Comparing the welfare effects of income and excise taxes in the presence of the other taxation paradox

This paper implements numerically a general equilibrium model in which all private producers are price makers and the government utilizes tax revenues to provide a public good. After deriving the partial equilibrium condition for an excise tax to increase price by more than the tax (for a monopoly firm), numerical examples are given, demonstrating this phenomenon for both partial and general equilibrium. In the general equilibrium context, optimal excise taxation and optimal flat-rate income taxation are compared. In the excise tax regime, prices increase by more than the taxes. In the income tax regime, prices actually decline relative to the no-tax regime. In all of the examples given, flat-rate income taxation is superior to excise taxation in terms of welfare. The author has benefitted from exceptionally helpful comments received from J. Ronnie Davis, John D. Wilson, Ralph W. Pfouts, and Amy Crews. He has also benefitted from conversations with Franz Gehrels, David E. Wildasin, Herbert J. Kiesling, and Harold York. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Economic Comparison of Alternative Tillage Systems under Risk.

Stochastic dominance efficiency criteria are used to rank the net farm return distributions for four different tillage systems under six different farm scenarios. Pairwise comparisons of tillage systems are carried over incremental upper and lower risk-aversion coefficient (RAC) bounds identified for each farm scenario, based on the size and spread of the outcome distributions to identify regions where dominance may switch between tillage systems. Ridge-till systems are generally the dominant tillage system for all farm scenarios considered. No-till systems on clay loam soils are more dominant in the risk-preferring range and less dominant in the risk-averse range, which relates to the relatively larger range of net return values and smaller mean net return values generated by this tillage system. Conversely, the moldboard plow and chisel plow systems are more dominant in risk-aversion intervals and less dominant in the risk-preferring intervals for clay loam soils. In sandy soil scenarios, the ridge-till and no-till systems are dominant over the two fall tillage systems for all farm sizes, indicating that these tillage systems are more competitive with conventional tillage systems in lighter soil type situations. A sensitivity analysis between moldboard plow and no-till systems indicates that no-till would dominate in risk-preferring intervals, and an increase in no-till net farm returns of 16 per acre would change dominance in favor of no-till in risk-averse interval space. On a utilisé les critères d'efficacitéà dominance stochastique pour classer les divers niveaux de recettes agricoles nettes dans quatre systèmes différents de travail du sol, selon six scénarios d'exploitation. Des comparaisons en paires des systèmes de travail ont été faites en regard de tranches croissantes des limites supérieures et inférieures du coefficient d'aversion du risque (CER), établies pour chaque scénario d'après l'importance et l'étendue des distributions du rendement, dans le but d'identifier les régions où la dominance serait susceptible de passer d'un système de travail à l'autre. Le système de travail sur billons était en général le système dominant dans tous les scénarios d'exploitation examinés. La culture sans travail du sol sur loam argileux était plus dominante dans les intervalles d'acceptation du resque et moins dominante dans les intervalles d'aversion du resque, cequi s'explique au fait que ce système de travail donne lieu à une fourchette relativement plus large, mais aussi à une moyenne plus faible du revenu net. À l'inverse, le labour à la charrue classique et au chisel dominait davantage dans les intervalles d'aversion du risque. Dans les sols sableux, le travail sur billons et la culture sans labour l'emportaient sur les deux autres régimes dans toutes les tailles d'exploitation, ce qui porte à croire que, dans les sols plus légers, ces régimes sont plus concurrentiels avec les systèmes classiques. L'analyse de sensibilité entre le labour à la charrue et les systèmes sans travail du sol montre que ces derniers dominent dans les intervalles d'acceptation du risque et qu'un accroissement du revenu agricole net de 16 /acre ferait glisser la dominance vers les intervalles d'aversion du risque.     

Correlation of gender-related values of independence and relationship and leadership orientation

This study compares the relationship between the moral reasoning modes and leadership orientation of males versus females, and managers versus engineers/scientists. A questionnaire developed by Worthley (1987) was used to measure the degree of each participant's respective independence and justice, and relationships and caring moral reasoning modes. Leadership orientation values and attitudes were measured using the Fiedler and Chemers (1984) Least Preferred Coworker Scale.The results suggest that, although males differ from female in their dominant moral reasoning modes, managers are not distinguishable from the engineers/scientists they manage in terms of their moral reasoning mode or Least Preferred Coworker score.Clarence E. Butz is a Professor of Management in the School of Business and Management at Azusa Pacific University, California. Dr. Butz's teaching areas include general management, organizational behavior, and business ethics. Phillip V. Lewis is Dean of the School of Business and Management at Azusa Pacific University. He is the author of Organizational Communication (Gorsuch Scarisbrich, 1996) and Bank Ethics: An Exploratory Study of Ethical Behaviors and Perceptions in Small, Local Banks (Journal of Business Ethics, 11: 197–205, 1992).     

Was Jules Dupuit a Market Socialist: A Retrospective Note on Marginal Cost Pricing

This paper examines the extent to which Dupuit preceded Hotelling in the theory of marginal cost pricing and the relation of marginal cost pricing to the Pigou–Robinson definition of exploitation, Coase’s multipart pricing, and the Kaldor compensation principle. Tsuneki’s partial rehabilitation of Hotelling’s proof of MC pricing is partially endorsed.      

A bully pulpit

It is pointed out that in an economy with only one resource and price-making firms, virtually any price vector is a market-clearing vector if profits are distributed as dividends and consumers correctly anticipate these dividends. It is argued that the resulting model has been useful in comparing competition and monopoly, direct and indirect taxation, and first and second best and has the potential for shedding light on many other questions in welfare economics. A painless procedure for verifying the counterintuitive fundamental proposition is provided.Presidential Address presented at the Forty-Second International Atlantic Economic Conference, Washington, DC, October 10–13, 1996.     

Augustin cournot and neoclassical economics

This paper compares Cournot's exposition of elasticity of demand and the theory of the firm with modern exposition. In the case of the theory of the firm, this comparison is accomplished by translating the modern textbook exposition into Cournot's mathematics. It is demonstrated that Cournot's exposition translates into current usage in all cases but that the degree of convolution in the translation process varies from case to case. For elasticity, only trivial algebraic manipulation is involved. For monopoly, the inverse derivative rule translates Cournot's exposition into current usage. The case of perfect competition is much more complicated. Although Cournot gets the same result as current theory, his mathematics doesn't translate directly into current usage. But a comparison in the text that doesn't appear in his mathematics suggests that he considered the modern derivation but chose to use another derivation. One reason for doing this is rather obvious. It fits better into Cournot's unified approach to the theory of the firm. It might also be judged more elegant and mathematically precise. With regard to oligopoly, Cournot provided, in a different contest, the analytical structure that is now used in IO to analyze differentiated oligopoly. It is retierated that Cournot had a general method for finding equilibria for non-cooperative games and was aware of the fact that his method was more general than a single application. The relation between Cournot equilibria and Nash equilibria is discussed. The author benefited from comments by Richard R. Ruble and a referee, but is responsible for all errors.     

Ownership dispersion as a second-best counterstrategy against monopoly

A literature on second-best pricing as counterstrategy against monopoly has evolved in economics. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that ownership dispersion through forced divestiture can be more effective in restricting the social damage of monopoly. Economists generally hold an ordinal view of utility. To the extent that the second-best literature suggests the possibility of reducing dead-weight loss through counterpricing, most economics would accept counterpricing as welfare increasing and reject ownership dispersion. The example presented in this paper suggests that this mindset may cause us to overlook promising alternatives.