Some Effects of EU Sugar Reforms on Development in Africa

Intereconomics - The sugar industry is a major provider of jobs and income for sugar-exporting countries in Africa. The lower sugar prices that were caused by the recent liberalisation of the EU...     

Antitrust Compliance: Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behavior

This article analyzes a manager's incentives to establish and sustain an illegal collusive agreement if her firm is subject to profit shocks, if her utility function is concave in profits (e.g., because of risk aversion), and if she incurs opportunity costs (e.g., by violating a social norm). The model supports the empirical observation that if collusion is to be established and sustained in a state with low profits, then this state must be quite persistent. It also indicates that compliance with antitrust laws can be ensured best by combining a zero tolerance policy with a strategy of forgiveness. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Die neuen Leitlinien für EU-Regionalbeihilfen 2014 bis 2020 aus ökonomischer Sicht

This article analyses the European Commission’s Guidelines on Regional State Aid for 2014–2020 that were passed in late June 2013. The author argues that some elements of these guidelines are neither in line with economic theory nor with related guidelines and communications of the Commission. Before applying the guidelines, some rules, e.g. on market delineation and foreclosure, should be defined more clearly.     

The Value of Collusion with Endogenous Capacity and Demand Uncertainty

Collusion has often been alleged in industries where long‐lived capacity investments are important. This article develops a computational duopoly model with capacity investments, demand shocks and either competitive or collusive pricing. It shows that allowing for endogenous capacity investments can sometimes make collusion less valuable than competition and that it can change the normal relationships between the profitability of collusion and both the discount rate and industry‐wide demand shocks.     

CO2-Bepreisung beeinflusst den Wettbewerb — und profitiert von ihm

Wirtschaftsdienst - Maßnahmen zur Begrenzung des Klimawandels haben Auswirkungen auf den Wettbewerb. Am Beispiel des Brennstoffemissionshandelsgesetzes lässt sich zeigen, warum die...     

Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings and Collusion

Review of Industrial Organization - This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and...     

Staatliche Beihilfen und Beihilfenkontrolle im Agrarsektor

In 2010, EU member states granted worth yy10.3bn aid to their agricultural sector. Given the requirement to revise the guidelines for state aid in the agricultural sector by the end of 2013, this article presents the legal rules and facts of this topic from an economic point of view. It is shown that economic methods which have been increasingly used in state aid control for non-agricultural sectors since 2005 can also be used for the analysis of state aid in the agricultural sector. Additional research is required to further develop these methods and establish the benefi ts of their application.