Factors driving embodied carbon in international trade: a multiregional input–output gravity model

ABSTRACT

Concerns about the effects and consequences of climate change have notably increased in recent decades. Despite large advances in the understanding of this phenomenon, further research into the determinants of gas emissions is necessary, to shed light on the responsibilities of producers and consumers, and their potential contribution to mitigation strategies. This paper studies the trajectories and determinants of carbon embodied in world trade during a period of 15 years. Our methodology relies on a multiregional input–output model, environmentally extended. Drawing on data from the World Input–Output Database, we estimate embodied emissions in bilateral flows. Then, we assess the determinants of CO₂ emissions embodied in trade, combining input–output modelling with trade gravity panel data analysis. This paper offers a methodological approach that explains and quantifies the underlying factors of carbon trade, integrating the production and consumption perspectives and considering the geographical, structural and institutional context of countries.     

Market impact: a systematic study of the high frequency options market

This paper deals with a fundamental subject that has seldom been addressed in recent years, that of market impact in the options market. Our analysis is based on a proprietary database of metaorders—large orders that are split into smaller pieces before being sent to the market—on one of the main Asian markets. In line with our previous work on the equity market [Said, E., Bel Hadj Ayed, A., Husson, A. and Abergel, F., Market impact: A systematic study of limit orders. Mark. Microstruct. Liq., 2018, 3(3&4), 1850008.], we propose an algorithmic approach to identify metaorders, based on some implied volatility parameters, the at the money forward volatility and at the money forward skew. In both cases, we obtain results similar to the now well-understood equity market: Square-Root Law, Fair Pricing Condition and Market Impact Dynamics.     

Collusion and group lending with adverse selection

In an environment with correlated returns, this paper characterizes optimal lending contracts when the bank faces adverse selection and borrowers have limited liability. Group lending contracts are shown to be dominated by revelation mechanisms which do not use the ex post observability of the partners' performances. However, when collusion between borrowers under complete information is allowed, group lending contracts are optimal in the class of simple revelation mechanisms (which elicit only the borrower's own private information) and remain useful with extended revelation mechanisms.     

Developing a tutoring module for presentation of computerized patient management problems

The simulation problem is one of the most commonly used formats in computer-assisted instruction (CAI). In medical education, a patient simulation problem is known as a patient management problem (PMP). A number of computerized PMP systems are currently available. However, to date, there is no record of PMP systems having been developed using artificial intelligence. This is noteworthy since artificial intelligence techniques could help in the generation of more effective and intelligent instructional systems.

This paper analyzes and evaluates existing instructional simulation software in clinical medicine in terms of effective educational design attributes. Components of effective PMP systems thus identified are incorporated into a computerized instructional system which uses artificial intelligence techniques for teaching problem-solving and diagnostic skills to undergraduate medical students.     

Micro-level product-market dynamics: Shared knowledge and its relationship to market development

This work draws on consumer and psychology research to explain sociocognitive aspects of product-market dynamics at a higher level of specificity than prior research. The authors extend the field’s understanding of market-shaping shared knowledge through a theory-informed discussion of how shared product knowledge comes to exist and how it changes as product markets develop. They define shared knowledge as the aspects of product representations that are common across the minds of market actors, making it possible for them to understand one another. The authors also discuss ways to track shared knowledge content that is expressed in market narratives. As the characteristics of shared knowledge are explained and linked to stages of product-market development, the authors develop a set of researchable propositions to guide future research. The theoretical arguments and propositions in this article complement extant marketing strategy research by integrating individual-level consumer theory with market evolution models. José Antonio Rosa (jose.rosa@case.edu; Ph.D., University of Michigan) is an assistant professor of marketing at Case Western Reserve University. His research interests include product markets as sociocognitive phenomena, embodied knowledge in consumer and managerial sensemaking, consumer illiteracy and coping, commitment and motivation among members of network marketing organizations, and buying group satisfaction. His research has been published in marketing and management publications, including theJournal of Marketing and theAcademy of Management Journal. Before entering academia, he worked in the automotive and information systems industries. Jelena Spanjol (jspanjol@tamu.edu; Ph.D., University of Illinois) is an assistant professor of marketing at Texas A&M University. Her research interests include product market dynamics, product portfolio management, innovation, sensemaking, and organizational and managerial cognition in marketing strategy. Her research has been published in marketing and management publications, including theJournal of Marketing and several book chapters. Before academia, she worked in the scientific software industry.     

Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information

Summary We consider a simple model of incomplete information in location theory. Two firms compete in a two stage framework: a sequential location stage and a price competition stage. Firm 1 knows both its own constant marginal cost technology and that of Firm 2, whereas the latter has incomplete information about firm 1's technology. The location stage turns out to be a monotonic signaling game and theunique D1 equilibrium is a pure strategy separating equilibrium if firm 1's cost advantage is below some bound, and otherwise a pooling equilibrium if the prior probability that Firm 1 is of the low cost type is high, or a semi-pooling equilibrium if it is low. This surprising result is due to the fact that the location gap between the two types of Firm 1 is bounded because of natural economic reasons, which may prevent the separation of the two types. Hence, incomplete information matters: the equilibrium locations differ quite significantly from the full information equilibrium locations.We would like to thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and also the participants in seminars at GREQE (Marseille), Université de Montréal, UBC, HEC (Paris), in the Location Theory session of the World Congress of the Econometric Society (Barcelona) and in the Game Theory Conference at the University of Western Ontario for their comments. We remain, of course, solely responsible for the content of the paper. Financial support from FCAR (Québec), SSHRCC (Canada) and CNRS (France) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information

This paper shows that supervision with soft information is valuable whenever supervisors and supervisees collude under asymmetric information and proceeds then to derive an Equivalence Principle between organizational forms of supervisory and productive activities. We consider an organization with an agent privately informed on his productivity and a risk averse supervisor getting signals on the agent's type. In a centralized organization, the principal can communicate and contract with both the supervisor and the agent. However, these two agents can collude against the principal. In a decentralized organization, the principal only communicates and contracts with the supervisor who in turn sub-contracts with the agent. We show that the two organizations achieve the same outcome. We discuss this equivalence and provide various comparative statics results to assess the efficiency of supervisory structures.     

Intertemporal market division:: A case of alternating monopoly

In this paper, we report on an equilibrium with market dominance that exists in a simple two-firm model that features neither entry barriers nor sophisticated punishment strategies. This equilibrium induces an intertemporal market division in which the two firms alternate as monopolists - despite the fact that the model also sustains a Cournot duopoly. Even when initially both firms are active in the market, the alternating monopoly reveals itself rather quickly. Moreover, it Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibrium - as it is close to the cartel outcome. Several examples of what well may be such alternating monopolies are presented.