Strategic Pricing Behavior under Asset Value Maximization

In this paper, we empirically evaluate strategic pricing behavior and shareholder delegation of financial market objectives in the U.S. butter and margarine market. Shareholders are assumed to maximize the value of firm assets according to a certainty equivalent capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The delegation setup instructs managers to maximize a linear combination of firm profits and shareholder equity values. A key result from the analysis is that a test of financial market influences cannot be rejected in the product market for butter and margarine. Product market competition is best described using a conjectural variation model of industrial organization. Estimates of Lerner Indexes suggest significant market power and counterfactual simulations point toward significant biases in estimated Lerner Indexes when capital market dimensions are ignored or if the wrong market structure is assumed. Dans le présent article, nous avons effectué l'évaluation empirique de comportements stratégiques dans la détermination des prix et la délégation d'objectifs financiers de la part d'actionnaires sur le marchéétatsunien du beurre et de la margarine. Nous avons supposé que les actionnaires maximisent la valeur de l'actif d'une firme selon l'équivalent certain du modèle d'évaluation des actifs financiers (MEDAF). La structure de la délégation amène les gestionnaires à maximiser une combinaison linéaire des profits de la firme et de la valeur nette des actions. L'un des principaux résultats de l'analyse est qu'un test des influences du marché des capitaux sur le marché des produits ne peut être rejeté pour le cas du beurre et de la margarine. La concurrence sur le marché des produits est plus adéquatement caractérisée par un modèle d'organisation industrielle à variations conjecturales. Les estimations de l'indice de Lerner ont indiqué la présence de pouvoir de marché, et les simulations contrefactuelles ont montré des biais significatifs dans les valeurs estimées des indices de Lerner lorsque l'on ne tient pas compte du marché des capitaux ou que l'on suppose une structure de marché erronée.     

An empirical test of the rent-shifting hypothesis: the case of state trading enterprises

A central result in the theoretical literature on strategic trade is the ‘rent-shifting hypothesis’, the idea that government’s can employ trade policy as a precommitment device to transfer profit from foreign to domestic firms. To our knowledge, however, the rent-shifting hypothesis remains untested empirically. This paper constructs a theory-based empirical test of rent-shifting behavior that relies on observations of government precommitment variables employed through State Trading Enterprises (STEs). The analysis applies data on the delayed producer payment structure of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) and examines its merits as a rent-shifting mechanism in the international durum market. The model fails to reject the hypothesis that the CWB utilizes a pre-commitment mechanism in the international durum market and several nonparametric tests confirm that the observed transfer payments set by the CWB are consistent with rent-shifting behavior in the 1972-95 pre-WTO period.     

State Trading Enterprises in a Differentiated Product Environment: The Case of Global Malting Barley Markets

This study tested if the exclusive procuring and pricing policies of two state trading enterprises (STEs) in international malting barley markets could be used in a strategic trade context. The research provided four key findings. First, the global malting barley market operated in a quantity-setting oligopolistic structure during the study years. Second, both STEs and other exporting countries were in Cournot competition and thus made available strategic trade possibilities. Third, initial commodity payments were too high to generate a rent-shifting outcome. Fourth, product differentiation was confirmed, which may have dampened the desire/ability of STEs to pursue a rent-shifting objective.     

Regime switching and oligopsony power: the case of U.S. beef processing

In this article, we estimate a model of oligopsony behavior under imperfect monitoring of rival actions to analyze weekly marketing margin data for the U.S. beef packing industry. Oligopsonists are hypothesized to follow a discontinuous pricing strategy in equilibrium, and we focus on shocks in the normal throughput of supply as a potential catalyst for regime switching between cooperative and noncooperative phases. We adopt an algorithm developed by Bellone (2005) that relies on Hamilton’s (1989) multivariate first‐order Markov process to test for the cooperative/noncooperative switching behavior. We find strong evidence that links switching conduct by packers to disruptions in coordinating the derived demands for processed beef with the supply of live cattle. Once switched, cooperative regimes lasted an average of 21 weeks, while noncooperative regimes averaged 33 weeks. The average marketing margin for processed beef was 68% lower in the noncooperative regimes compared to the cooperative regimes. This led to an annual average increase in profits of 408 million dollars to the beef packing industry and about an 8–9% reduction in live cattle prices.     

An analysis of bundle pricing in horizontal and vertical markets: The case of the U.S. cottonseed market

The U.S. cottonseed market has seen the rapid development and adoption of seeds with differing bundles of genetically modified (GM) traits. It has also seen an increase in vertical integration by biotechnology firms. In this article, we investigate the price impacts associated with structural changes in the U.S. cottonseed market from 2002 to 2007. We develop a structural model to examine the substitution/complementarity relationships among cottonseeds sold with different genetic trait bundles and under different vertical arrangements. We examine the price impacts emanating from product differentiation, market concentration, and market size. The econometric investigation finds evidence of subadditive bundle pricing in patented biotech traits. While higher own‐market concentrations are found to be associated with higher prices, we also uncover evidence of cross‐product complementarity effects that lead to lower prices. Simulations are used to evaluate net price effects, illustrating the usefulness of the approach in the analysis of changing market structures.     

An analysis of bundle pricing: the case of biotech seeds

Biotechnology has provided opportunities for strategic management and pricing of patented products. This article analyzes the economics and strategy of bundling and bundle pricing of biotech traits in seeds. When the bundling of genes/traits is decided by biotech firms, firms may choose among subadditive pricing, component pricing, or superadditive pricing strategies. We argue that complementarity among component genes contributes to subadditive pricing, while substitution among components contributes to superadditive pricing. The nature of bundle pricing is explored empirically using U.S. seed corn data from 2000 to 2007. We document that subadditive bundle pricing of traits is commonly found in the seed corn market. However, we also present evidence of superadditive pricing and component pricing. The presence of different pricing and bundling strategies suggests a rapidly advancing and complex market. The preponderance of subadditive pricing suggests that trait bundling offers benefits to farmers exhibiting strong demand for multiple complementary genetic traits.     

Evaluating the U.S. Wheat Protein Complex

This paper models the economic linkages between a commodity (wheat gluten) and a commodity characteristic (wheat protein). The purpose of this research is to address several issues in the wheat protein complex including the impact of the U.S. gluten import quota on producer protein premiums. Four important conclusions are found. First, the hard red winter (HRW) protein market strongly influences wheat gluten market but the wheat gluten market has its greatest influence on the hard red spring (HRS) protein market. Second, the demand for intrinsic protein is estimated to be very elastic. Thus, the returns to breeding or biotechnology programs designed to raise protein levels of wheat are likely to remain stable in response to small increases in wheat protein content. Third, the U.S. import quota on wheat gluten is estimated to provide a 14% increase in the price of wheat gluten in the first year. By the third year, prices are only 5% above the prequota price. U.S. gluten supplies increase about 15% in the first year and remain at about that level for the next two years. Although these are small estimated impacts, they are not far from what the USITC had anticipated. Finally, the three‐year quota increases protein premiums and provides about $500 ($1000) in additional revenue for an average 1000‐acre farm producing HRW (HRS) wheat. Les auteurs ont modélisé les liens économiques entre un produit (le gluten de blé) et une de ses caractéristiques (les protéines). L'objectif était de répondre à plusieurs questions associées au complexe des protéines du blé, notamment l'incidence du contingentement des importations de gluten par les États‐Unis sur les primes consenties aux producteurs en fonction de la valeur protéique du blé. De leur étude, les auteurs tirent quatre grandes conclusions. La premiére est que le marché des protéines du blé roux vitreux d'hiver (BRVH) exerce une forte influence sur le marché du gluten qui, lui, influe principalement sur le marché des protéines du blé roux vitreux de printemps (BRVP). Deuxiémement, on estime que la demande de protéines intrinséques est trés élastique. De petites hausses de la teneur en protéines du blé devraient donc se traduire par un rendement stable des programmes d'hybridation ou de biotechnologie destinés à augmenter la concentration de protéines dans le blé. En troisième lieu, on estime que le contingentement des importations de gluten par les États‐Unis a entraîné une majoration de 14 % du prix de ce produit la premiére année. Deux ans plus tard, les cours s'étaient stabilisés à 5 % au‐dessus du prix en vigueur avant le contingentement. L'offre américaine de gluten augmentera d'environ 15 % la premiére année et se maintiendra à peu prés au même niveau les deux années suivantes. Même si elles ne sont guère importantes, pareilles retombées se rapprochent de celles anticipées par l'USITC. Enfln, les trois années de contingentement ont donné lieu à un relèvement des primes versées pour la concentration en protéines et débouché sur une hausse moyenne de 500 $ (1 000 $) du revenu des exploitations de 1 000 acres qui produisent du BRVH (BRVP).