Specification and Estimation of ELES

The Extended Linear Expenditure System b reformulated to yield private per capita net worth as the basic explanatory variable. As a by-product the model implies that the marginal propensity to consume/save out of permanent income varies with the rate of interest. In the estimation, account is taken of inconsistencies in data compiled from different sources by explicity including the savings relationship in the system. Parameter estimates based on Australian data are presented.     

The Default Risk of Swaps

We characterize the exchange of financial claims from risky swaps. These transfers are among three groups: shareholders, debtholders, and the swap counterparty. From this analysis we derive equilibrium swap rates and relate them to debt market spreads. We then show that equilibrium swaps in perfect markets transfer wealth from shareholders to debtholders. In a simplified case, we obtain closed-form solutions for the value of the default risk in the swap. For interest-rate swaps, we obtain numerical solutions for the equilibrium swap rate, including default risk. We compare these with equilibrium debt market default risk spreads.     

最大化你的定价权

根据最新的一项全球调研表明,只有35%的公司认为它们有足够的定价权来保证其产品能获得合适的定价;其余65%的公司认为它们没有将其产品定价到应该的高度,这意味着它们不得不接受利润缩水25%的现实。那些不具定价权的公司往往将责任推卸到外部因素,如激进的竞争对手和严苛的客户。但是,根据该调     

Asset Pricing Implications of Nonconvex Adjustment Costs and Irreversibility of Investment

This paper derives a real options model that accounts for the value premium. If real investment is largely irreversible, the book value of assets of a distressed firm is high relative to its market value because it has idle physical capital. The firm's excess installed capital capacity enables it to fully benefit from positive aggregate shocks without undertaking costly investment. Thus, returns to equity holders of a high book‐to‐market firm are sensitive to aggregate conditions and its systematic risk is high. Simulations indicate that the model goes a long way toward accounting for the observed value premium.     

Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns

We develop a new and comprehensive database of firm‐level contributions to U.S. political campaigns from 1979 to 2004. We construct variables that measure the extent of firm support for candidates. We find that these measures are positively and significantly correlated with the cross‐section of future returns. The effect is strongest for firms that support a greater number of candidates that hold office in the same state that the firm is based. In addition, there are stronger effects for firms whose contributions are slanted toward House candidates and Democrats.