across the World*

This paper presents MAcMap–HS‐6, a database providing a consistent, ad valorem equivalent measure of tariff duties and tariff rate quotas for 163 countries and 208 partners, at the six‐digit level of the Harmonized System (5111 products), accounting for all preferential agreements. We describe the methodology used to compute and aggregate an ad valorem equivalent of applied protection. Emphasis is placed on minimizing the endogeneity bias in the aggregation procedure, while acknowledging structural differences in export specialization. The resulting quantitative assessment is illustrated by giving an overview of applied protection across the world in 2001, in terms of average as well as distribution.     

The adequacy of asymptotic approximations in the near-integrated autoregressive model with dependent errors

We consider the normalized least squares estimator of the parameter in a nearly integrated first-order autoregressive model with dependent errors. In a first step we consider its asymptotic distribution as well as asymptotic expansion up to order O_p(T⁻¹). We derive a limiting moment generating function which enables us to calculate various distributional quantities by numerical integration. A simulation study is performed to assess the adequacy of the asymptotic distribution when the errors are correlated. We focus our attention on two leading cases: MA(1) errors and AR(1) errors. The asymptotic approximations are shown to be inadequate as the MA root gets close to −1 and as the AR root approaches either −1 or 1. Our theoretical analysis helps to explain and understand the simulation results of Schwert (1989) and DeJong, Nankervis, Savin, and Whiteman (1992) concerning the size and power of Phillips and Perron's (1988) unit root test. A companion paper, Nabeya and Perron (1994), presents alternative asymptotic frameworks in the cases where the usual asymptotic distribution fails to provide an adequate approximation to the finite-sample distribution.     

Opportunistic tendencies in IJVS with the Japanese: The effects of culture,shared decision making,and relationship age

This study investigated how partners' self-reported opportunism and shared decision making varied by culture in international joint ventures (IJVs) with the Japanese. Data were gathered by a mail survey of senior officials in IJVs located in 11 host countries. Significant differences were found between partners from Western cultures and the Japanese, but not between other Asians and the Japanese. Indirect effects suggest that shared decision making neutralizes cultural tendencies toward opportunism. Results indicated that opportunistic tendencies did not diminish as the IJV relationship aged, and that shared decision making did diminish as the relationship aged.     

New Evidence on the Performance Advantages of Multihospital Systems

This study analyzes the performance effects of proprietary, multihospital systems. It is shown that the organizational structure of these systems may affect the operating costs of member hospitals. Estimating a cost function for Florida hospitals and controlling for other factors, the average costs of HUMANA hospitals are empirically about 17 percent lower, while the costs of other leading chains are about 12 percent lower than not-for-profit institutions. These results contrast with earlier studies that found no such differences. Furthermore, the cost differential that exists between system and non-system hospitals can be largely attributed to technical efficiencies arising from chain ownership.     

Employment and Wage Bargaining in an Open Monetary Union

This paper studies alternative patterns of wage bargaining in an open two-country monetary union. Wages are fixed by trade unions for two periods, either at the national or at the monetary union level. It is shown that the best solution with regard to unemployment depends on the nature of externalities and dynamic strategic interactions between the monetary union's countries; namely on the degree of openness of the monetary union, and the differentiation index between national goods.