Macroeconomic Stabilization in the EMU: Rules Versus Institutions

This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of different regimes of international fiscal coordination and monetary‐fiscal cooperation in a monetary union with independent fiscal authorities, that act strategically vis‐à‐vis a common central bank. In the presence of other policy goals than cyclical stabilization, such as interest rate smoothing and fiscal stability, we show that coordination among national fiscal authorities can reduce output and inflation volatility relative to the non‐cooperative setting in specific circumstances, as in case of demand disturbances, while turning potentially counterproductive otherwise. The adverse effects of union‐wide coordinated fiscal measures can be attenuated in a regime of global coordination, namely, when a centralized fiscal stabilization is coordinated with the common monetary policy as well.     

The value and security of money. Metallic and fiduciary media in Ferdinando Galiani's Della moneta

This paper proposes a new interpretative framework for Galiani's monetary theory. The main argument is that, by adopting “the methodology of successive approximations” (correctly attributed to him by Luigi Einaudi), Galiani investigated the theoretical foundations of the two archetypal moneys: metallic money and paper money. On these foundations, he developed the model of a complex monetary economy based on the coexistence of a metallic and a fiduciary circulation. The paper also illustrates how the experience of the “public banks” of Naples inspired his analysis, thus shedding new light on the theoretical and institutional richness of his monetary thought.     

Sovereign Risk, FDI Spillovers, and Growth

This paper studies the effect of sovereign risk on capital flows from rich to poor nations in the context of a two-country model, where Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) creates positive externalities in domestic production. We show that if externalities are large, a developing country never expropriates foreign assets, and behaves as under perfect enforcement of foreigners' property rights, jumping to the steady state in one period. If externalities are absent, a developing country always expropriates foreign assets and, then, there are no capital flows in equilibrium, as occurs in autarky. If externalities are of a medium size, our model can account for scarce capital flows from rich to poor nations, as well as other key features of the data, such as rising-over-time patterns of foreign capital and FDI in developing countries. In addition, the model offers an economic rationale for the FDI restrictions observed across nations.     

Money, cycles and capital formation: von Mises the 'Austrian' vs. Robertson the 'Dynamist'

A ‘disequilibrium’ between saving and investmentdecisions determines a maladjustment in production, the disruptionof capital, and a downturn in economic activity, according tothe ‘Austrian’ approach. By contrast, the ‘Dynamists’argue that it may lead to economic growth, as disequilibriummay well be instrumental to capital accumulation. What explainsthese different predictions in otherwise similar models? Thekey is in the interplay between the analytical features andthe ideological options underlying each of these approaches:alternative lines of thought, entirely compatible with theiranalytical models, were abandoned by some of these authors whenthey conflicted with their pre-analytical views. This paperillustrates the argument by exploring the models of two ‘fathers’,von Mises and Robertson.     

Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining

This paper introduces a contract between the government and trade unions in a model of strategic wage bargaining à la Lippi (2003). It shows that an optimal contract can be implemented through an appropriately defined inflation target.     

When is the risk of cooperation worth taking? The prisoner’s dilemma as a game of multiple motives

This experimental article helps to understand the motives behind cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. It manipulates the pay-off in case both players defect in a two-player, one-shot prisoner’s dilemma and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of four motives: efficiency, conditional cooperation, fear and greed. All motives are significant but some become only significant if one controls for all remaining ones. This seems to be the reason why earlier attempts at explaining choices in the prisoner’s dilemma with personality have not been successful.     

Fiscal and monetary interactions when wage-setters are large: is there a role for corporatist policies?

This paper studies the macroeconomic consequences of alternative policy regimes in a closed economy where a central bank, a fiscal authority and a monopoly union interact via their effects on output and inflation. The analysis compares macroeconomic outcomes in a non-cooperative setting, where players may move sequentially or simultaneously, and in a regime of cooperation between the government and wage-setters. The cooperative regime captures a climate of accord among social parties that is finalised at common macroeconomic targets in the tradition of corporatism, as in the recent experience of “social pacts” in many European countries. The paper makes two main contributions. First, it shows that macroeconomic outcomes are suboptimal in the non-cooperative regime and may deliver extreme (undesirable) results even when all players share common ideal targets for output and inflation. All players would be better off with a less extreme value for output or inflation, yet they fail to reach a more advantageous allocation as long as there is an inherent conflict among their further objectives. Moreover, the result is robust to a change in the degree of central bank’s conservatism. Second, I find that cooperation between the government and the monopoly union towards common ideal targets for inflation, output and taxes enhances social welfare even in the absence of explicit coordination with the central bank.     

Current global imbalances and the Keynes Plan: A Keynesian approach for reforming the international monetary system

This paper proposes a “logical experiment”, illustrating how alternative international monetary systems may produce opposite results in the global economy. In the current organisation, “key currencies” work as international money. Keynes, by contrast, proposed that this role should be assigned to a supranational, “credit” money. While the world currently lives in an asymmetric regime, which lead to what has been defined as a “balance of financial terror”, Keynes tried to achieve a more peaceful type of “international balance”. I argue that the structural reform and the technical provisions proposed by the “Keynes Plan” may still – at least in principle – provide useful remedies for international disequilibria, by remedying the asymmetries of the current international payments architecture and helping to curb both inflationary and deflationary pressures on the world economy.