Research on charitable giving has known a renewed interest over the last years. Despite a recent evolution, the literature remains predominantly Anglo‐Saxon, and studies are consequently conducted in societies marked by a strong charitable giving culture. In that respect, donors are generally considered as isolated individuals, and the impact of social and environmental factors such as public policies, institutional specificities, and punctual events is often underestimated. Moreover, research on generosity often suffers from the absence of reliable data, free of desirability bias. Based on fiscal data of tax returns and gift tax returns provided by the official Belgian statistics bureau, this research investigates individual donating behaviors while considering the influence of environmental determinants on generosity. More specifically, we empirically assess the generosity of Belgian households over a period of 8 years marked by natural disasters, massive calls for public generosity, and changes in tax policies. Among other things, we qualify the results of previous research on the role of age and open the debate on the role of household composition as a variable for segmenting donors. Finally, we propose leads for future research in order to stimulate further academic effort on the topic. 相似文献
This paper begins by documenting the extent to which the predictions of standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) models are incompatible with observed movements in real interest rates. The main finding of the paper is that extending the baseline model to include habit persistence in consumption and adjustment costs to capital significantly improves the model's empirical performance. In our evaluation of the model's performance, we take special care of estimating and testing predictions of the model using both moments drawn directly from the data and moments calculated after identifying shocks to the stochastic trend. 相似文献
Summary. This paper studies monotone risk aversion, the aversion to monotone, mean-preserving increase in risk (Quiggin [21]), in the Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) model. This model replaces expected utility by another functional, characterized by two functions, a utility function u in conjunction with a probability-perception function f. Monotone mean-preserving increases in risk are closely related to the notion of comparativedispersion introduced by Bickel and Lehmann [3,4] in Non-parametric Statistics. We present a characterization of the pairs (u,f) of monotone risk averse decision makers, based on an index of greedinessGu of the utility function u and an index of pessimismPf of the probability perception function f: the decision maker is monotone risk averse if and only if
. The index of greediness (non-concavity) of u is the supremum of
taken over
. The index of pessimism of f is the infimum of
taken over 0 < v < 1. Thus,
, with Gu = 1 iff u is concave. If
then
, i.e., f is majorized by the identity function. Since Pf = 1 for Expected Utility maximizers,
forces u to be concave in this case; thus, the characterization of risk aversion as
is a direct generalization from EU to RDEU. A novel element is that concavity of u is not necessary. In fact, u must be concave only if Pf = 1.Received: 10 April 2001, Revised: 18 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
D81.
Correspondence to: Michéle CohenAlain Chateauneuf, Michéle Cohen, Isaac Meilijson: We are most grateful to Mark Machina, Peter Wakker and two anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions and comments. 相似文献
Summary. We show, in the Choquet expected utility model, that preference for diversification, that is, convex preferences, is equivalent
to a concave utility index and a convex capacity. We then introduce a weaker notion of diversification, namely “sure diversification.”
We show that this implies that the core of the capacity is non-empty. The converse holds under concavity of the utility index,
which is itself equivalent to the notion of comonotone diversification, that we introduce. In an Anscombe-Aumann setting,
preference for diversification is equivalent to convexity of the capacity and preference for sure diversification is equivalent
to non-empty core. In the expected utility model, all these notions of diversification are equivalent and are represented
by the concavity of the utility index.
Received: July 27, 1999; revised version: November 7, 2000 相似文献
The paper presents some results concerning the averaging approach in a general linear regression model in one dimension under suitable conditions about the martingale structure of errors. At first asymptotics of the primary and averaged estimators are discussed. Then it is shown that variances of estimators can be consistently estimated by appropriate integrated squared deviations functionals. Finally applications to the construction of confidence regions are considered. 相似文献
Summary This paper investigates the dynamical properties of optimal paths in one-sector overlapping generations models without assuming that the utility function of the representative agent is separable. When the utility function is separable, the optimal growth paths monotonically converges toward the modified golden rule steady state. In the non-separable case, we show that the optimal growth path may be oscillating and optimal two-period cycles may exist. Applying these results to the model with altruism, we show that the condition of operative bequest is fully compatible with endogeneous fluctuations provided that the discount factor is close enough to one. All our results are illustrated using Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions.We thank C. Blackorby, J. Blot, P. Cartigny and one anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions which generally improved the exposition of the paper. We would also like to thank the participants of the Population and demography session of the European Economic Association 10th Annual Congress (Prague, The Czech Republic, September 1–4, 1995). 相似文献
In this paper, we examine irreversible investment decisions in duopoly games with a variable economic climate. Integrating timing flexibility, competition, and changes in the economic environment in the form of a cash flow process with regime switching, the problem is formulated as a stopping‐time game under Stackelberg leader‐follower competition, in which both players determine their respective optimal market entry time. By extending the variational inequality approach, we solve for the free boundaries and obtain optimal investment strategies for each player. Despite the lack of regularity in the leader's obstacle and the cash flow regime uncertainty, the regime‐dependent optimal policies for both the leader and the follower are obtained. In addition, we perform comprehensive numerical experiments to demonstrate the properties of solutions and to gain insights into the implications of regime switching. 相似文献
Many environmental problems are due to damage caused by pollutants that accumulate with a time lag following their emission. In this study, we focus on nitrates used in agriculture, which can pollute groundwater many years after their initial application. A dynamic optimal control problem with heterogeneous farmers is proposed. The usual structural parameters such as the discount rate, the natural clearing rate and the lagged time interval between the occurrence of soil‐level pollution and the impact on groundwater are taken into account. We also examine pollution as caused by a continuous set of farms characterised by their individual performance index and by their individual marginal contribution to the pollution. The issue is further investigated by taking account of change in the information context, successively related to perfect information and to asymmetric information. As a result, when the delay between the spreading of N‐fertilizer and the impact on the aquifer increases, that is, the longer the lag, the steady‐state pollution stock and the steady‐state shadow price of the stock both increase. Moreover, we show that the optimal regulation may require a decreasing amount of fertilizer over time, even in the case of initial underpollution. 相似文献
James Buchanan’s views on public finance have already been analyzed and they are quite well known, as are their origins and roots. However, nothing has ever been said about why Buchanan chose public finance in the first place. The first goal of this paper is to show that Buchanan had made this choice before arriving at Chicago. We show how Carlton C. Sims and Charles P. White influenced him. We also show, by analyzing Buchanan’s M.A. thesis, that he was not only interested in public finance but was also primarily concerned by ethical questions and defended a bureaucratic centralized solution to solve the problem he was discussing – how to share the benefits collected from a gasoline tax among Counties. This helps to understand that Buchanan did not choose to study public finance to learn how to fight government intervention. Quite the contrary: it was to legitimate it. Second, we also demonstrate that a lot of the ideas that will matter for Buchanan in his career – the importance of ethics and the principle of an equal treatment for equals, the need to link taxes to benefits, the importance to adapt the scale of provision of a public good to the type of public good – were already present in this first work.