Brexit: How Will UK Agriculture Fare?

There is little doubt that Brexit would have significant implications for UK agriculture, a sector with strong trade links to the EU and strong reliance on CAP income support. This article reports preliminary results from employing a Computable General Equilibrium Model, a Partial Equilibrium Model and Farm Level Models to explore selected trade and domestic policy scenarios post‐Brexit. These allow for the estimation of changes in producer prices, production and farm incomes against a baseline scenario of continued EU membership. Under a Free Trade Agreement with the EU, agricultural impacts are relatively modest. By contrast, unilateral removal of import tariffs has significant negative impacts on prices, production and incomes. Adoption of the EU's WTO tariff schedule for all imports favours net importers (e.g. dairy) and harms net exporters (e.g. sheep). Given the strong dependence of most UK farms on direct payments, their removal worsens negative impacts of new trade arrangements and offsets positive impacts. Impacts vary across different types and sizes of farm, but also regionally. However, the period of adjustment to new trade and domestic policy conditions may prove very challenging for a large number of farm businesses.     

Income Distribution, Taxation, and the Private Provision of Public Goods

This article investigates the role of taxation when public goods are privately provided. Externalities between consumers via the public good are shown to cause kinks in social indifference curves. As a result, a government restricted to income taxation should engineer enough inequality to ensure there are some non-contributors to the public good. Whether commodity taxation changes this conclusion depends on the extent to which consumers "see through" the government budget constraint. If they can, inequality should still be sought. When they cannot, in contrast to the case of an economy with only private goods, commodity taxation can be used in conjunction with income transfers to achieve the first-best.     

Revenue Sharing versus Expenditure Sharing in a Federal System

Problems of intergovernmental policy coordination can take many forms and are becoming increasingly important with continuing economic integration. In this paper we focus on the fiscal competition problem where the non-cooperative choice of taxes and transfers among governments typically leads to a suboptimal outcome. We look at the effect of two widely used corrective policies: revenue sharing and expenditure sharing (or intergovernmental matching grants). Our main result is that these two corrective policies have opposite effects depending on the form of competition between governments, namely whether governments compete in taxes or expenditures. More precisely, for any form of competition, revenue sharing is desirable exactly when expenditure sharing is not and vice versa. The implication is that the choice of the optimal corrective policy requires a complete understanding of the underlying non-cooperative behavior among governments. Our second main result is that neither revenue sharing or expenditure sharing can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium among governments, although all governments would benefit from one of these two corrective policies. Central intervention is therefore inevitable unless governments can pre-commit to the optimal corrective policy before setting their fiscal policies.     

Competition‐driven repositioning

We study competition as an impetus for firms to reposition—to abandon their current positioning strategy and adopt a new one. We predict that as a strong firm moves closer, competition erodes the profitability of situated firms and prompts them to reposition. We expect this effect is pronounced the greater difference in competitive strength. However, we expect that countervailing forces exist such that the viability of alternative positions and the opportunity cost of abandoning a current position mitigate this effect. Evidence from a natural experiment in China's satellite television industry supports our hypotheses. This research adds to the existing literature on repositioning, which emphasizes the phenomenon as opportunity‐driven, and to the competitive interaction literature, which typically does not distinguish between noncounterattack strategies. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Marketing charitable bequests to lawyers

There is scant literature about the role of the lawyer in influencing the likelihood of a charitable bequest being made in a will. Charities regularly advertise in legal journals and supply bequest materials to lawyers, but the effectiveness of these strategies for influencing lawyers appears not to have been measured in the literature or in practice. Our exploratory research indicates that specialist estate lawyers report that they pay little or no attention to traditional marketing of charitable bequests to them and that lawyers' specific information needs from charities about bequests are not being satisfied appropriately. Our study reveals that lawyers do seek information from charities in order to write a will's bequest clause, once a bequest has been considered by the client. Lawyers indicated frustration with obtaining this information from charities, and we recommend some actions for charities to rectify this situation. Recommendations for enhanced bequest solicitation are made together with suggestions for pathways for future bequest research involving lawyers. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Structure of the optimal income tax in the quasi-linear model

Existing numerical characterizations of the optimal income tax have been based on a limited number of model specifications. As a result, they do not reveal which properties are general. We determine the optimal tax in the quasi-linear model under weaker assumptions than have previously been used; in particular, we remove the assumption of a lower bound on the utility of zero consumption and the need to permit negative labor incomes. A Monte Carlo analysis is then conducted in which economies are selected at random and the optimal tax function constructed. The results show that in a significant proportion of economies the marginal tax rate rises at low skills and falls at high. The average tax rate is equally likely to rise or fall with skill at low skill levels, rises in the majority of cases in the centre of the skill range, and falls at high skills. These results are consistent across all the specifications we test. We then extend the analysis to show that these results also hold for Cobb-Douglas utility.     

Transaction Costs and Cattle Marketing: The Information Content of Seller-Provided Presale Data at Bull Auctions

At sales of breeding bulls, prospective buyers have strong incentives to undertake presale measurement activities. To reduce these transaction costs, sellers often provide information on sale bulls. We examine the information content of two measures of the expected performance of the bulls and find that within a given herd, older, simpler measures of performance contain more information about prices (from buyers' perspectives) than newer, more sophisticated measures known as expected progeny differences, or EPDs. We also find, however, that buyers appear to pay considerable attention to annual changes in herd-average EPD values when comparing animals from different sellers.     

Monetary Policy Rules with Model and Data Uncertainty

In this paper we examine the prevalence of data, specification, and parameter uncertainty in the formation of simple rules that mimic monetary policymaking decisions. Our approach is to build real-time data sets and simulate a real-time policy-setting environment in which we assume that policy is captured by movements in the actual federal funds rate, and then to assess what sorts of policy rule models and what sorts of data best explain what the Federal Reserve actually did. This approach allows us not only to track the performance of alternative rules over time (hence facilitating a type of model selection among competing rules), but also to more generally assess the importance of the data revision process in the formation of macroeconomic time series models. From the perspective of real-time data, our results suggest that the use of data that are erroneous, in the sense that they were not available at the time decisions could have been made based on forecasts from the rules, can lead to the selection of quantitatively different models. From the perspective of finding a rule that best approximates what the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) has actually done (and hence from the perspective of finding a rule that best approximates what the Fed will do in the future), we find that (i) our version of “calibration” is better than naïve estimation, although both are dominated by an approach to rule formation based on the use of adaptive least-squares learning; (ii) rules based on data that are not seasonally adjusted are more reliable than those based on seasonally adjusted data; and (iii) rules based solely on preliminary data do not minimize mean square forecast error risk. In particular, early releases of data can be noisy, and for this reason it is useful to also use data that have been revised when making decisions using policy rules.