全文获取类型
收费全文 | 105篇 |
免费 | 5篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 6篇 |
工业经济 | 4篇 |
计划管理 | 9篇 |
经济学 | 64篇 |
贸易经济 | 8篇 |
农业经济 | 10篇 |
经济概况 | 9篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 2篇 |
2021年 | 2篇 |
2020年 | 3篇 |
2018年 | 1篇 |
2017年 | 5篇 |
2016年 | 4篇 |
2014年 | 3篇 |
2013年 | 8篇 |
2012年 | 6篇 |
2011年 | 3篇 |
2010年 | 1篇 |
2009年 | 4篇 |
2008年 | 3篇 |
2007年 | 9篇 |
2006年 | 2篇 |
2005年 | 5篇 |
2004年 | 3篇 |
2003年 | 8篇 |
2002年 | 5篇 |
2001年 | 2篇 |
2000年 | 3篇 |
1999年 | 3篇 |
1998年 | 5篇 |
1997年 | 2篇 |
1995年 | 2篇 |
1993年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 2篇 |
1982年 | 1篇 |
1981年 | 2篇 |
1980年 | 2篇 |
1978年 | 1篇 |
1976年 | 1篇 |
1975年 | 1篇 |
1974年 | 2篇 |
1973年 | 1篇 |
1970年 | 1篇 |
1969年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有110条查询结果,搜索用时 125 毫秒
1.
Wolfgang Buchholz Swapan Dasgupta Tapan Mitra 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2005,107(3):547-561
In a standard exhaustible resource model, it is known that if, along a competitive path, investment in the augmentable capital good equals the rents on the exhaustible resource (known as Hartwick's rule), then the path is equitable in the sense that the consumption level is constant over time. In this paper, we show the converse of this result: if a competitive path is equitable, then it must satisfy Hartwick's rule. 相似文献
2.
Kenneth J. Arrow Partha Dasgupta Karl-Göran Mäler 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2003,26(4):647-685
We are interested in three related questions:(1) How should accounting prices be estimated?(2) How should we evaluate policy change in animperfect economy? (3) How can we check whetherintergenerational well-being will be sustainedalong a projected economic programme? We do notpresume that the economy is convex, nor do weassume that the government optimizes on behalfof its citizens. We show that the same set ofaccounting prices should be used both forpolicy evaluation and for assessing whether ornot intergenerational welfare along a giveneconomic path will be sustained. We also showthat a comprehensive measure of wealth,computed in terms of the accounting prices, canbe used as an index for problems (2) and (3)above. The remainder of the paper is concernedwith rules for estimating the accounting pricesof several specific environmental naturalresources, transacted in a few well knowneconomic institutions. 相似文献
3.
On the concept of optimum population 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
Dasgupta PS 《The Review of economic studies》1969,36(3):295-318
The economic welfare of a community is affected by policies that determine both the rate of capital accumulation and the rate of growth of population. The optimum size of population at any point is time will depend on the size of the existing capital stock and the optimum rate of savings will depend on the existing number of people. Consequently, in this sense, a population policy cannot be developed without a concurrent savings policy. The criterion of optimality that will be used is the ma ximization of the total discounted welfare of all generations from now to infinity. The problem will be to select that rate of savings and that size of population at every moment which will achieve this maximum welfare if, in fact, a maximum exists. An inquiry is made into the existence of an optimum policy under various circumstances. An attempt is made to evaluate the consequences of various ethical beliefs. 相似文献
4.
Subhasish M. Chowdhury 《Southern economic journal》2017,84(2):375-390
I model innovation contests as an all‐pay auction in which it is possible not to achieve successful innovation despite costly R&D investments, and as a result, there is no winner. In such a case, the winning payoff turns out to be nonmonotonic in own bid. I derive the sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, and fully characterize the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibrium. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the support of the low‐value bidder is not continuous, and both the high‐value and the low‐value bidders place an atom in the (distinct) lower bound of their respective support. Under symmetric valuation, both bidders place an atom at zero. These results can explain why one does not observe very low quality innovation in real life, or why even symmetric firms may stay out of an innovation contest. 相似文献
5.
We revisit the meta-analysis of Sheremeta on overbidding in contest experiments and focus on the effect of endowment on overbidding. Sheremeta assumes, and finds evidence of, an increasing linear relationship between endowment and overbidding, Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) predicts an increasing concave relationship, while Baik and colleagues find an inverted U-shaped relationship in their analysis of a single experiment. We use the same data as in Sheremeta, but employ a different econometric model which leads to support for both QRE and the inverted U-shaped relationship. Following Baik and colleagues, we posit that the inverted-U relationship may be interpreted in terms of a wealth effect. 相似文献
6.
Learning and knowledge diffusion in a global economy 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Kunal Dasgupta 《Journal of International Economics》2012,87(2):323-336
I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model to understand how multinationals affect host countries through knowledge diffusion. Workers in the model learn from their managers and knowledge diffusion takes place through worker mobility. Unlike in a model without learning, I present a novel mechanism through which an integrated equilibrium represents a Pareto improvement for the host country. I go on to explore other dynamic consequences of integration. The entry of multinationals makes the lifetime earning profiles of host country workers steeper. At the same time, if agents learn fast enough, integration creates unequal opportunities, thereby widening inequality. The ex-workers of foreign multinationals also found new firms which are, on average, larger than the largest firms under autarky. 相似文献
7.
A bargaining model of regulation is developed. It is shown that regulated firms can improve their bargaining positions and induce the regulator to set higher prices for firm output by choosing more debt. Firms, in choosing an optimal level of debt, trade off this bargaining advantage against expected bankruptcy costs. The model predicts that firms would tend to choose higher levels of debt in harsher regulatory environments. This prediction is shown to be consistent with cross-sectional evidence for U.S. electric utilities for the sample period 1972–1983. 相似文献
8.
9.
We study how shocks to some business segments affect investment in a firm's non-shock segments. We find that subsequent investment in the non-shock segments is significantly lower compared to segments of firms that do not experience shocks. Surprisingly, lower availability of internal funds does not account for the lower investment. We find that segment shocks propagate within the firm by decreasing the value of collateral assets and reducing the availability of external finance. Our results support the operation of an external finance collateral channel ([Kiyotaki, N., Moore, J., 1997. Credit cycles. Journal of Political Economy 105, 211–248.]) previously discussed in the literature. 相似文献
10.
Subhasish Dugar 《Review of Industrial Organization》2007,30(2):107-119
Price-matching guarantees have been alleged to sustain collusive prices in a homogenous product market. Theories in this literature
also suggest that there exist multiple equilibria (i.e., a set of price equilibria between the competitive and the monopoly
price) when all sellers adopt these guarantees in such a market. Theoretical prediction in this case fails to pin down the
actual behavior of players a priori. This paper illustrates the essential role of controlled experiment in testing the collusive theory of price-matching guarantees
and thereby shedding light on the embedded equilibrium selection problem. In particular, this paper studies two highly stylized
market models, obtains testable predictions, and lays out the design of the controlled experiment. Results indicate that these
guarantees facilitate collusion among sellers and thus solve the equilibrium selection problem considerably.
I am grateful to Jim Cox, Martin Dufwenberg, Haimanti Bhattacharya, and the editor of this journal and the two referees for
their suggestions. I thank seminar participants at the University of Arizona and North American Economic Science Association
meeting at Tucson, 2003 for their helpful comments. A research grant from ESL, University of Arizona, for this project is
gratefully acknowledged. I am solely responsible for any remaining errors and omissions. 相似文献