Corruption in agricultural processing firms: A comparison of cooperatives and investor-owned firms

This paper examines managerial corruption in cooperatives (co-ops) and investor-owned firms (IOFs), including its impact on prices and farmer welfare. Even when co-op managers have greater incentives to engage in corruption because of the co-op's larger production, the resulting corruption is not sufficient to offset the competitive effect that co-ops exert vis-à-vis IOFs. This conclusion holds regardless of the functional form of the production function, the farm input supply curve, and the demand curve for the processed product. In addition to showing the robustness of the competition effect, the paper provides a highly flexible modeling framework that can be used to examine other co-op behavior questions.     

Optimal Two‐Part Pricing in a Carbon Offset Market: A Comparison of Organizational Types

This article examines the optimal two‐part pricing by an intermediary in a carbon offset market. In addition to creating a framework for analyzing carbon offset pricing, this article makes two contributions to the theoretical literature. First, we provide an in‐depth examination of the roles played by the upstream inframarginal supply and participation elasticities and the downstream demand elasticity in determining the optimal two‐part pricing strategy. Second, we compare the pricing decisions of three different organizational types: a for‐profit firm, a public agency, and a producer association. The producer association problem, which has received little attention in the literature, yields counterintuitive results because a producer association must simultaneously reduce output and distribute all profits back to its members.     

Consumption effects of genetic modification: what if consumers are right?⋆

This paper develops a model of differentiated consumers to examine the consumption effects of genetic modification (GM) under alternative labelling regimes and segregation enforcement scenarios. Analytical results show that if consumers perceive GM products as being different than their traditional counterparts, GM affects consumer welfare and, thus, consumption decisions. When the existence of market imperfections in one or more stages of the supply chain prevents the transmission of cost savings associated with the new technology to consumers, GM results in welfare losses for consumers. The analysis shows that the relative welfare ranking of the ‘no labelling’ and ‘mandatory labelling’ regimes depends on: (i) the level of consumer aversion to GM products; (ii) the size of marketing and segregation costs under mandatory labelling; (iii) the share of the GM product in total production; and (iv) the extent to which GM products are incorrectly labelled as non‐GM products.     

Underinvestment in Producer‐Funded Agricultural R&D: The Role of the Horizon Problem

Agricultural research and development (R&D) investment has become an increasingly important policy issue as food prices increased and food security problems emerged over the last decade. An important source of agricultural R&D funding is the producer check‐off, which is increasingly being used to fund applied agricultural research. Existing studies of producer‐funded agricultural R&D indicate there are high private rates of return to agricultural R&D investment by farmers, and thus farmers are underinvesting in R&D. Since a farmer's time horizon is typically less than the period of time over which the benefits of agricultural R&D take place, the horizon problem has been identified as a possible factor in this underinvestment. This paper shows that the horizon problem is unlikely to be the only cause of the underinvestment when the internal rate of return is large. Instead, shortened producer horizons only emerge as the main source of underinvestment when the internal rate of return is low. As a result, other factors, including behavioral determinants, need to be looked at as contributors to the underfunding of agricultural R&D. Les investissements en recherche et développement agricoles sont devenus un important enjeu politique étant donné l'augmentation des prix des aliments et les problèmes de sécurité alimentaire de la dernière décennie. Une importante source de financement pour la recherche et le développement dans le domaine agricole sont les programmes de contribution des producteurs, ces derniers étant de plus en plus sollicités pour financer la recherche agricole appliquée. Certaines études portant sur la recherche et le développement agricoles financés par les producteurs indiquent un haut taux de rendement privé des investissements en recherche et développement agricoles par les producteurs. Ces derniers y investissent donc moins. Puisque l'échéancier de l'agriculteur est typiquement moins long que celui pendant lequel les avantages liés à la recherche et au développement dans le domaine agricole s'échelonnent, le problème de l'horizon a été identifié comme facteur potentiel au sous‐investissement. Il est probable, selon cet article, que le problème de l'horizon ne soit pas la seule cause du sous‐investissement lorsque le taux interne de rendement s'avère grand. Plutôt, les échéanciers réduits des agriculteurs apparaissent seulement comme les sources principales de sous‐investissement lorsque le taux de rendement interne est bas. Il en résulte que d'autres facteurs, incluant les déterminants comportementaux, doivent être examinés à titre de contributeurs au sous‐investissement de la recherche et du développement en agriculture.