Corporate Disclosure of Environmental Liability Information: Theory and Evidence*

Abstract. The decision to disclose information concerning a firm's environmental liabilities is modeled as a sequential game involving the firm, a capital market, and outside stakeholders who can impose proprietary (political) costs on the firm. A partial disclosure equilibrium is derived in which firms reveal information strategically, maximizing the share-value net of expected political costs. Inherent uncertainty regarding the existence and size of the liabilities creates a setting where outsiders are uncertain if management is informed about these liabilities, so firms can plausibly withhold “bad news”, that is, they do not disclose liabilities that exceed a threshold level. Three novel hypotheses are that a firm is more likely to disclose as (1) its pollution propensity increases, (2) outsiders' knowledge of its environmental liabilities increases, and (3) the risk of incurring proprietary costs decreases. Empirical support is found for the hypotheses, based on the accounting disclosures made by sample firms selected from the records of the Ontario Ministry of the Environment and Energy. Improved accounting and auditing standards for environmental disclosure would build on at least three implications of the study:

• 1 To the extent that inherent uncertainty leaves managers with discretion as to what to disclose, the partial disclosure equilibrium result suggests that not all firms will comply with disclosure standards.
• 2 Publishing broad environmental performance indicators for companies in nonaccounting outlets would increase public awareness of a manager's private information endowment, making voluntary accounting disclosures of the liabilities more likely.
• 3 If a significant decline in stakeholder tolerance of pollution occurs, the expected proprietary costs of disclosing increase, and companies become less likely to disclose.

     

Investment Horizon and Composition of Optimal Portofolio: International Evidence

Little attention has been paid in the literature to the impact of different investment horizons on the portfolio compositiondespite its importance to portfolio managers. One exception isthe study by Gunthorpe and Levy (1994) on the U.S. stock market.Our paper extends the same study to the stock markets of Japan,Hong Kong and Korea. Using 40 individual stocks in each market,our results support those of Gunthorpe and Levy (1994) in thatthe composition of an optimal portfolio depends heavily on theinvestment horizon. When the investment horizon lengthens, theproportion of defensive stocks becomes larger while that ofaggressive stocks becomes smaller.     

Understanding the Impact of Health Reform on the States: Expansion of Coverage through Medicaid and Exchanges

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) expands Medicaid coverage and creates subsidized state health insurance exchanges. The implementation of the ACA will impact the states and consequently the state residents differently. We discuss the factors contributing to the variation in uninsured rates and the Medicaid population, and we predict that these underlying economic, demographic factors and state policies will continue to affect health insurance coverage. Using data from the March 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS), we examine health care coverage at the state level prior to the ACA and forecast the percentage of state residents eligible for expanded Medicaid and the exchanges. Our results suggest the percentage of state population eligible for expanded Medicaid and subsidized exchanges will vary considerably, especially for adults. Further, we show that current state Medicaid eligibility rules, the percentage of employers offering health insurance and poverty rates will continue to shape the variation in projected health insurance coverage across the states. Finally, we discuss the potential impact of the Supreme Court decision that allowed states to opt‐out of Medicaid expansion.     

The Walk‐down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives*

It has been alleged that firms and analysts engage in an "earnings‐guidance game" where analysts first issue optimistic earnings forecasts and then "walk down" their estimates to a level that firms can beat at the official earnings announcement. We examine whether the walk‐down to beatable targets is associated with managerial incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (through new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (through option exercises and stock sales). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the walk‐down to beatable targets is most pronounced when firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on the impact of capital‐market incentives on communications between managers and analysts.