Evaluation of national foresight activities: Assessing rationale, process and impact

The paper addresses the question of what constitutes an appropriate evaluation strategy for national foresight activities in different situations. The variety of rationales for foresight is explored, ranging from a desire to set priorities through to participation-oriented goals and building new networks around common visions and strategies. A generational model of foresight is used to show the evolution of key evaluation issues. The generic motivations for evaluation of accountability, justification and learning are discussed in the context of foresight. Evaluation grounded in the concept of behavioural additionality and the systems failure rationale is shown to be more suited as a rationale for foresight as public policy.Assessing the effects of foresight requires an understanding that it is only one of several influences on public policy. To be effective it needs to be tuned into the strategic behaviour and cycles of policy and economic actors. Cases are presented of evaluation of foresight programmes in the United Kingdom, Germany and Hungary. It is concluded that there is no “one-size-fits-all” evaluation approach and that the method selected is conditioned by motivation, timing and the level of aggregation. Foresight cannot be fully evaluated independently from its context. Foresight is being strengthened by the emergence of rigorous and systematic knowledge to assist learning and improvement.     

Locally Greater Vulnerability to Background Risk

Willingness to take on risk is influenced by the presence of fair and unfair background risks for decision makers who are risk vulnerable as defined by Gollier and Pratt [1996], for these decision makers are more risk averse when they possess such an uninsurable background risk. We present an alternative derivation of the index of local vulnerability based on Diamond and Stiglitz [1974] compensated increases in risk, such that risk aversion increases with the introduction of any small fair background risk if and only if the index of local vulnerability is positive. We establish that the increase in risk aversion is greater for those who are more vulnerable as measured by the index of local vulnerability.     

Intra-metropolitan shifts in labor demand and the adjustment of local markets

I offer new evidence on the adjustment of local labor markets to geographic shifts in labor demand within US metropolitan areas using a unique data set in which metropolitan subregions are geographically matched across the 1970–1980 and 1980–1990 decades. The evidence uncovered paints the following picture. Workers, especially those with less education, make incomplete adjustments within metropolitan areas in response to intra-metropolitan demand shifts. Although blacks may not make especially limited adjustments, they have disproportionately suffered deleterious effects from job movements because the demand shifts have tended to be away from their places of residence.     

Racial Discrimination and Mortgage Lending

Looking at a sample of conventional fixed-rate mortgages, this paper examines whether lending practices are consistent with the competitive hypothesis that the racial and ethnic composition of the borrower??s neighborhood affects the contract rate charged only to the extent that these characteristics objectively influence the probability of the loan defaulting or prepaying. Our results, however, reject this hypothesis, showing instead that borrowers in predominantly black neighborhoods pay a significantly higher contract rate than is consistent with evidence of their behavior.     

The Impact of Second Loans on Subprime Mortgage Defaults

An estimated 12.6% of primary mortgage loans were simultaneously originated with a second loan from 2004 until 2008, although relatively little is known about how the presence of such subordinate loans affects the default decisions of borrowers. We use a novel data series of loan servicing records from 2002 until 2010 to identify such borrowers and find evidence that the default behavior of these borrowers significantly differs from borrowers without second loans. Estimating a discrete‐time proportional odds hazard model, we find borrowers with a second loan were 62.7% more likely to default each month on their primary loan when conditioning alone on the attributes of the primary loan. However, borrowers of second loans were 58.3% less likely to default on their primary loan as compared to single‐loan borrowers with equivalent current combined attributes (i.e., loan‐to‐value, balance and interest rate). We hypothesize and provide empirical evidence that this occurs because borrowers with second loans have the option to sequentially default on each loan since subordinate lenders will not pursue foreclosure if borrowers have insufficient equity. Lenders of defaulted subordinate debt may revisit their decision to foreclose in the future after housing markets start to recover, thus prompting a new round of foreclosures.     

Ross risk vulnerability for introductions and changes in background risk

We present two theorems that provide necessary and sufficient conditions for an expected utility maximizer to become more risk averse in the sense of Ross with respect to bearing a foreground risk after the introduction of any independent fair or unfair additive background risk. We call these decision makers Ross risk vulnerable, and show that Ross decreasing absolute risk aversion and Ross decreasing absolute prudence are jointly sufficient for Ross risk vulnerability. Restrictions on utility necessary and sufficient for Ross risk vulnerability with respect to stochastic dominance deteriorations of an existing background risk are also presented. Our analysis concludes with applications of Ross risk vulnerability.