Pricing in Segmented Markets, Arbitrage Barriers, and the Law of One Price: Evidence from the European Car Market

The paper uses micro‐level price data from the European car market to examine why there are deviations from the law of one price. The absolute law of one price is strongly rejected, but there is convergence to its relative version. Two sets of explanations are considered: (i) price‐setting in segmented markets, and (ii) arbitrage barriers. Overall, the determinants of arbitrage costs have more explanatory power. The single most important factor is the distance between markets. Evidence for Belgium and Luxembourg suggests that a single currency lowers price differences significantly.     

Social economics and economics imperialism

Address delivered at a session on April 2, 1993 at the Midwest regional meetings of the Association for Social Economics, Indianapolis, IN.     

Wirkungen einer EU–weiten Verlustverrechnung auf das Steueraufkommen

Seit einigen Jahren stellt der Europäische Gerichtshof vermehrt Regelungen der nationalen Steuersysteme in Hinblick darauf in Frage, ob sie mit dem EG-Recht konform gehen. Im aktuellen Fall Marks & Spencer entscheidet der Gerichtshof, ob Konzerne Verluste ausländischer Töchter mit inländischen Gewinnen verrechnen dürfen. Welche Wirkung hätte eine EU-weite Verlustverrechnung auf das deutsche Steueraufkommen?Prof. Dr. Clemens Fuest, 36, ist Direktor des Finanzwissenschaftlichen Forschungsinstituts an der Universität zu Köln und Mitglied des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen; Thomas Hemmelgarn, 30, Dipl.-Volkswirt, ist Mitarbeiter an demselben Institut; Fred Ramb, 39, Dipl.-Volkswirt, ist Mitarbeiter der Deutschen Bundesbank, Economic Research Centre, in Frankfurt. Dieser Artikel repräsentiert die persönliche Auffassung der Autoren und entspricht nicht notwendigerweise der Position der Deutschen Bundesbank oder ihrer Mitarbeiter.     

Introduction: What Role Can Experiments Play in Research on Regulation?

Journal of Regulatory Economics -     

Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms

This paper discusses the role of multinational firms and double taxation treaties for corporate income taxation in open economies. We show that it is optimal for a small open economy to levy positive corporate income taxes if multinational firms are taxed according to the full taxation after deduction system or the foreign tax credit system. Positive corporate taxes also occur in the asymmetric case where some countries apply the exemption system and others apply the tax credit system. If all countries apply the exemption system, the optimal corporate income tax is zero. We also show that, under tax competition, corporate income taxes are not necessarily too low from the perspective of the economy as a whole. While the undertaxation result is confirmed for the case of the exemption system, tax rates may also be inefficiently high if the deduction or the credit systems are applied.     

The minimum variance hedge and the bankruptcy risk of the firm

In this paper, we analyze the influence of hedging with forward contracts on the firm's probability of bankruptcy (POB). The minimization of this probability can serve as a substitute for the maximization of shareholders' wealth. It is shown that the popular minimum variance hedge is generally neither necessary nor sufficient for the minimization of the firm's POB. Moreover, our model suggests a correction of the widespread view that a reduction in the variance of the future value of the firm is inevitably accompanied by a reduction in its default risk. We derive an analytical solution for the variance-minimizing hedge ratio of a firm exposed to both input and output price uncertainty that takes into account the issue of correlation. Based on this solution, we provide a graphical analysis to prove our claim that there is a fundamental difference between hedging policies focused on bankruptcy risk and those following conventional wisdom even if positive correlation constitutes a “natural” hedge.