The Effects of Ambiguous Information on Initial and Subsequent IPO Returns

Newly public companies must disclose significant risk factors in the offering prospectus. These disclosures are examples of “soft” or ambiguous information. Ambiguity models predict that investors will alter their portfolio weights and react to subsequent signals about such information. We test for these effects in a sample of 1,398 initial public offerings (IPOs) using word count ratios between soft and hard information as measures of ambiguity. We find a significant relationship between the soft information on risk and both initial and ex post measures of returns. These results support the view that soft information embeds ambiguity and that it influences investors’ portfolio choices.     

Reviews

“Urban unemployment”

Hasluck, C., 1987: Urban Unemployment: Local labour markets and employment initiatives. London, Longman, £6.95 paper.

“Property and industrial development”

Fothergill, S., Monk, S. and Perry, M. 1387: Property and Industrial Development London: Hutchinson, £12.95 paper.

“High-tech”

Breheny, M. J. and McQuaid, R. W. 1987: The Development of High Technology Industries: An International Survey. London: Croom Helm, £35.00.

Monde, C. (ed), 1986: Science Parks -- Their Contribution to Economic Growth. Birmingham: UK Science Parks Association, £15.00 paper.

“American perspectives”

Bergman, Edward M. Editor 1986: Local Economies in Transition: Policy Realities and Development Potentials. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, $40.00 cloth, $16.95, paper.

“Marginal regions”

O'Cearbhaill, D. and Cawley, M. (editors) 1986: New approaches to the development of Marginal Regions, 8th International Seminar on Marginal Regions in association with University College Galway, 3 Vote: no price stated.

“Training without jobs”

Finn, Dan 1987: Training Without Jobs:New Deals and Broken Promises:From Raising the School Leaving Age to the Youth Training Scheme. London: Macmillan £6.95.

“The coopera tive workplace”

Rothschild, J. and Whitt, A. J. 1986: The Cooperative Workplace: potentials and dilemmas of organizational democracy and participation. USA: American Sociological Association Rose Monograph Series, Cambridge University Press. No price stated.

“Opposition to plant closures”

Maunders, A. 1986: A Process of Struggle. Aldershot: Gower £20.00 cloth.

“Property data”

Investment Property Databank, 1987: The IPD Annual Review 1987 London, £45.

“Urban economic development”

Hausner.V. A. (editor) 1987: Critical Issues in Urban Economic Development. Volume II. Oxford: Clarendon Press, £22.50 hardback.     

Click me: an examination of the impact size,color, and design has on banner advertisements generating clicks

Banner advertisements are either ignored or criticized and rarely receive clicks. However, companies tend to use consistent messages but vary the visual characteristics to entice clicks. This study examined 22,978 instances of banner placements measured in weeks from an insurance company in 2016. Results point to the 300 × 250 size, blue ads, and static design generating more clicks than larger sizes, red ads, and animated designs.     

Not just guidelines: Pirate codes and the emergence of property rights in <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Invisible Hook</Emphasis>

Peter Leeson’s The Invisible Hook provides a readable and entertaining narrative of the hidden economics of the Golden Age of Piracy. This essay comments on one particular aspect of Leeson’s work: what we can learn from pirates about the emergence and evolution of property rights? I conclude that pirate codes had their origins in part in legally enforceable agreements and that pirates’ blend of individual and communal property rights bore some resemblance to the property rights of wandering tribal peoples.     

The growth of government in the United States: An economic historian's perspective

This paper first outlines the salient features of the growth of government in American history. Secondly, it offers a neoclassical explanation of that history in which increasing specialization and division of labor brought on by the scientific/technological revolution of the nineteenth century drastically altered the demand for and supply of government. Finally, it argues that institutions matter and describes the way the particular structure of governments was important in the timing and pace of its growth.     

The hiring of accounting and finance officers from audit firms: how did the market react?

This study investigates the market’s reaction to companies hiring accounting and finance officers directly from their external audit firms—the auditor-to-client hiring practice referred to as the “revolving door.” The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) eliminated this hiring practice, reflecting concerns that such appointments may impair audit and financial reporting quality. However, it was also argued that companies may have benefited from hiring individuals already familiar with their systems, organization and personnel. To determine the prevalence of this hiring practice and how shareholders viewed these appointments, we examine 3-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements of newly appointed accounting and finance officers over the period 1985–2002. We find that the proportion of revolving door hires is relatively low (only 6.1% of all hires in our sample), but that when they did occur the market valued the revolving door appointments more positively than other appointments. Further tests reveal that the positive market reaction to revolving door appointments is driven mainly by smaller companies, and that these appointments are not associated with lower financial reporting quality when assessing subsequent discretionary accruals or the receipt of an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER). Overall, the low frequency of occurrence, investors’ positive perceptions, and the lack of association with deteriorated reporting quality indicate that the SOX restriction on revolving door appointments may have been unnecessary and will do little to protect shareholders.