Beyond Single-Factor Affine Term Structure Models

This article proposes a new approach to testing for the hypothesisof a single priced risk factor driving the term structure ofinterest rates. The method does not rely on any parametric specificationof the state variable dynamics or the market price of risk.It simply exploits the constraint imposed by the no-arbitragecondition on instantaneous expected bond returns. In order toachieve our goal, we develop a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and applyit to data on Treasury bills and bonds for both the United Statesand Spain. We find that the single risk factor hypothesis cannotbe rejected for either dataset.     

The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional investors around the world

We study the role of institutional investors around the world using a comprehensive data set of equity holdings from 27 countries. We find that all institutional investors have a strong preference for the stock of large firms and firms with good governance, while foreign institutions tend to overweight firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. and members of the Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index. Firms with higher ownership by foreign and independent institutions have higher firm valuations, better operating performance, and lower capital expenditures. Our results indicate that foreign and independent institutions, with potentially fewer business ties to firms, are involved in monitoring corporations worldwide.     

Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance

We show that female directors have a significant impact on board inputs and firm outcomes. In a sample of US firms, we find that female directors have better attendance records than male directors, male directors have fewer attendance problems the more gender-diverse the board is, and women are more likely to join monitoring committees. These results suggest that gender-diverse boards allocate more effort to monitoring. Accordingly, we find that chief executive officer turnover is more sensitive to stock performance and directors receive more equity-based compensation in firms with more gender-diverse boards. However, the average effect of gender diversity on firm performance is negative. This negative effect is driven by companies with fewer takeover defenses. Our results suggest that mandating gender quotas for directors can reduce firm value for well-governed firms.     

Patterns of Entry,Post-Entry Growth and Survival: A Comparison Between Domestic and Foreign Owned Firms

This study compares the patterns of entry, survival and growth of domestic and foreign owned firms. We show that the post-entry behavior of foreign owned firms is quite different from that of their domestic counterparts. Among foreign entrants, we were able to distinguish between those which proceed by creating a new firm and those that acquire an already existing business. Our evidence reveals that the choice of the mode of entry in foreign markets exerts an impact upon the performance of firms that persists long after the moment of entry. As a consequence, our work clearly indicates that there is much to be gained in the understanding ofthe process of entry in foreign markets by studying the behavior of entrants over their first years in these markets.     

Shareholder Value Creation in European M&As

This paper looks at the value generated to shareholders by the announcement of mergers and acquisitions involving firms in the European Union over the period 1998–2000. Cumulative abnormal shareholder returns due to the announcement of a merger reflect a revision of the expected value resulting from future synergies or wealth redistribution among stakeholders. Target firm shareholders receive on average a statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of 9% in a one‐month window centred on the announcement date. Acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns are null on average. When distinguishing in terms of the geographical and sectoral dimensions of the merger deals, our main finding is that mergers in industries that had previously been under government control or that are still heavily regulated generate lower value than M&A announcements in unregulated industries. This low value creation in regulated industries becomes significantly negative when the merger involves two firms from different countries and is primarily due to the lower positive return that shareholders of the target firm enjoy upon the announcement of the merger. This evidence is consistent with the existence of obstacles (such as cultural, legal, or transaction barriers) to the successful conclusion of this type of transaction, which lessen the probability of the merger actually being completed as announced and, therefore, reduce its expected value.