Habit,Decision-Making,and Rationality: Comparing Thorstein Veblen and Early Herbert Simon

The article aims to contribute to the convergence between institutional and neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary economics. It intends to help unify the behavioral foundations of these two strands of thought by returning to the original views of their main historical inspirations. It thus proposes a comparative analysis of the theory of human behavior developed by Thorstein Veblen and Herbert Simon, respectively. The article notably discusses how Simon’s early work links together the notions of habit, rationality, and the decision-making process, and explores the extent to which his views are consistent with, complementary to, or divergent from Veblen’s. The article highlights several commonalities between Simon and Veblen’s views on habits. However, Simon departs from Veblen in developing a dual model of human behavior which clearly differentiates habit-based from decision-based behaviors. The article argues that neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary economists should go beyond this binary model and build on the pragmatist-Veblenian approach, in which these two dimensions are intimately entangled. This process could allow the economists in question to take advantage of the most valuable insights of institutional economics regarding the interactions between individual choices and habits and institutions.     

Do incentive systems spur work motivation of inventors in high tech firms? A group-based perspective

In this paper, we explore with a model the potential tensions between the incentive system of groups of inventors and knowledge diversity in a high tech firm. We show that, when all groups are rewarded and able to interact freely with their peers, extrinsic and intrinsic motives are mutually self-reinforcing, leading to crowding in effects. As a result, the level of created knowledge increases in each group, reinforcing the diversity of the firm’s knowledge base. By contrast, competitive rewards and constrained autonomy are likely to produce motivating effects in a small number of groups, limiting knowledge creation to the firm’s core competencies. In this case, the firm can suffer from crowding out effects by the other groups, leading eventually to the extinction of creation in their fields and reduced diversity in the long run. The results are illustrated with empirical findings from a case study of a French high tech firm.     

From knowledge to business ecosystems: emergence of an entrepreneurial activity during knowledge replication

Small Business Economics - Our article emphasizes the relationship between knowledge and business ecosystems. Transformation of a knowledge ecosystem can lead to the emergence of a technological...     

Knowledge, hierarchy and the selection of routines: an interpretative model with group interactions

The aim of this paper is to analyze the selection of routines inside an organizational structure characterized by different cognitive representations and facing hierarchical pressure leading to either truce or conflict. After a brief discussion of the role of hierarchy and the related problems of organizational practice selection in the evolutionary literature, we model the interactions between different groups within a firm trying to interfere with its coordination mechanisms in order to support their own practices. Numerical simulations highlight the different learning abilities present in various organizational set-ups and their related knowledge distribution. It is shown that networking designs are the most profitable organizational configurations because of their dynamics of learning, though they are very sensitive to the truce problem.JEL Classification: L14, L20, L22, B52, D83Correspondence to: Nathalie Lazaric     

The new challenges of organizing intellectual property in complex industries: A discussion based on the case of Thales

The defense industries in France and elsewhere have, in recent years, undergone important technological, organizational and institutional changes that have profoundly altered their architectures. These changes have introduced a new division of labor bringing new opportunities for interaction leading to the creation of additional assets. In this context, the issue of protecting innovations and their exploitation has become central. Managing intellectual property rights (IPR) requires industrial groups to draw on additional capabilities. This article analyzes these evolutions and focuses in particular on the new organizational arrangements that have accompanied them. Using the case of Thales, which in 2005 outsourced its Intellectual Property (IP), we answer questions such as: why should IP be outsourced; how should the outsourcing of IP activities be organized; and, how should capabilities involved in this new organizational arrangement be managed. These issues lie at the center of this research and illustrate new challenges inherent to in-house and outsourced IPR management strategies.