The Valuation Model for a Risky Asset When Its Risky Factors Follow Gamma Distributions

This paper constructed a pricing model for the asset with multi‐risks by specifying the risky factors (i.e., interest rate and termination hazard rates) to follow gamma distributions. The model not only avoids the possibility of the termination hazard rate taking an irrational (i.e., negative) value, but it also makes it easier to derive a valuation formula for a risky asset. Our model can also effortless apply because the parameters of the gamma distribution can easily be estimated from market data. An example using Taiwanese bond data illustrates how the model can be utilized for practical applications. To facilitate understanding of how accurately the different models price risky bonds, we compare their out‐of‐sample pricing errors for different hazard rate specifications assuming normal and gamma distributions. The results show that our pricing formula is realistic and accurate in its applications. Therefore, it should help market participants to accurately price risky assets and to effectively manage complicated portfolios.     

Toward a More Humanistic Governance Model: Network Governance Structures

This conceptual article suggests a reexamination of current governance structures, specifically those of unitary boards after the financial crisis of 2008. We suggest that the existing governance structures are based on an outdated paradigm of business, rooted in economics. We propose an alternative paradigm, a more humanistic paradigm, which allows conceiving alternative, network-oriented governance structures. As hierarchical firms grow larger and more complex, the risk of failure increases from biases, errors, and missing data in communication and control systems. These problems are exacerbated by information overload on senior managers, directors, and their respective regulators. In contrast to traditional corporate governance, network governance introduces a division of power via multiple boards, checks and balances, and active stakeholder engagement. We argue that those features could have prevented the stresses and failures of financial firms in 2008, since they were anticipated by both individuals within firms and external commentators. However, those exposed to risks possessed insufficient influence in either governing and/or regulating firms to take corrective action.     

Determining an Optimal Principal Limit Factor for Reverse Mortgages under Economics-Based Models

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Determining an optimal principal limit factor (PLF) is important for a reverse mortgage (RM) contract because it mainly influences the development...