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Victor J. Tremblay Kosin Isariyawongse 《International Journal of the Economics of Business》2013,20(1):125-141
We develop a model to explain why firm behavior differs in the market for small cars. Firms such as Honda compete in output (Cournot) and produce marketing campaigns with universal appeal, while firms such as Scion compete in price (Bertrand) and produce targeted marketing campaigns. We show that this mixture of Cournot and Bertrand behavior can occur when advertising rotates demand. When behaving as a Cournot-type firm such as Honda, it is more profitable to pursue a mass-market advertising campaign that rotates demand counterclockwise when it faces relatively low unit costs and a flat demand function. When behaving as a Bertrand-type firm such as Scion, it pays to pursue a niche-market advertising campaign that rotates demand clockwise when it faces relatively high unit costs and a steep demand. 相似文献
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Victor J. Tremblay Carol Horton Tremblay Kosin Isariyawongse 《Bulletin of economic research》2013,65(4):332-342
Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot‐Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot‐Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome. 相似文献
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