Accumulation and distribution of human capital: the interaction between individual and aggregate variables

The paper analyses the joint evolution of accumulation and distribution of human capital in an OLG framework. Dynamics arises from the interplay between human capital distribution and individual variables—inherited human capital and inborn ability. Such interaction drives individual investment in human capital and accumulation in the economy. According to initial distribution the model provides different dynamical behaviours linking growth and inequality; in general economies with a more equal initial distribution grow faster but other cases are possible. Moreover, since the model provides an endogenous threshold for investing in human capital, the distribution is characterised by multi-modality.     

Financial Innovation and Information: The Role of Derivatives When a Market for Information Exists

We study the effects of financial innovation in a model of endogenousinformation acquisition. We determine the conditions under whichthe introduction of a derivative written on an existing stockincreases or decreases the incentive to purchase information.We show that financial innovation produces some effects whichhold across informational structures and others which differ.The former coincide with the few empirical results that arerobust in the literature (effects on prices, risk premia, andvolatility), while the latter coincide with the ones that differexperiment by experiment (effects on volume, correlation betweenvolume and volatility, and market informational efficiency).     

Evaluation of cooperative research

This report looks at evaluation studies of a number of cooperative academic-industrfy research programmes in Europe, and suggests that indirect economic benefits should be taken into account as well as motives and goals of participating firms.     

Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining

The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted.     

On pricing lookback options under the CEV process

Abstract We consider the problem of pricing European lookback options when the underlying asset price is driven by a constant elasticity of variance (CEV) process. The evaluation model is based on the binomial approximation developed by Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990) and we show how to apply it in the case of such options. We develop simple pricing algorithms that compute accurate estimates of the option prices.     

Concentration and public policies in the broadcasting industry: the future of television

New technologies are deeply transforming the broadcasting industry. What we have seen so far is only the beginning of a long story. Inevitably, industry regulations must adapt, which means that a wide-ranging rethink of current practices is required. In order to assess the likely evolution of the industry, this article decomposes it into a number of components, from conception of programmes to their broadcasting, including distribution, storage and licensing. Contrary to popular expectations, the analysis suggests that the current high degree of concentration will, if anything, increase. The policy implication is that regulation, so far driven by now obsolete technological constraints, should increasingly emphasize promoting competition.