More on the role of switching costs in service markets: A research note

The present paper focuses on several important and under-researched issues related to switching costs (SC) as a defensive marketing tool in retaining customers with complaint handling. While most previous research analyzed the effects of SC on the behavioral intent of customers, our findings have focused on the actual behavior of bank customers; that is, staying with or leaving the bank to which they had complained previously. The findings show that, of the six potential facets of SC, only two significantly affect the actual behavior of complainants, one directly (i.e., Continuity Costs) and the other as a moderator (i.e., Learning Costs). Likewise, a customer's evaluation of the complaint handling affects behavior directly.     

The interaction of retail density and music tempo: Effects on shopper responses

Research examining the effects of store environment on shoppers has found that a number of atmospheric cues have significant effects on shoppers' cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses. To date, retail atmospheric cues have been studied in isolation, instead of simultaneously, like they occur in the retail setting. This study examines the interactive effects of two atmospheric cues—retail density and music tempo—and their impact on shopper responses within a real shopping environment. Based on the schema incongruity model, it is found that shopper hedonic and utilitarian evaluations of the shopping experience are highest under conditions of slow music/high density and fast music/low density. Significant main effects of music tempo are found for behavioral responses such as approach/avoidance tendency and extent of browsing behavior. The results underscore the need to examine interactive effects of atmospheric cues to better understand the impact of the store environment on shoppers. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The double-edged sword: The positive and negative effects of switching costs on customer exit and revenge

What happens when customers have to deal with switching costs after a service failure and a poor recovery? This study seeks to address this question by proposing and testing an integrative model that incorporates customers' negative emotions as mediators between switching costs and behavioral outcomes (i.e., loyalty and revenge). The model distinguishes positive from negative switching costs, and inward from outward negative emotions. Analysis of survey data from 280 real customers who actually experienced a service failure and poor recovery with a major telecommunications firm reveals that customers react to switching costs strongly, emotionally, and sub-optimally. In contrast to most findings in the service literature, the results indicate that negative switching costs generate both exit and desire for revenge. Paradoxically, positive switching costs generate both loyalty and an even higher level of desire for revenge. These findings have important implications for the service industry.     

Incentives, redistribution and social insurance

We extend the familiar income taxation model à la Mirrlees, so as to include income uncertainty, due for instance to a risk of illness. Following a line of research initiated by Blomqvist and Horn [1984] we prove that the existence of a Social Health Insurance system may be justified even when the insurance market is efficient. Moreover, if there is a negative statistical dependence between probability of illness and labor productivity, then the optimum of a Utilitarianist Social Welfare function implies that Social Insurance provides a complete coverage for every household.     

Equilibrium in a reinsurance market: Introducing taxes

We introduce profit taxation in Borch's [1962] model of a competitive insurance market. We analyze the impact of taxation on equilibrium prices and characterize the cases where optimal risk sharing is preserved. In the case of Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions, this abstract characterization is translated into simple conditions involving the solvency ratios of the companies. The case of Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility functions is also studied.     

Unspoken ethical issues in the climate affair: Insights from a theoretical analysis of negotiation mandates

Taking climate change as an example, this paper provides new insights on the optimal provision of a long-term public good within and across generations. We write the Bowen–Lindhal–Samuelson (BLS) conditions for the optimal provision of the public good in a world divided into N countries, with two periods, present and future, and we simultaneously determine the optimal response in the first and second periods for a given rate of pure time preference. However, the Negishi weights at second period cannot be determined unambiguously, even under a “no redistribution constraint” within each generation, because they depend on non-observable future incomes; and thus on the answers to two often-overlooked ethical questions: (i) Do rich countries agree on deals which recognize that developing countries may catch up with developed countries in the long run, or do they use their negotiating powers to preserve the current balance of power? And (ii) does each country consider only the welfare of its own future citizens (dynastic solidarity) or does it extend its concern to all future human beings (universal solidarity)? Answers to (i) and (ii)—critical in the debate about how to correct the market failures causing global warming—define four sets of Negishi weights and intertemporal welfare functions, which we interpret as four mandates that countries could give to the Chair of an international negotiation on climate change to find an optimal solution. We find that in all mandates, public good provision expenditures are decreasing functions of income at first period. But each mandate leads to a different allocation of expenditures at second period and to different optimal levels of public good provision at both first and second periods. Finally, we show that only one of these four mandates defines a space for viable compromises.     

Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm

We extend the Laffont–Tirole regulation model to the case of risk-averse firms. Our main results are:

• The impact of risk aversion is to shift the optimal contract toward a cost-plus contract.

• As compared with the risk-neutral case, distortions are greater and informational rents are smaller.

• For high levels of risk aversion, the optimal contract involves cost ceilings and the less efficient firms are bunched together.

Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D8, L5.     

A proposed model of online consumer behavior: Assessing the role of gender

This research examined the influence of Internet experience and web atmospherics on consumer online behavior. It developed a model of web navigation behavior where these antecedent variables drove website exploratory behavior and website involvement, which in turn, drove site attitudes and pre-purchase evaluations. These relationships were tested and confirmed in the context of a pharmaceutical website. Further, men and women differed in web navigation behavior, with men engaging in less exploratory behavior and developing less website involvement than women. However, across the two sexes, entertainment, challenge, and effectiveness of information content were the key drivers of website attitudes. The findings provide several guidelines for online communication strategy.