Investment liberalization — Why a restrictive cross-border merger policy can be counterproductive

Investment liberalizing countries are often concerned that cross-border mergers and acquisitions, in contrast to greenfield investments, might have an adverse effect on domestic firms and consumers. However, given that domestic assets are sufficiently scarce, we identify a preemption effect and an asset complementarity effect, which imply that the acquisition price is substantially higher than the domestic seller's profits. Moreover, we show that for the acquisition to take place, the MNE must be sufficiently efficient when using the domestic assets, otherwise rivals will expand their business, thereby making the acquisition unprofitable. Consequently, restricting cross-border M&As may also hurt consumers.     

Privatization and foreign competition

This paper determines the equilibrium market structure in an international oligopoly, where a state enterprise is sold at an auction. The paper suggests that high greenfield costs and high trade costs do not necessarily induce foreign acquisitions in privatizations, despite the fact that foreign firms would gain considerably from acquiring in such situations. The reason is that domestic firms can then prevent foreign firms from becoming strong local competitors and thus, their willingness to pay for the state assets is high.     

Should countries block foreign takeovers of R&D champions and promote greenfield entry?

Abstract In R&D intensive industries, governments promote greenfield foreign investments, while being sceptical towards foreign acquisitions of domestic high‐quality firms. We develop a theoretical model that shows that foreign acquisitions are conducive to high‐quality targets because of strategic effects on the sales price. However, foreign firms ‘cherry pick’ high‐quality targets to expand R&D rather than to downsize. Otherwise, rivals expand R&D, making the acquisition unprofitable. Thus, our model predicts that acquired affiliates invest more in R&D than greenfield affiliates. Using affiliate data, we find evidence that acquired affiliates have a higher level of sequential R&D intensity than greenfield affiliates.     

Cross-border acquisitions and taxes: efficiency and tax revenues

Abstract .  We develop a theoretical oligopoly model to study how international differences in profit and capital gains taxes affect foreign acquisitions. Reductions in foreign profit taxes tend to trigger inefficient foreign acquisitions, while reductions in foreign capital gains taxes may trigger efficient foreign acquisitions. Foreign acquisitions can increase domestic tax revenues even when profit taxes are evaded. The reason is that bidding competition between foreign firms ensures that all benefits from the acquisition, including tax advantages, are captured by a domestic seller paying capital gains taxes. Tax code issues, such as the treatment of goodwill, are shown to affect the pattern of foreign acquisitions.     

Multinational Firms and Plant Divestiture

Multinational firms not only make acquisitions, but also frequently divest affiliates. Affiliate divestiture is the result of many factors, some internal and some external to the firm. Using detailed confidential survey data of Swedish multinationals, we are able to examine divestiture decisions within the context of the world‐wide affiliate network of the firm. In contrast, most existing studies of multinational exit focus on one country only. A model of mergers and acquisitions with financing constraints generates predictions regarding the correlation between affiliate size and the decision to sell. Consistent with this theory, we find that larger affiliates are more likely to be divested, but an increase in relative size of an affiliate reduces the probability of divestiture. Additional network characteristics, the presence of other affiliates nearby and sales of affiliates elsewhere, are also positively correlated with divestiture. We find no support for the notion of footloose multinationals.     

Globalization and profitability of cross-border mergers and acquisitions

This paper studies how the surplus generated by the globalization process is divided between MNEs and owners of domestic assets. We construct an oligopoly model where the equilibrium acquisition pattern, the acquisition price and firms’ greenfield investments are endogenously determined. Acquisition entry is shown to be more likely when the complementarity between domestic and foreign assets is high. However, we show that such acquisitions might have a low profitability, since the bidding competition over the domestic assets is then so fierce that the firms involved would be better off not starting a bidding war. Risks associated with different entry modes are also examined.     

Entrepreneurial innovations,competition and competition policy

We construct a model where an entrepreneur can innovate for entry or for sale. It is shown that increased product market competition tends to increase the relative profitability of innovation for sale. Increased competition not only reduces the profits of entrants and the acquirer of the inventions in a similar fashion, but also reduces the profit of non-acquirers. Therefore, incumbents' valuations of innovations are less negatively affected by increased competition, and the incentive for innovation for sale can increase with increased competition. Moreover, a stricter, but not too strict, merger policy is shown to increase the incentive for innovations for sale by ensuring the bidding competition for the innovation.     

Cross-Border Mergers & Acquisitions Policy in Service Markets

We provide facts showing that in service markets: (i) restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) are under reform, (ii) cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions dominate as the entry mode of FDI, and (iii) there is often a high market concentration. Based on these facts, we present a model for analyzing cross-border merger and acquisition policy in liberalized service markets taking into account efficiency and market power effects. Our findings suggest that a merger policy, but not a discriminatory policy towards foreigners, seems warranted. Moreover, policies ensuring competition for domestic target firms seem warranted. In this vein, harmonization of the EU takeover regulations may particularly benefit assets owners in countries with many target firms.     

Making it work in free agent work: The coping practices of Swedish freelance journalists

Studies of post-industrial work have shown how workers are increasingly shouldering the risk of and the responsibility for social protection, work shortages, professional training, and securing a stream of continuous incoming work. This study of Swedish freelance journalists examines how these free agents cope with a situation whereby the need exists to actively bear the full responsibility for attracting and contracting, producing, and billing their work as journalists. The empirical material shows how freelancers engage in various coping practices to secure both sufficient amounts of work and the accompanying economic compensation. Freelancers who “make it work” are often those managing to embed themselves in long-standing relationships with clients and colleagues, thus ensuring a long-term work horizon and a steady income. Even so, the inherent “responsibilization” of contemporary work is amplified and intensified by the freelance work mode. This study makes two contributions: Firstly, it provides knowledge of free agent work in a Swedish context, a national setting that is often presumed to be a “role model” for good working conditions. Secondly, it highlights the specifics of managing work that entails a continuous stream of sequential and parallel assignments of limited duration and the ongoing “employment management work” this entails as regards making sure assignments keep “coming in”.     

Subsidizing Away Exports? A Note on R&D-policy Towards Multinational Firms

In this paper, I investigate whether instead of strengthening home-based production, government R&D-subsidies can induce R&D-intensive firms to locate production abroad. Investigating firm-level data on Swedish MNEs, however, I find no evidence of such relocation. R&D subsidies rather tend to encourage export production at the expense of foreign production. The theory presented suggests that this is consistent with technology transfer costs, which outweigh trade costs for physical goods.