Wirkungen einer EU–weiten Verlustverrechnung auf das Steueraufkommen

Seit einigen Jahren stellt der Europäische Gerichtshof vermehrt Regelungen der nationalen Steuersysteme in Hinblick darauf in Frage, ob sie mit dem EG-Recht konform gehen. Im aktuellen Fall Marks & Spencer entscheidet der Gerichtshof, ob Konzerne Verluste ausländischer Töchter mit inländischen Gewinnen verrechnen dürfen. Welche Wirkung hätte eine EU-weite Verlustverrechnung auf das deutsche Steueraufkommen?Prof. Dr. Clemens Fuest, 36, ist Direktor des Finanzwissenschaftlichen Forschungsinstituts an der Universität zu Köln und Mitglied des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen; Thomas Hemmelgarn, 30, Dipl.-Volkswirt, ist Mitarbeiter an demselben Institut; Fred Ramb, 39, Dipl.-Volkswirt, ist Mitarbeiter der Deutschen Bundesbank, Economic Research Centre, in Frankfurt. Dieser Artikel repräsentiert die persönliche Auffassung der Autoren und entspricht nicht notwendigerweise der Position der Deutschen Bundesbank oder ihrer Mitarbeiter.     

Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms

This paper discusses the role of multinational firms and double taxation treaties for corporate income taxation in open economies. We show that it is optimal for a small open economy to levy positive corporate income taxes if multinational firms are taxed according to the full taxation after deduction system or the foreign tax credit system. Positive corporate taxes also occur in the asymmetric case where some countries apply the exemption system and others apply the tax credit system. If all countries apply the exemption system, the optimal corporate income tax is zero. We also show that, under tax competition, corporate income taxes are not necessarily too low from the perspective of the economy as a whole. While the undertaxation result is confirmed for the case of the exemption system, tax rates may also be inefficiently high if the deduction or the credit systems are applied.     

Steuerpolitik und Wirtschaftswachstum

The design of the tax system matters for economic growth. During times of economic crisis, tax instruments such as temporary tax cuts can be used to soften adverse effects on the economy by stimulating private and corporate spending. However, empirical evidence suggests that the overall impact of short term tax policies is limited. In the long run, the structure of the tax system is essential to building up an investment friendly and innovation-stimulating environment, which will promote sustainable economic growth.     

THE MEANING OF FAILED REPLICATIONS: A REVIEW AND PROPOSAL

The welcome rise of replication tests in economics has not been accompanied by a consensus standard for determining what constitutes a replication. A discrepant replication, in current usage of the term, can signal anything from an unremarkable disagreement over methods to scientific incompetence or misconduct. This paper proposes a standard for classifying one study as a replication of some other study. It is a standard that places the burden of proof on a study to demonstrate that it should have obtained identical results to the original, a conservative standard that is already used implicitly by many researchers. It contrasts this standard with decades of unsuccessful attempts to harmonize terminology, and argues that many prominent results described as replication tests should not be described as such. Adopting a conservative standard like this one can improve incentives for researchers, encouraging more and better replication tests.     

With which countries do tax havens share information?

In recent years tax havens and offshore financial centres have come under increasing political pressure to cooperate with other countries in matters of taxation and efforts to crowd back tax evasion and avoidance. As a result many tax havens have signed tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs). In order to comply with OECD standards tax havens are obliged to sign at least 12 TIEAs with other countries. This paper investigates how tax havens have chosen their partner countries. We ask whether they have signed TIEAs with countries to which they have strong economic links or whether they have systematically avoided doing this, so that information exchange remains ineffective. We analyse 565 TIEAs signed by tax havens in the years 2008–2011 and find that on average tax havens have signed more TIEAs with countries to which they have stronger economic links. Our analysis thus suggests that tax havens do not systematically undermine tax information exchange by signing TIEAs with irrelevant countries. However, this does not mean that they exchange information with all important partner countries.     

Abschaffung der Abgeltungsteuer — gerechter und steuersystematisch einheitlicher?

There is a rising political discussion in Germany around abolishing the final withholding tax on capital income. The German tax reforms that introduced this tax lowered tax rates, in particular on interest income. According to some authors, the growing inequality of income and property is a strong argument for the higher taxation of capital income. However, other authors argue that the neutrality aspects concerning private investment are inadequate. An abolishment of the final withholding tax would not solve these problems and, moreover, would turn back the achieved improvements. Therefore, the German Council of Economic Experts suggests complementing the previous reforms by introducing an allowance for corporate equity.     

Cross‐Country Evidence on Labor Market Institutions and Young Adult Employment through the Financial Crisis

I develop and analyze a set of cross‐country facts regarding employment and wage setting institutions over the decade surrounding the 2008 financial crisis. Among long‐industrialized countries, young adult employment declined more than prime age employment over this time period. I show that differences in countries' wage setting institutions strongly predict variations in the magnitude of declines in young adult employment. Both unconditionally and conditional on changes in macroeconomic conditions, young adult employment declined 5 percentage points less in countries where wage setting is driven by collective bargaining arrangements than in countries with statutory wage floors. Evidence on the evolution of legislated minimum wage rates and of an asymmetry in the relationship between growth and young adult employment suggest an important role for a standard “wage rigidity” mechanism.     

Weitzman Revisited: Emission Standards Versus Taxes with Uncertain Abatement Costs and Market Power of Polluting Firms

Studies dealing with the optimal choice of pollution control instruments under uncertainty have invariably taken it for granted that regulated firms face perfectly competitive markets. By introducing the product market into the stochastic framework of Weitzman (Rev Econ Stud 41:477–491, 1974), this paper shows for the case of a polluting symmetric Cournot oligopoly that Weitzman’s policy rule for choosing emission standards versus taxes with uncertain abatement costs is biased in the presence of market power. Since the oligopolists take into account their influence on the market price, their total abatement effort, including the restriction of output, is less vulnerable to miscalculations of the tax rate compared to price-taking firms. Consequently, the comparative advantage of instruments is shifted in favour of taxes. In a further step, the provided policy recommendations are generalised by abolishing the assumption that firms are symmetric.