State Trading Enterprises as an Impediment to Improved Market Access: The Case of the Korean Rice Market

The trade and welfare effects of tariffs are well known. Less well known, and more difficult to analyze, are the economic effects of state trading enterprises (STEs). Despite STEs in importing countries having the potential to limit market access, they are no longer on the agriculture agenda in the Doha Round Negotiations in the WTO, because some Members have asserted that importing STEs do not distort international trade. We evaluate this assertion through the use of a theoretical model of an STE, which is calibrated to data for the Korean rice market. We show that this STE does distort international trade by restricting market access relative to a Cournot benchmark, and that it affects the domestic and international distribution of social welfare. This finding permits the conclusion that an important opportunity is being missed in the negotiations to improve market access, because importing STEs are not on the agenda.     

Partial‐ and General‐Equilibrium Measures of Trade Restrictiveness

New partial‐equilibrium forms of the Trade Restrictiveness Index and the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index have recently been used by the World Bank and others. In this paper we examine the bias in the partial‐equilibrium forms due to the neglect of general‐equilibrium effects. We propose “semi‐general‐equilibrium” measures that capture those general‐equilibrium effects due to vertical input–output relations without the need for a computable general‐equilibrium model. These measures also incorporate nontariff measures. Australian data are used to compute the semi‐general‐equilibrium measures. These estimates indicate that the partial‐equilibrium forms generally underestimate the true value of the indices, and by a large margin in some cases.     

The Trade and Welfare Effects of State Trading in China with Reference to COFCO

The use of state trading to manage imports and exports has been a long‐standing feature of China’s agricultural trade regime. While the use of state trading was modified by China’s accession to the WTO, state trading still dominates for some commodities, even though there have been recent attempts to diminish its importance. In this paper, we analyse the potential trade distorting effect of COFCO on market access and export competition by drawing on some recent research on the impact of STEs on agricultural trade. By using a calibrated model of China’s imports of wheat and exports of maize, we are able to quantify the size of the trade distortions.     

CANADIAN WHEAT EXPORTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET: AN EXPLORATORY ECONOMETRIC AND POLICY ANALYSIS

This study attempts to measure with a two-region model some of the key economic relationships for Canadian wheat in the world market. The excess demand function facing Canadian wheat exports was found to be price elastic. Dynamic policy multipliers were derived to calculate the effects on wheat exports and the world price of changes in policy instruments including the initial payment for wheat.
Cette étude a pour but de mesurer, au moyen d'un modèle portant sur deux régions, quelques-uns des principaux rapports économiques entre l'économie canadienne du blé et les marchés mondiaux. La fonction de demande excédentaire des exportations canadiennes de blé s'est vérifiée élastique par rapport au prix. Les effets de changements dans les instruments de la politique agricole, tels que le paiement initial du blé, sur les exportation canadiennes et sur le prix mondial du ble ont eté calcule au moyen de multiplicateurs dynamiques.     

Market intermediaries,storage and policy reforms

Intermediaries play a crucial role in the functioning of agricultural and food markets in developing countries through linking production, imports and storage with consumption. We analyse how competition in the intermediary sector and alternative forms of intermediaries determine the incentives for storage and market outcomes more generally. We apply this framework to the Egyptian wheat sector as an illustrative case study, a country where food security is a priority, where both forms of intermediaries co-exist and undertake storage but where issues of reforms to the role of intermediaries have been raised. Through stochastic simulation, we analyse two changes in government policy: first, the effects of changing the policy instruments with both types of intermediaries undertaking storage; second, relating to market reforms where the private sector replaces the storage function of the parastatal. These issues have wider significance for addressing the interaction between food security and a wide range of policy reforms including de-regulation of parastatals in developing countries.     

THE OUTPUT RESPONSE OF THE RISK AVERSE FIRM: SOME COMPARATIVE STATICS FOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The policy conclusions which stem from the deterministic theory of the competitive firm are well known and unambiguous. However, once product price is regarded as stochastic, there exist several theories upon which to base an analysis of the impact of agricultural policy on the output response of the firm. The paper considers four models from the safety-first and expected utility frameworks. These models produce a diverse set of comparative statics results which in many instances conflict with those of the deterministic model. Hence, the paper concludes that it is important in agricultural policy analysis that greater consideration by given to the links between risk aversion, policy-induced uncertainty and output response than is conventionally the case.     

Domestic and Trade Equivalences of State Trading Importers

Market intermediaries in importing countries in the form of state trading enterprises (STEs) involve government manipulation of market structure that can be designated a nontariff measure because they are perceived to affect market access. However, the trade effect may be only an unintended consequence of the pursuit of the domestic concerns towards which the objectives of the STE are targeted as well as the extent of the exclusive rights that it is given. These objectives may reflect concerns about domestic distortions or, where these do not exist, redistribution towards producers or consumers. To this end, identifying the domestic effects of STEs through the use of producer and consumer subsidy equivalents that complement measures of the trade distorting effect is important in gauging the overall impact of STEs. In this paper, we outline a method to measure these policy equivalences which can be readily applied to aid transparency in trade negotiations.     

Do state trading exporters distort trade?

In this paper, we analyse the trade-distorting effects of state trading enterprises (STEs) which exist in some exporting countries. Because of these potential effects, several countries have raised the issue of state enterprises in the Doha Round negotiations in the WTO. The belief is that STEs in certain developed countries have trade effects which are equivalent to an export subsidy. STEs also exist in developing countries, though since the aim of government policy may differ from the developed country case, the trade distortion may be equivalent to an export tax. We present a theoretical model that is sufficiently general to allow us to consider the case of exporting STEs in developed and developing economies. The model is calibrated with data on two examples of STEs, one typical of an STE in a developed country, the other typical of an STE in a developing economy. In each case, we allow for differences in the nature of the STE's pay-off function. The overall conclusion is that STEs do distort trade and the trade distortion effect is potentially significant.