Cost Analysis of Calcium in Store Brand versus National Brand Grocery Products

Objective: This study was to determine if calcium fortification yields a higher price per serving in grocery store products. Researchers compared store brand to national brand grocery products in relation to cost in order to examine if calcium values were similar between store brand and national brand products. Methods: A total of 112 store brand and 211 national brand grocery products were collected from three low (national chain store), middle and high priced (Virginia and North Carolina regional store) grocery venues. Products were compared using price and calcium percentage per serving. ANOVA was used to determine between store brand and national brand for price per serving and calcium content, and between grocery venues. Results: National brand fortified products had a significantly lower mean price per serving when compared to national brand non-fortified products (p = 0.0002). There was no statistical difference between store brand fortified and non-fortified products (p = 0.9256). Low priced store brand products had the lowest mean price per serving ($0.34 ±0.24). Conclusions: This study found store brand products have similar calcium content as national brand products. Product cost was lower at low priced store compared to middle and high priced stores.     

Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions

Auditing is modeled in a sequential game without commitment. The manager must decide whether and where to audit a worker's output, taking into account all interim information he has obtained. The worker will work just hard enough (and show it) to divert the manager from making an audit or cover up, withholding information about his work to make an audit more difficult. This usually raises the costs of setting work incentives, so incentives are softened, sometimes drastically. Moreover, when a worker's on-the-job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions, work incentives must be softened to improve the internal flow of information.     

Competition with Congestible Networks

We analyse competition between two network providers when the quality of each network depends negatively on the number of customers connected to that network. With respect to price competition we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Comparative statics show that as the congestion effect gets stronger quantities will decrease and prices increase, under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. In an example with endogenous capacities it turns out that equilibrium capacities are at first increasing and then decreasing in the strength of congestion. Furthermore, capacities are higher under Cournot competition. Welfare comparisons between Bertrand and Cournot competition are unambiguous for fixed capacities, but may turn around for endogenous capacities.     

Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Equity Partnerships: Evidence from Hollywood's Slate Financing Agreements

We use a movie industry project‐by‐project data set to analyze the principal–agent problem in slate financing arrangements. Under this specific film financing regime, which has become a significant mode of raising capital in Hollywood over the past decade, an external investor concludes a long‐term contract with a film producer and commits to cofinance a larger number of future film projects of that particular partner. In line with our theoretical conjectures, slate cofinanced movies receive poorer quality ratings and yield considerably lower return rates. Our data suggests that a substantial part of these performance differences may be attributed to adverse project selection and producer moral hazard.     

Inference for large financial systems

We treat the parameter estimation problem for mean‐field models of large interacting financial systems such as the banking system and a pool of assets held by an institution or backing a security. We develop an asymptotic inference approach that addresses the scale and complexity of such systems. Harnessing the weak convergence results developed for mean‐field financial systems in the literature, we construct an approximate likelihood for large systems. The approximate likelihood has a conditionally Gaussian structure, enabling us to design an efficient numerical method for its evaluation. We provide a representation of the corresponding approximate estimator in terms of a weighted least‐squares estimator, and use it to analyze the large‐system and large‐sample behavior of the estimator. Numerical results for a mean‐field model of systemic financial risk highlight the efficiency and accuracy of our estimator.     

Diminishing effects of location? Some evidence from Swiss municipalities, 1950–2000

This paper analyzes how location has affected, in the second half of the twentieth century, the population growth of 2889 municipalities in Switzerland. The analysis demonstrates the temporal relativity of location attributes, even for small territorial divisions, such as the Swiss cantons. However, we also show that, both absolute and relative location attributes have weakened over time as population growth predictors, apparently due to improving road infrastructures, and growing motorization. The study has been made possible by a detailed historical population and accessibility database available for Swiss municipalities. To the best of our knowledge, no database of such scope and quality is available for any other European country.     

Identifying the strategic market

When are markets truly global? Will Europe be a single market after 1992, and how will we know? When are niche strategies sustainable? In this article, John Kay develops answers to these questions by developing the concept of the strategic market–the minimum area, product or geographical, within which it is possible to compete. He identifies the common strategic error involved in confusing the dimensions of the market with those of the industry, and warns that economic integration is not at all the same as the creation of a single market.