Does the recent success of some OECD countries in lowering their unemployment rates lie in the clever design of their labor market reforms?

In recent years some OECD countries were successful in loweringthe unemployment rate substantially while other countries werenot. In this paper we investigate to what extent successfulcountries implemented a comprehensive set of institutional reforms.We present a theoretical framework to investigate the relationshipbetween unemployment and labor market institutions (LMI) suchas labor taxes, unemployment benefits, employment protection,union bargaining power and (de)centralization of bargaining.In our empirical analysis of data over the period 1960–99of 17 OECD countries we show that particular combinations ofLMI are responsible for low unemployment rates.     

Unemployment and Labor Market Institutions: An Empirical Analysis

The development of the unemployment rate differs substantially between OECD countries. In this paper we investigate to what extent these differences are related to labor market institutions. In our analysis we use data of eighteen OECD countries over the period 1960–1994 and show that the way in which institutions interact is important. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 2001, 15(4), pp. 403–418. Department of Economics, CentER, Tilburg University and Institute for Labour Studies (OSA), The Netherlands. © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E24, J68.     

Immigrant Selection in the OECD*

In this paper, we examine the determinants of educational selectivity in immigration using immigrant stock data for 70 source countries and 21 OECD destination countries, as observed in the year 2000/2001. We develop a variant of the Roy model to estimate the determinants of educational selectivity. Two key findings emerge. First, the effect of the skill premium, which is at the core of the Roy model, can be observed only after we take into account the poverty constraints operating in the source countries. Second, cultural similarities, colonial legacies, and physical distance are often more important determinants of educational selectivity than wage incentives or selective immigration policy.     

Does reducing student support affect scholastic performance? Evidence from a Dutch reform

This paper investigates the impact of student support on performance and time allocation of students in Dutch higher education. In 1996 the maximum duration of grants was reduced by 1 year, and thereby limited to the nominal duration of the study program. This reform could have had substantial financial consequences for students. We evaluate the effects of the reform using a difference-in-differences approach. Our main findings are that after the reform, students early in their study (i) switched less to other programs, (ii) obtained higher grades, while (iii) they did not spend more time studying or working. In addition, for students not older than 20 years when they started their study we find larger effects on all performance variables (switching, percentage of completed courses, graduation in the first year and grade point averages). These findings are consistent with recent evidence on heterogeneous treatment effects for higher ability students.     

A new perspective on the issue of selection bias in randomized controlled field experiments

Many randomized controlled trials require participants to opt in. Such self-selection could introduce a potential bias, because only the most optimistic may participate. We revisit this prediction. We argue that in many situations, the experimental intervention is competing with alternative interventions participants could conduct themselves outside the experiment. Since participants have a chance of being assigned to the control group, participating has a direct opportunity cost, which is likely to be higher for optimists. We propose a model of self-selection and show that both pessimists and optimists may opt out of the experiment, leading to an ambiguous selection bias.     

Are People Equally Other-Regarding When Selecting a Match Versus Choosing an Allocation?

There are many assignment processes in which agents are given the opportunity to unilaterally select a match. Resulting allocations can be inefficient if agents do not internalize the consequences of their choice on others. To test this formally, we study how other-regarding behaviors vary across two decision contexts: when subjects make a pure allocation decision; and when they select a partner. In both settings each subject's decision is final and it affects their payoff and that of other subjects in the same way. We find that subjects are more likely to sacrifice their own material well-being to increase that of others when dividing a pie than when selecting a partner in a large anonymous setting—even though the consequences on the material payoffs of others are identical. These findings suggest that in assignment processes with unilateral selection, efficiency can be improved by presenting the selection process as a choice between outcomes involving multiple individuals, instead of simply selecting a match for themselves.     

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer–seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the value of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary whether buyers can interrogate the seller and the contextual richness. The buyers’ prediction accuracy is above chance, and is substantial for confident buyers. There is no evidence that the option to interrogate is important and only weak support that contextual richness matters. These results show that the information asymmetry is partly eliminated by people’s ability to spot deception.     

Freedom of choice between unitary and two-tier boards: An empirical analysis

We examine board structure in France, which since 1966 has allowed firms the freedom to choose between unitary and two-tier boards. We analyze how this choice relates to characteristics of the firm and its environment. Firms with severe asymmetric information tend to opt for unitary boards; firms with a potential for private benefits extraction tend to adopt two-tier boards. Chief executive officer turnover is more sensitive to performance at firms with two-tier boards, indicating greater monitoring. Our results are broadly consistent with the Adams and Ferreira (2007) model and suggest that gains result from allowing freedom of contract about board structure.