Dynamics of Harvest Subcontracting: The Roles Played by Labour Contractors

A historical perspective of three export agro‐industries in Argentina (lemons, sweet citrus and tobacco) illustrates the range of factors that may foster subcontracting and the choice of subcontracting modalities. The case studies also illustrate that subcontracting is often a fragile strategy that leads to the eventual reabsorption of subcontracted tasks. We argue that the fragility of subcontracting the harvest rests on the inability of producers and labour contractors to negotiate a relationship that favours collaboration and problem solving. This failure is at the root of the high transaction costs of harvest subcontracting that force producers to resort to ancillary investments or sanctions, or to reabsorb some or all of the delegated tasks. A mismatch of resources and technical competence between producers and harvest labour contractors also contributes to inadequate performance of services. It is thus not surprising that harvest labour contractors are not always permanent fixtures; they may appear, disappear and reappear, particularly in fresh fruit export industries.     

The number of banking relationships and the business cycle: New evidence from Colombia

We study the determinants of multiple bank–firm relationships using a uniquely rich data set comprised of information on individual loans of a large number of firms in Colombia. We control for firm-specific variables and find that the business cycle exerts important influence on the number of bank relationships sustained by firms. Our evidence suggests that the number of bank relationships is counter-cyclical, decreasing during macroeconomic expansions and increasing during contractions. However, this effect is stronger for large firms which have more access to alternative sources of funding.     

Board Characteristics,Compliance, and Firm Performance: Empirical Findings from Colombia

Using data from a single database of Colombian firms, we confirmed an endogenous relationship between specific board characteristics, compliance with corporate governance guidelines, and firm performance. A board comprising experts without conflicts of interest is more likely to control ethical behavior, implement audit committees, review compliance with accepted accounting standards, and approve and control the firm’s strategic planning, all of which will lead to an improvement in firm results, and engagement and retention of higher quality board members. Conclusions have strong implications for public policy and managerial practice.