Welfare-State Retrenchment: The Partisan Effect Revisited

This paper aims to shed light on the role of the ‘ideology’of political parties in shaping the evolution of the welfarestate in 18 developed democracies, by providing empirical findingson the determinants of social-programme entitlements and socialspending over the period 1981–99. The paper shows thatstructural change is a major determinant of the extent of socialprotection. Our results suggest that overall spending is drivenup by structural change. On the other hand, strong structuralchange has a negative influence on welfare entitlements measuredby the net rate of sickness insurance. Partisan influence playsan important role in the dynamics of the welfare state. Left-winggovernments strengthen the positive effect of shocks on aggregatesocial expenditure, while right-wing governments undertake evenstronger cutbacks in replacement rates as a reaction to structuralchange. Footnotes ¹ E-mail addresses: bruno.amable{at}ens.fr; donatella.gatti{at}cepremap.cnrs.fr;jan.schumacher{at}wiwi.uni-regensburg.de     

New Scale and Scope for Industrial Policies in the 1990s

A central hypothesis of this paper is to consider that changes in the economic and political environment invite us to appraise the status that industrial policies can have in the making of contemporary macroeconomic policies. This perspective is first referred to the post-war debate on standard and radical Keynesianisms. The main trends in the fields of public interventions up to the 80s are recalled. It helps to stress the change of context in the 80s and 90s, especially regarding the forms of competition prevailing on product markets. All of which set opportunities to reshape industrial policies and all the more so given that macroeconomic policies are losing momentum. Despite their renewed legitimacy and efficiency, the question of the macroeconomic impact of these coordinated industrial policies remains open, still depending on the scale that central and local authorities are willing to give us to these new schemes.     

Who wants the Contrat de Travail Unique? Social Support for Labor Market Flexibilization in France

In France, a proposal was made to substitute a unique labor contract with a degree of employment protection increasing with tenure to the existing open‐end and fixed‐term contracts. Using survey data, this paper analyzes the social support for this contrat de travail unique (CTU). Contrary to the prediction of insider/outsider theories, support for the CTU comes from insider groups, whereas most outsider groups oppose it. This result may be the consequence of the job protection increasing with tenure. This mechanism could reinforce certain types of market segmentation instead of abolishing employment precariousness.     

Competition among techniques in the presence of increasing returns to scale

A model of technology diffusion and growth originally proposed by Batten (1987), taking into account the interaction of the supply of and demand for a new product, is modified so as to admit a production technology with increasing returns to scale and the possibility of a competition between two techniques. On the opposite to the case where the production technology of the new technique exhibits decreasing returns, the presence of increasing returns to scale prevent the splitting of the market between two new techniques, and the monopoly position of one technique must obtain. The winning technique may not be the most efficient in terms of its market expansion potential, the outcome of competition depends on initial conditions on production capacity and diffusion.The author wishes to thank Robert Boyer for his helpful advice and remains the sole responsible for all remaining errors and omissions.     

Catch-up and convergence: a model of cumulative growth

This article builds a model of cumulative growth in order to explain the patterns of convergence and divergence in levels of productivity for a large sample of developed and developing countries. Determinants of productivity growth are endogenized: investment equipment share in GDP, innovative activity and the level of schooling. The catch-up hypothesis states that lagging countries should enjoy a higher rate of productivity increase. In fact, this hypothesis must be qualified, countries that possess a ‘social capability’ can catch up to the technological leaders. The model presented here tries to take account of some important determinants of the social capability. The growth of productivity rests on a cumulative growth mechanism based on investment, innovation and education. The model is estimated for a sample of 59 countries over the period 1960–85. Contrary to most recent studies on the subject, a general pattern of divergence rather than convergence in productivity levels is found.     

Product market competition, job security, and aggregate employment

Standard economic wisdom generally stresses the benefits ofincreased competition on the product market. This paper proposesa model of monopolistic competition with an endogenous determinationof workers flows in and out of unemployment, where wages aredetermined according to an efficiency wage mechanism. We showthat an increase in product market competition boosts the hiringrate as well as the separation rate thus reducing job security.Hence, the efficiency wage schedule compatible with more competitionshifts upward. An adverse effect on workers' incentive is atwork which pushes real wages up to the point that increasedcompetition may indeed generate employment losses rather thangains.