All–Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards

We study all–pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder's privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid.     

If you feel it now you will think it later: The interactive effects of mood over time on brand extension evaluations

While mood has been found to affect brand extension evaluations, the specific mechanisms by which it affects those evaluations remain largely untested. This study suggests that mood‐induced differences in cognitive processing style (relational vs. item‐specific elaboration) are possible explanations affecting brand extension evaluations. Results of two experiments showed that consumers in a positive (vs. negative) mood engaged in relational (vs. item‐specific) elaboration and consequently evaluated brand extensions and brand extension fit more favorably than consumers in a negative mood. The effects were found immediately after exposure (Experiment 1) and after a one‐week delay (Experiment 2). Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Participation Constraints

We study all‐pay contests with an exogenous minimal effort constraint where a player can participate in a contest only if his effort (output) is equal to or higher than the minimal effort constraint. Contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. The designer decides about the size and number of prizes. We analyze the optimal prize allocation for the contest designer who wishes to maximize either the total effort or the highest effort. It is shown that if the minimal effort constraint is relatively high, the winner‐take‐all contest in which the contestant with the highest effort wins the entire prize sum does not maximize the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. Rather, a random contest in which the entire prize sum is equally allocated to all the participants yields a higher expected total effort as well as a higher expected highest effort.     

Calendar Effects on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange

For daily data on a value-weighted index of all shares in the Netherlands (1981-1998), we find abnormally high returns in the pre-Christmas period of the second half of December and around the turn of the month, whereas returns are negative and volatility is relatively high on the Mondays where the previous week's return is below zero. Furthermore, our evidence indicates the presence of an ARCH(1) effect. Our intraday results based on an equal-weighted index of the leading shares in the Netherlands (1986-1993) reveal a U-shaped return pattern over each trading day, Monday morning excluded. Moreover, our tests reveal repeated price adjustments mostly in the same direction around and over non-trading periods. We argue that the arrival of private information is affected by strategic and behavioral factors incompatible with the risk-return paradigm.     

The effects of mood,gender, and ad context on type of elaboration and product evaluation

An experiment was conducted to examine the effects of mood, gender, and ad context in relation to item-specific and relational elaboration, product evaluation, and purchase intention. Specifically, mood, gender, and ad context were posited to interact. The findings supported hypotheses predicting that mood interacted with gender to influence the type of elaboration. The findings also demonstrated that mood, gender, and ad context interacted to influence product evaluation and purchase intention. Furthermore, the findings showed that mood did not override gender predisposition of elaboration. Instead, mood acted to enhance elaboration that is predisposed by gender. Theoretical and practical implications were discussed regarding how women and men in different mood states process information in different ad contexts.     

Round‐Robin Tournaments with a Dominant Player

We analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of the round‐robin tournament with one strong (dominant) and two weak players, and we compare this tournament and the one‐stage contest with respect to the players' expected payoffs, expected total effort, and their probabilities of winning. We find that if the contest designer's goal is to maximize the players' expected total effort, then – if the asymmetry between the players is relatively low – the one‐stage contest should be used. However, if the asymmetry is relatively high, then the round‐robin tournament should be used.     

A new measurement method of investor overconfidence

We present an alternative measurement method of investor overconfidence, using unique survey data on stock market predictions of investors. We apply the Parkinson estimate based on extreme bounds around the stock forecast to deduce investor confidence. The results support overconfidence.     

Seeing the Big Picture: Multitasking and Perceptual Processing Influences on Ad Recognition

Media multitasking has been shown to have negative consequences for ad memory. However, there may be situations and individuals for which multitasking is not always detrimental to memory for ads. Two studies explored how analytic and holistic processing styles (trait or mood induced) affect perceptual processing. Similar to previous findings, people processing in an analytic style showed decreased ad recognition when performing multiple tasks; however, ad recognition did not decrease for people processing holistically. People who were processing holistically also demonstrated better recollection memory for the ads seen while multitasking than did analytic processors. Differences in advertising recognition measures (familiarity and recollection), load types, and implications for advertising are also discussed.     

Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning

We study two-stage all-pay contests in which synergy exists between the stages. The value of winning for each contestant is fixed in the first stage while it is effort-dependent in the second one. We assume that a player’s effort in the first stage either increases (positive synergy) or decreases (negative synergy) his value of winning in the second stage. The subgame perfect equilibrium of this contest is analyzed with either positive or negative synergy. We show, in particular, that whether the contestants are symmetric or asymmetric their expected payoffs may be higher under negative synergy than under positive synergy. Consequently, they prefer smaller values of winning (negative synergy) over higher ones (positive synergy).