The smartization of metropolitan cities: the case of Paris

International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - Although the smart city literature is continuously increasing these last decades, there is still a need to better understand what make their...     

Small producers,supermarkets, and the role of intermediaries in Turkey's fresh fruit and vegetable market

A wide range of empirical studies show the extent to which the rise of supermarkets in developing countries transforms domestic marketing channels. In many countries, the exclusion of small producers from so‐called dynamic marketing channels (that is, remunerative ones) has become a concern. Based on data collected in Turkey in 2007 at the producer and the wholesale market levels, we show that intermediaries are important to understanding the impact of downstream restructuring (supermarkets) on upstream decisions (producers). Results show first that producers are not aware of the final buyer of their produce, because intermediaries hinder the visibility of the marketing channel, thereby restricting a producer's choice to that of the first intermediary. Econometric results show that producers who are indirectly linked to the supermarkets are more sensitive to their requirements in terms of quality and packaging than to the price premia compensating the effort made to meet standards. Therefore, the results lead us to question the role of the wholesale market agents who act as a buffer in the chain and protect small producers from negative shocks, but who stop positive shocks as well, and thereby reduce incentives.     

Marketing cooperative vs. commission agent: The Turkish dilemma on the modern fresh fruit and vegetable market

In Turkey, the Wholesale Markets Law was enacted in 1995 to facilitate small-scale growers’ access to the fresh produce market. Cooperatives and commission agents have thus become the main marketing structures available to small-scale fresh produce growers, to supply supermarkets and comply with their new requirements. In this paper, we question the advantages and disadvantages that confront small farmers with respect to those marketing structures to allow for market matching or quality upgrading. Drawing on ownership and transaction cost arguments, we use an analytical framework to identify and compare the costs of these marketing organizations. Based on data collected through a large number of interviews with stakeholders, we show that commission agents and credit cooperatives tend to be more efficient than traditional cooperatives as regards sales performance and decision costs. However, the lack of apparent competition between commission agents does not allow for sufficient provision of incentives for producers to invest in high-quality production. Consequently, credit cooperatives are the only structure progressively turning to strategies of quality upgrading and supermarket supply. The flipside of such strategies is that they may lead to the marginalization of small-scale farmers.     

The role of input vouchers in modernizing the fresh fruit and vegetable market in Turkey

Contractual arrangements between farmers and traders aiming at providing input/credit in return for output selling have been widely studied in the literature on agricultural economics. Nonetheless, there is one issue, which is barely mentioned in the literature: how to enforce the contract terms when traders offer credit in cash rather than input advances? This article aims to describe an innovation in farming contracts, used by fresh fruit and vegetable wholesalers in Turkey, which involves a kind of private voucher system. Drawing on original data collected from wholesalers—a segment in the supply chain hardly covered in the literature—we investigate the factors determining contract adoption using a two‐limit Tobit model. Our results suggest that this private voucher system contributes to supply chain coordination and facilitates smallholder farmer participation in export and supermarket channels, which are growing rapidly in this developing country.