为什么日中需要货币合作——经济上的要求和地缘政治含义

东亚汇率稳定机制的必要性 在东亚,民间企业活动推动了经济一体化.一体化的经济要求汇率的稳定.但是,目前东亚地区仍不存在构筑汇率稳定机制的政治意愿.目前仍在扩大的世界经济不平衡导致新一轮货币危机时,将有可能迫使东亚构筑汇率稳定机制.     

Partial memories, inductively derived views, and their interactions with behavior

We explore the inductively derived views obtained by players with partial temporal (short-term) memories. A player derives his personal view of the objective game situation from his accumulated (long-term) memories, and then uses it for decision making. A salient feature that distinguishes this paper from others on inductive game theory is partiality of a memory function of a player. This creates a multiplicity of possibly derived views. Although this is a difficulty for a player in various senses, it is an essential problem of induction. Faced with multiple possible views, a player may try to resolve this using further experiences. The two-way interaction between behavior and personal views is another distinguishing feature of the present paper.     

A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang

We consider an international financial problem called debt overhang, by which we mean a situation where a sovereign country has borrowed money from foreign banks and has been unable to fulfill the scheduled repayments for some period. The problem is formulated as a noncooperative game withn lender banks as players where each decides either to sell its loan exposure to the debtor country at the present price of debt on the secondary market, or to wait and keep its exposure. This game has many pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We show, however, that in any Nash equilibrium, the resulting secondary market price remains almost the same as the present price for a large number of banks. We also obtain the comparative statics result that in a mixed strategy equilibrium, a bank with a smaller loan exposure has a greater tendency to sell than one with a larger loan exposure. We discuss the implications of these results for the functioning of the secondary market and the resolution of debt overhang.We thank J. Crémer, H. Haller, S. Mendes, and the referees of this Journal for helpful comments on earlier drafts.     

The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy

An economic model of the allocation process with public goods is presented. We define a concept of equilibrium and prove the existence. Next we present a voting game in which a level of the public goods to be produced is decided. We prove that the core of the voting game and the equilibria exist simultaneously, and that they coincide.     

Symposium: logic and economics—interactions between subjective thinking and objective worlds

This is the second symposium of the same title “Logic and Economics” in this journal and has four papers studying the issues expressed in the subtitle. In this introduction, the guest editor first describes a general perspective for this symposium and then explains each paper from this perspective. Finally, a few remarks are given.     

The Nash social welfare function for a measure space of individuals

In this paper we consider the Nash social welfare function for a society which is given as an arbitrary finite measure space. We show that the Nash social welfare function for the society is derived from certain rationality criteria.