Managing the transfer of capabilities within multinational corporations:: the dual role of the subsidiary

In this article, the relation is explored between the external technical embeddedness of the subsidiary, its assigned role, and capability development in the MNC. It is argued that assigning roles of responsibility or mandates to certain subsidiaries can effect integration of subsidiary-developed knowledge in the MNC. Departing from literature on the market-as-networks perspective and writings from recent years on subsidiary roles, hypotheses are developed and a model outlined. The model describes a significant link between the external technical embeddedness of the subsidiary and its assigned role within the MNC, and a significant relation between the subsidiary's assigned role and its importance for other units’ capability development. The model is tested on a sample of 97 subsidiaries using the LISREL 8.3 statistical method. The final model implies that by assigning specific roles to different subsidiaries, headquarters can exploit the knowledge developed in the external environments of these subsidiaries.     

Issues in the estimation and application of latent structure models of choice

Our paper provides a brief review and summary of issues and advances in the use of latent structure and other finite mixture models in the analysis of choice data. Focus is directed to three primary areas: (1) estimation and computational issues, (2) specification and interpretation issues, and (3) future research issues. We comment on what latent structure models have promised, what has been, to date, delivered, and what we should look forward to in the future.     

Optimales Vertragsdesign bei moralischem Risiko in der Rückversicherung

This paper addresses the optimal design of risk sharing arrangements in reinsurance contracts with asymmetric information concerning the primary insurer’s behavior. The latter usually has significant unobservable discretions, for instance with respect to risk selection, implying a moral hazard problem. We show that the existence of moral hazard strongly affects the characteristics of the reinsurance indemnification rule, i. e. the connection between the level of losses and the indemnity, which is specified in the contract. For this analysis, a standard model framework from the theory of optimal reinsurance with perfect information is modified by the assumption that the primary insurer has unobservable control of the probability distribution of the extent of losses. In particular, the solution indicates that for this situation, a Pareto-optimal indemnity rule is less steep, and therefore the primary insurer’s share in a marginal increase of the loss is greater, compared to the case of complete information. A deductible, however, turns out not to be a suitable approach in this context.     

Are stationarity and cointegration restrictions really necessary for the intertemporal budget constraint?

Time series related to fiscal and external deficits are commonly subjected to stationarity and cointegration tests to assess if the deficits are sustainable. Such tests are incapable of rejecting sustainability. The intertemporal budget constraint proves to be satisfied if either the debt series or the revenue and with-interest spending series are integrated of arbitrarily high order, i.e., stationary after differencing arbitrarily often. Revenues and spending do not have to be cointegrated. Rejections of low-order difference-stationarity and of cointegration are thus consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint. Error-correction-type policy reaction functions are suggested as more promising for understanding deficit problems.     

The Impact of Non-Normality and Estimation Methods in SEM on Satisfaction Research in Marketing

This paper discusses consequences of violating the normal distribution assumption imbedded in Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). Based on real data from a large sample customer satisfaction survey we follow the procedures as suggested in leading textbooks. We document consequences of this practice and discuss its impact on decision making in marketing.     

Delaying integration of immigrant labor for the purpose of taxation

Delayed integration (DI) is a rule for taxing migrants. It requires that immigrants be taxed in the host country only after some period of transition. Conversely, emigrants are released from the obligation to pay taxes only after a certain period. DI is an alternative to the Employment Principle and the Home-Country Principle. The former governs the international taxation of labor. The latter is a close substitute for the Nationality Principle, on which US tax law is based. The paper studies DI in a setting which allows one to trade off the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation and of wasteful government.     

Außenhandelsstruktur und Faktorintensität 1962/1977

Summary As a supplement to the findings presented in an article in volume 2/1978 of this journal byG. Fink andJ. Skolka some further results concerning the capital and labour intensity of Austria's trade are provided. These results are based on a more disaggregated input-output approach and on modified ways to measure direct capital and labour inputs and seem to strenghten the hypothesis that in 1964 the capital and labour intensity of Austria's foreign trade was more or less neutral.The same approach was used to investigate the effects of the changing composition of export and import bundles on the factor intensities for the period 1962/1977. Although the structure of both exports and imports changed remarkable over this period the total content of labour and capital remained rather stable and the evolution was almost paralell for exports and imports.     

Concave utility on finite sets

When does a preference relation on a finite set have a concave or a strictly concave utility function? We provide a complete answer. Our proof is an application of the Theorem of the Alternative, and constructs a concave utility if one exists.     

The effects on investment incentives of an allowance for corporate equity tax system: the Belgian case as an example

The Modigliani–Miller theorem serves as the standard finance paradigm on corporate capital structure and managerial decision making. Implicitly, it is assumed that the market possesses full information about the firm. However, if firm managers have insider information, they may attempt to ‘signal’ changes in the firm’s financial structure and, in competitive equilibrium, shareholders will draw deductions from such signals. Empirical work shows that the value of underlying firms rises with leverage because investors expect such firms to implement positive NPV projects. We empirically examine this view using a sample of debt issue announcements by publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. We argue that the timing of debt issues is fundamental in determining the relationship between leverage and risk-adjusted returns. We show that an announcing firm’s intrinsic value may not rise depending on when management publicly ‘signals’ changes in their firm’s capital structure. Specifically, we show that risk-adjusted returns rise positively for firms that make debt announcements during normal economic conditions while they tend to decline for firms making debt announcements during recessionary periods. During recessionary periods, market risk and loss aversion rise and investors focus less on the potential growth of debt announcing firms and focus more on potential losses instead. We conclude that the timing of new debt is of paramount importance and managers’ inability to prudently time such announcements can lead to exacerbated levels of systematic risk coupled with a significant erosion in shareholder wealth.