Knowledge spillovers, transboundary pollution, and growth

Trade in natural resources is construed as a dynamic game betweenNorth and South. Policies that promote growth in the North alsocause knowledge spillovers and transboundary pollution in theSouth. Cooperative and noncooperative Nash equilibria of thisstrategic trade game are simulated under various scenarios byparallel genetic algorithms to highlight the distortions inthe growth/pollution trade-off. Absent cooperation, both regionsbenefit when North simultaneously cuts waste and increases knowledgespillovers, impelling South to reciprocate by lower resourceprices.     

Trade,Growth, and Environmental Quality*

This paper examines linkages between international trade, environmental degradation, and economic growth in a dynamic North–South trade game. Using a neoclassical production function subject to an endogenously improving technology, North produces manufactured goods by employing labor, capital, and a natural resource that it imports from South. South extracts the resource using raw labor, in the process generating local pollution. We study optimal regional policies in the presence of local pollution and technology spillovers from North to South under both non‐cooperative and cooperative modes of trade. Non‐cooperative trade is inefficient due to stock externalities. Cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet do not benefit North. Both regions gain from improved productivity in North and faster knowledge diffusion to South regardless of the trading regime.