BANK PRIVATIZATION AND CONVERGENCE OF PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

We trace the extent of performance deviation of privatized banks from established private banks in 30 countries from 1994 to 2005 and investigate the role of bank regulatory and supervisory norms, market competition, ownership structure, deposit insurance scheme, and governance structure affecting the deviation. Evidence shows that privatization does improve the performance of banks in the first year of being privatized, but performance gradually declines, which is consistent with the government restructuring argument before the privatization. Governance, foreign ownership, banking freedom (regulations), and the deposit insurance scheme in respective economies are found to affect performance deviation significantly.     

Comparison of SML and GMM estimators for the random coefficient logit model using aggregate data

A simulated maximum likelihood (SML) estimator for the random coefficient logit model using aggregate data is found to be more efficient than the widely used generalized method of moments estimator (GMM) of Berry et?al. (Econometrica 63:841?C890, 1995). In particular, the SML estimator is better than the GMM estimator in recovery of heterogeneity parameters which are often of central interest in marketing research. With the GMM estimator, the analyst must determine what moment conditions to use for parameter identification, especially the heterogeneity parameters. With the SML estimator, the moment conditions are automatically determined as the gradients of the log-likelihood function, and these are the most efficient ones if the model is correctly specified. Another limitation of the GMM estimator is that the product market shares must be strictly positive while the SML estimator can handle zero market share observations. Properties of the SML and GMM estimators are demonstrated in simulated data and in data from the US photographic film market.     

An examination of selected marketing mix elements and brand equity

This study explores the relationships between selected marketing mix elements and the creation of brand equity. The authors propose a conceptual framework in which marketing elements are related to the dimensions of brand equity, that is, perceived quality, brand loyalty, and brand associations combined with brand awareness. These dimensions are then related to brand equity. The empirical tests using a structural equation model support the research hypotheses. The results show that frequent price promotions, such as price deals, are related to low brand equity, whereas high advertising spending, high price, good store image, and high distribution intensity are related to high brand equity. Boonghee Yoo (Ph.D., Georgia State University) is an assistant professor of marketing at St. Cloud State University. His research interests include brand equity, cross-cultural scale development, service quality, retail productivity, Internet marketing, and marketing methodology. He has published previously in theJournal of Retailing, theJournal of Business Research, theJournal of Business & Industrial Marketing, theJournal of Service Research, and theJournal of Marketing Channels. Naveen Donthu (Ph. D., University of Texas, Austin) is a professor of marketing at Georgia State University. His research interests center on research methodology, site selection models, comparative and outdoor advertising, brand equity, Hispanic consumer research, cross-cultural issues, and customer satisfaction. His work has appeared in journals such asMarketing Science, theJournal of Marketing Research, theJournal of Consumer Research, theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, theJournal of Advertising, theJournal of Advertising Research, theJournal of Retailing, and theJournal of Business Research. Sungho Lee (Ph.D., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) is an assistant professor of marketing at the University of Seoul, South Korea. His research focuses on understanding consumers’ cognitive processing of brand and price information, brand extension and brand equity, and advertising-driven persuasion processes. He has published previously inAdvances in Consumer Research, Asia-Pacific Advances in Consumer Research, Academy of Marketing Science-World Marketing Congress, Korean Marketing Review, andKorean Management Review.     

Capturing flexible correlations in multiple-discrete choice outcomes using copulas

This paper aims to examine three purchase patterns which frequently occur in multiple-discrete choice situations: joint-purchase, quantity-preference, and quantity-concordance. First, “joint-purchase” refers to the tendency that two products are either purchased together or separately. Second, “quantity-preference” refers to the tendency to purchase a product in preferred amounts. Third, “quantity-concordance” refers to the tendency that purchase quantities of two products are either concordant or discordant. These patterns are mainly attributed to unobserved factors such as economic reasons, habits, time pressure, mood, and/or physical environment. No study has fully incorporated the three purchase patterns simultaneously.In this study, we develop a unified copula-based approach which can incorporate all the three purchase patterns simultaneously. The proposed approach is so flexible that any copula function or parametric distribution can be used. We use a simulation study to illustrate the trade-off between the Gaussian copula and the FGM copula. We show the Gaussian copula which captures the full range of correlations quickly becomes infeasible as the number of choice alternatives increases. On the contrary, the FGM copula substantially reduces the computational complexity and is scalable to larger dimensions. Furthermore, we extend the range of correlations of the FGM copula at almost no cost by introducing the sine generating function. To show the scalability, we apply this approach to IRI scanner panel data with 13 alternatives. Throughout two empirical studies, we show that the three purchase patterns indeed exist in our data. Moreover, we find that ignoring the three purchase patterns distorts key managerial metrics such as demand predictions and price elasticities. This results in suboptimal managerial decisions regarding peelies promotions, bundling, and package size. Furthermore, we illustrate that managers can improve the profitability of promotions by implementing a joint promotion strategy based on the three purchase patterns.     

Parallel Imports,their Deterrence and Accommodation with Service Differentiation

In the traditional economics models, parallel imports prevent a manufacturer from price discrimination involving the same good between countries. As a result, the manufacturer loses profit and tries to discourage parallel imports. The consumers in low-price countries also lose when parallel imports are legalized because the price in such countries increases. When value-added services such as a warranty and technical support are available only for the authorized product (i.e., when services are differentiated), however, the manufacturer may obtain a larger profit with parallel imports, as shown in literature. We extend this study by analyzing the case in which the manufacturer can choose the level of value-added services. It turns out that the manufacturer may even encourage parallel imports when the cost for value-added services is not too low or too high. We also show that the consumers in low-price countries may gain when parallel imports are legalized.     

Knowledge complexity and the performance of inter‐unit knowledge replication structures

Research Summary: Intra‐firm replication of complex knowledge is difficult yet critical to firm growth and the exploitation of competitive advantage. Inter‐unit organizational structures can facilitate the replication of complex knowledge between a source unit and a recipient unit. This study examines how inter‐unit organizational structures perform at different levels of knowledge complexity. We dimensionalize the patterns of information‐processing interactions according to three specific factors: the degree of inter‐unit connectivity, the extent of mirroring between the structure and the knowledge configuration, and coordination mechanisms. Simulation analyses offer a set of novel findings on how the information‐processing and bounded‐rationality concerns of organizational design impact the replication performance of the structures. We derive optimal structures for different levels of knowledge complexity, and articulate their theoretical and practical implications. Managerial Summary: The growth of firms often involves redeployment of their complex knowledge to new subunits or markets, in the context of acquisitions, alliances, or the creation of multinational subsidiaries. Complex knowledge is difficult to imitate, and thus, serves as a source of competitive advantage. However, it is also challenging to replicate within a firm, which limits firms’ ability to redeploy their capabilities in pursuit of new opportunities. A proper design of inter‐unit structures can facilitate the replication of complex knowledge between intra‐firm units. This study examines how the design of inter‐unit structures affects the outcome of this replication. Our results suggest that managers in charge of redeployment efforts should be mindful of the connectivity among units, coordination mechanisms, information overload, and the level of knowledge complexity.     

GRANTING AN EXIT OPTION TO CONDUCT AN AUDIT

We study a principal–agent relationship with auditing in which information from an audit is ‘soft’– by conducting an audit, the principal observes the agent's private information, but cannot obtain verifiable evidence on the information. Moreover, the principal's auditing effort is unverifiable in our model. Therefore, besides the agent's misreporting incentive, there is the principal's incentive to accuse the truthful agent even without auditing. If the principal's auditing effort is verifiable, granting no exit option to the agent is optimal although the principal can still accuse a truthful agent after the audit. We show that when the principal's auditing effort is unverifiable, granting an exit option to the agent and auditing are complementary. Without granting an exit option to the agent, no auditing is optimal, and the principal grants an exit option to conduct a sincere audit, which in turn mitigates the agent's misreporting incentive. Our analysis also reveals that, when the cost of auditing is sufficiently large, the principal conducts more sincere audits with a smaller amount of penalty.     

Minimum safety standards with asymmetric safety costs

We explore the welfare effect of minimum safety standards, focusing on the case where duopoly firms are asymmetric in that they have different safety effort costs. If duopoly firms are symmetric, they do not provide enough safety to be socially efficient, and so imposing minimum safety standards can resolve this problem. We show, however, that imposing minimum safety standards may reduce the social welfare when there is a large asymmetry in the safety effort costs. In the unregulated equilibrium, the high-cost firm’s safety effort is smaller than that of the low-cost firm, and the high-cost firm is more likely to provide a larger safety effort than is needed to have a socially efficient level with larger asymmetry in the safety effort costs. If safety standards raise the high-cost firm’s safety effort, both firms’ safety efforts may end up further away from the socially efficient level: the low-cost firm reduces its safety effort when the rival’s effort increases because safety efforts are strategic substitutes.     

Informed principal and information gathering agent

We study a principal–agent model in which the principal has a production technology. The efficiency parameter of the principal’s technology is not known to the agent. Alternatively, the principal can make the agent use a technology from a different channel. By gathering information at a cost, the agent can be informed privately of the efficiency of the technology that he may acquire from another source. We find that the principal requires the agent to adopt the principal’s technology more (less) often when the cost of gathering information on the other technology is small (large). Also, with two states of nature, the outcome is first-best when the information gathering cost is intermediate.      

Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils

Both bribery and extortion weaken the power of incentives, but there is a trade‐off in fighting the two because rewards to prevent supervisors from accepting bribes create incentives for extortion. Which is the worse evil? A fear of inducing extortion may make it optimal to tolerate bribery, but extortion is never allowed. Extortion discourages “good behavior” because the agent suffers from it even though he has done the right thing, whereas a bribe acts as a penalty for “bad behavior.” Our analysis provides lessons to fight corruption and explanations why developed countries may have an advantage in dealing with extortion.