A common value auction model with endogenous entry and information acquisition

Summary Much of the auction literature assumes both a fixed number of bidders and a fixed information setting. This sidesteps the important and often costly decisions a potential bidder must make prior to an auction: Should I enter and, if I do, what level of resources should I expend evaluating the good prior to bidding? We answer these questions for a stylized information model of a common value auction. The expected selling price is shown to be the expected value of the good minus the expected aggregate entry and information costs of the bidders. Thus, the seller indirectly pays for these costs to the bidders. There are auctions where the seller seemingly restricts the bidders' information expenditures. While this restriction does influence the entry decision, we demonstrate that the overall effect can be to improve the selling price. Finally, the probability of entry and the chosen accuracy of the information are never more in the second-price auction than in the first-price auction, and the seller prefers the second-price auction.We are grateful for the comments and suggestions of seminar participants at the University of British Columbia, Dartmouth College, the University of Wisconsin, Yale University, and the International Conference on Game Theory and Economics at SUNY Stony Brook.     

An Eye for an Eye Will Make the Whole World Blind: Conflict Escalation into Workplace Bullying and the Role of Distributive Conflict Behavior

The current study investigated how work-related disagreements—coined as conflicts—relate to workplace bullying, from the perspective of the target as well as the perpetrator. We hypothesized a positive indirect association between task conflicts and bullying through relationship conflicts. This process accounted for both for targets and perpetrators of bullying. Targets are distinguished from perpetrators in our assumption that this indirect effect is boosted by distributive conflict behavior, being yielding for targets and forcing for perpetrators. Results in a large representative sample of the Flemish working population (N = 2,029) confirmed our hypotheses. Additionally, our study also revealed a direct effect from task conflicts to bullying in the analyses regarding the indirect as well as the conditional indirect effects. For perpetrators, both the indirect and direct relationships are moderated by forcing, underlining the importance of distributive conflict behavior particularly for the enactment of bullying behaviors.